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Irenaeus and the *imago Dei*

An Analysis of the Irenaean Schema of the *imago Dei* with Respect to his Opponents and Contemporary Christian Influences

By
Thomas N. Hannah

A Project Submitted to
the Faculty of Covenant Theological Seminary
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Theology

Saint Louis, Missouri

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Abstract

This thesis intends to explore Irenaeus' schema and use of the *imago Dei* throughout *Against Heresies* and *Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching*. Since Irenaeus is arguably the first post-apostolic Christian to develop the doctrine of the *imago Dei* he is cited and utilized across the board in academic discourse on the *imago Dei*. However, very few scholars have presented Irenaeus' schema and use of the *imago Dei* with appropriate nuance. The historical analysis of Irenaeus' views in the last 60 years have tended to misrepresent his thought in the following ways: 1) by not taking into consideration the polemical background of his development of the doctrine, 2) by overemphasizing or underemphasizing the division between *similitudo* and *imago* in Irenaeus' schema without consideration of all pertinent texts, or 3) by truncating his views in order to synthesize his usage in a concise manner.

This project will intend to avoid these pitfalls by making two key moves. First, §1-3 of this thesis will attempt to portray the development of Irenaeus' schema with respect to his setting (§1), his opponents' views (§2), and possible Christian writers contemporary to Irenaeus (§3) so that his doctrine may be appropriately situated within his historical context. Second, §4 of the thesis will analyze each relevant text in Irenaeus' works (§4.1-4.2) and synthesize the findings with respect to each pertinent text (§4.3).

In thesis §1-3, two observations will be made: first, Irenaeus appears to borrow little from his opponents and peers with respect to the *imago Dei*;[1] second, Irenaeus'

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[1] The primary component that Irenaeus borrows from his opponents is the occasional division between *imago* and *similitudo* with reference to the *imago Dei*. Additionally, the thesis observes that may have been borrowed from his opponents is a unique usage of εἰκών, however this observation is less certain than the first. As to the borrowed notions from Irenaeus' contemporaries and post-apostolic predecessors, only Justin Martyr appears to be an individual that Irenaeus may have borrowed from. From Justin Martyr,

emphasis upon form-substance physicality with respect to the *imago Dei* was likely developed in response to his opponents.[2] In thesis §4, I will propose that Irenaeus' schema of the *imago Dei* has two primary categories: the first category is *a priori* to his schema, for Irenaeus the Son is the ontological *imago Dei* who serves as the divine mediator after whom we were formed (as the prototype for mankind) and after whose image we are being reformed (as the archetype for mankind); the second category concerns Irenaeus' use of the *imago Dei* in his economy of salvation. This second category shows a diverse application of Irenaeus' schema of the *imago Dei* within a cohesive system of thought. In thesis §5, I will weave the sections of the thesis together in response to two key question groups that will be introduced in §1.1.

Irenaeus may have borrowed central components of his soteriological-anthropology as well a possible correlation between the physicality of the human person (σαρκικός/σάρξ —*carneum/ carnes*) and the *imago Dei* (this second notion is dependent on the authenticity of *Fragments on the Resurrection* [see thesis §3.2.2]).

[2] This emphasis on physicality may also stem from Irenaeus' reading of, and/or possible discourse with, Justin Martyr (see thesis §3.2.1)

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Abbreviations

AH	*Adversus Haereses*
1 *Apol*	*The First Apology of Justin*
2 *Apol*	*The Second Apology of Justin*
Autol	*Theophilus to Autolycus*
Dem	*Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching*
Dial	*Dialogue with Trypho*
Fug	*On Flight and Finding*
Her	*Who is the Heir of Divine Things*
Ig. Anti	*Ignatius to the Antiochians*
Ig. Mag	*Ignatius to the Magnesians*
Ig. Phil	*Ignatius to the Philippians*
Ig. Rom	*Ignatius to the Romans*
Ig. Smyr	*Ignatius to the Smyrnaeans*
1, 2, 3 Leg	*Allegorical Interpretation*
Opif	*On the Creation of the World*
Or. Graec	*Address of Tatian to the Greeks*
PGL	*Lampe's Patristic Greek Lexicon*
QG	*Questions and Answers in Genesis*
Spec	*On the Special Laws*
Virt	*On the Virtues*

1.   INTRODUCTION

1.1.   The Intended Aim of This Project

Gustaf Wingren's work, *Man and the Incarnation* (1959), sparked a resurgence in Irenaean studies that has been reflected in dissertations and published works alike over the last 60 years. These studies have frequently touched on Irenaeus' use of the *imago Dei*. However, very few authors have attempted to give a full treatment of the Irenaean schema of the *imago Dei*.[3] For most authors, Irenaeus' use of the *imago Dei* is a corollary topic that receives a short treatment.[4] These concise treatments on his position have tended to truncate Irenaeus' use of the *imago Dei*. In numerous sources this reduction of his view has failed to capture the nuance of the Irenaean schema.

The intended aim of this thesis is to present Irenaeus' view with expanded categories of thought (§4.3) in effort to counter the academic truncation of his view. It is my hope that this thesis will become an additional source in the stream of scholarly discourse on the Irenaean *imago Dei*.

There are two primary question groups that have arisen over the history of scholarship on the Irenaean *imago Dei*. Both will be explored throughout this thesis in support of the primary effort.

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[3] Jacques Fantino is the most important scholar in this regard. He is the most cited author in modern scholarship concerning the *imago Dei* in Irenaeus. Other authors, such as Antonio Osborn, Gustaf Wingren, Eric Osborn, Matthew Steenberg, and John Behr have presented sections in their works that include Irenaeus' schema of the *imago Dei* but have fallen short of Fantino's work with regard to this one topic.

[4] Some examples are as follows: Montgomery Hitchcock, Thomas Holsinger-Friesen, Jackson Lashier, John Lawson, Ian Mackenzie, Denis Minns, Stephen Presley, etc.

The first group of questions concerns the origins of Irenaeus' view of the *imago Dei*. How much of Irenaeus' view on the *imago Dei* was formed in response to his opponents? Did he borrow major concepts from the Ptolemaic-Valentinian perspective? Were there other 'orthodox' theologians who may have helped develop his view of the *imago Dei*?[5] Irenaeus was certainly not the first theologian to develop and use the doctrine of the *imago Dei,* but is his schema unique with regard to other contemporary authors?[6] These questions will be primarily addressed throughout chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis.

The second group of questions concerns the Irenaean schema of the *imago Dei* itself. What, or who, is the *imago Dei*? Is Irenaeus consistent in his schema of the *imago Dei*? Does Irenaeus use the terms *imago* and *similitudo* consistently with respect the *imago Dei*? To what extent does Irenaeus divide *imago Dei* from *similitudo Dei*? When Irenaeus separates *imago* and *similitudo*, what are the associated categories with which he uses the terms? What is the role of the Son of God (both pre-incarnate and incarnate) in the *imago Dei*? What is the role of the Holy Spirit with respect to the Irenaean schema of

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[5] By 'orthodox' I am excluding those whose views deviated from the apostolic boundaries.

[6] There is a long history of development that predates Irenaeus' use. The notion is observed in Genesis 1:26-27, 5:1-3, and 9:6. There are numerous other ANE applications of the concept of the image of God (see Middleton, *The Liberating Image*, 27 n. 37). In the intertestamental period, the use of the *imago Dei* is observed in Wisdom of Solomon 1:13-14; 2:23, Sirach 17:1-4, and 2 Esdras 8:44. In the NT the *imago Dei* is further utilized and developed in Rom. 8:29; 1 Cor. 11:7, 15:49; 2 Cor. 3:18, 4:4; Col. 1:15, 3:18; Js. 3:9 (cf. Eph. 4:24, Phil. 2:7). Philo of Alexandria then develops a schema of the *imago Dei* that he utilizes in portraying his metaphysics, apologetics, and anthropology (see appendix A). Additionally, many of the opponents noted in Irenaeus' works apparently developed a schema of the *imago Dei* to describe their soteriological metaphysics, anthropology, and multi-tiered cosmogeny. These opponents were not Christian, but they were theologians. Irenaeus does however appear to be the first Christian of the post-apostolic age to develop a schema of the *imago Dei* and apply the concept liberally throughout his economy of salvation (see thesis §3).

the *imago Dei*? These questions will be primarily assessed throughout chapter 4 of this thesis (esp. §4.3).

Before these questions may be addressed some treatment must be given to introduce Irenaeus to the reader. Each of the subsections in chapter 1 will benefit the presentation of the Irenaean schema of the *imago Dei*. His life and setting (§1.2) situate Irenaeus amidst his opponents and conversation partners. His use of rhetoric and philosophy (§1.3) are vital for understanding his response to hyper-dualist 'gnostic' systems of thought. Irenaeus' use of the biblical text in alignment with the apostolic tradition (§1.4) is foundational for understanding his response to the opponents as well as his presentation of the economy of salvation. The primer to Irenaeus' opponents (§1.5) is necessary to help orient a new reader to the Ptolemaic-Valentinian worldview—an immensely complicated and foreign system of thought. The introduction to Irenaeus' works (§1.6) will help the new reader of Irenaeus to understand what the primary sources are and how they function. Lastly, the introduction to the role of typology (§1.7) will help orient the reader to the role of recapitulation in Irenaeus' work—both recapitulation and typology will be considered in the assessment of his view of the *imago Dei*.

1.2. *Sitz im Leben*

There is unfortunately little to say concerning Irenaeus' life and background. The primary sources for biographic information are his own works (many of which are lost)

and Eusebius' account.[7] He was born ca. 115-130, possibly in Smyrna or some area nearby (though certainly in Asia Minor).[8] He likely died ca. 200, it is possible that he died as a martyr during the persecution of Septimius Severus, however the attestation to this is quite late (401 ad).[9] During his early youth he met the bishop Polycarp in Smyrna.[10] It is possible that Irenaeus was a disciple of Polycarp.[11] Given that Irenaeus speaks with some frequency of Polycarp, there may be some weight to this notion.[12] Either way, Polycarp was a key figure in Irenaeus' formation and comprehension of the

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[7] Antonio Orbe, "Irenaeus of Lyons," in *Encyclopedia of Ancient Christianity*, ed. Angelo Di Berardino, trans. Eric E. Hewett, Joseph T. Papa, and Erik A. Koenke (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2014), 2:350.

[8] Mary T. Clark, "Irenaeus," in *Encyclopedia of Early Christianity*, Everett Ferguson, ed.,(New York, NY: Garland Publishing inc. 1997), 1:587. Cf. William Smith and Henry Wace, eds., *A Dictionary of Christian Biography: Literature, Sects, and Doctrines*, (New York, NY: AMS Press, 1984), 3:253.

[9] The attestation may be found in Jerome's commentary on Isaiah. See Eric Osborn, *Irenaeus of Lyons* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 2.

[10] Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, 3.3.4. "But Polycarp also was not only instructed by apostles, and conversed with many who had seen Christ, but was also, by apostles in Asia, appointed bishop of the Church in Smyrna, whom I also saw in my early youth, for he tarried [on earth] a very long time, and, when a very old man, gloriously and most nobly suffering martyrdom, departed this life, having always taught the things which he had learned from the apostles, and which the Church has handed down, and which alone are true."

[11] Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe, eds., "Introductory Note to Irenaeus against Heresies," in *The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus*, vol. 1, The Ante-Nicene Fathers (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Company, 1885), 32.

[12] Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, 3.3.4. and. 5.33.4. Also, worth noting is the much later text from Eusebius which shows a record of one letter that Irenaeus wrote to the church of Rome. This particular letter was written to Florinus and Irenaeus supposedly wrote this, "For when I was a boy, I saw thee in lower Asia with Polycarp, moving in splendor in the royal court and endeavoring to gain his approbation…I am able to describe the very place in which the blessed Polycarp sat as he discoursed, and his goings out and his comings in, and the manner of his life, and his physical appearance, and his discourses to the people, and the accounts which he gave of his intercourse with John and with the others who had seen the Lord. And as he remembered their words, and what he heard from them concerning the Lord, and concerning his miracles and his teaching, having received them from eyewitnesses of the 'Word of life,' Polycarp related all things in harmony with the Scriptures. These things being told to me by the mercy of God, I listened to them attentively, noting them down, not on paper, but in my heart. And continually, through God's grace, I recall them faithfully…" Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica,* 5.20.5-7. In addition to this it is likely that Pothinus of Lyons was probably a disciple of Polycarp. Irenaeus would have worked directly with him during his time as a presbyter at Lyons.

apostolic theology.[13] Irenaeus moved to Lyons (Lugdunum) in Gaul and there became a

presbyter during the reign of Marcus Aurelius.[14] During his time there, he was asked to

deliver a letter to the Bishop of Rome named Elutherus. The authors of this letter speak

highly of Irenaeus, while also communicating that persecution was beginning to arise

under Antoninus.[15] While Irenaeus was in Rome (or in a state of travel), a violent

persecution arose in ca. 177—during this time Pothinus (the bishop of Lyons) was

martyred and a new Bishop was needed to fill the position.[16] When Irenaeus returned, he

became Pothinus' successor as the Bishop of Lyons. [17]

1.3.   Irenaeus: Rhetoric and Philosophy

A careful reading of *Adversus Haereses* shows that Irenaeus was aware of

contemporary rhetoric and philosophical trends. Throughout *AH*, Irenaeus pragmatically

applies various philosophical concepts in his treatment of his opponents and presentation

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[13] *Encyclopedia of Ancient Christianity*, 2:350.

[14] "We pray, father Eleutherus, that you may rejoice in God in all things and always. We have requested our brother and comrade Irenaeus to carry this letter to you, and we ask you to hold him in esteem, as zealous for the covenant of Christ. For if we thought that office could confer righteousness upon anyone, we should commend him among the first as a presbyter of the Church, which is his position." Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, 5.4.2. Cf. H. Dressler, "Irenaeus, St.," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, ed. Berard L. Marthaler, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Gale, 2003), 7:570.

[15] Ibid., 5.4.1-3.

[16] F. L. Cross, and E. A. Livingstone, eds., *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian* Church, 3rd edition (Great Clarendon Street: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 852. Cf. *Encyclopedia of Ancient Christianity*, 2:350.

[17] Eusebius*, Historia Ecclesiastica,* 5.4.1. Cf. Parvis, 13.

of his own thought.[18] Additionally, rhetorical similarities between his writings those of

the second Sophists are striking.[19] It is possible that he received a Greek education in, or

near, Smyrna (which was a "major center of sophist culture and teaching").[20] From what

is available to us in his writings, it seems likely that his education would have focused on

the fundamentals of the Hellenistic education.[21]

Though hints of Irenaeus' philosophical awareness surface in *AH*, his works are

not fundamentally philosophical. Throughout *AH*, Irenaeus emphasizes his theological

frameworks encased in sophist Hellenistic rhetoric because his intent is theological

correction.[22] Irenaeus' interaction with philosophy primarily appears as a means to make

God, and the principles of his kingdom, known—this pragmatic approach to philosophy

and rhetoric fit Slusser's thesis on Irenaeus' heart for ministry.[23]

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[18] Parvis, 17.

[19] Secord, 27.

[20] Ibid., 25. Secord uses a helpful resource that explores the education under the second sophists at the time to point out that the education available in Smyrna would be similar to that offered in Athens, Pergamum, Rome, and Ephesus (the claim denotes categorical overlap without overclaiming qualitative similarity). See Ewen Bowie, "The Geography of the Second Sophistic: Cultural Variations," in *Paideia: The World of the Second Sophistic*, ed. Barbara E. Borg (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004).

[21] William R. Schoedel, "Philosophy and Rhetoric in the *Adversus haereses* of Irenaeus," in *Vigiliae Christianae*, 13 no. 1 (Apr 1959), 31.

[22] Though it is widely thought that Irenaeus is skilled in rhetoric to some degree, he depreciates his own ability and skill in rhetoric saying, "Thou wilt not expect from me, who am resident among the Keltæ, and am accustomed for the most part to use a barbarous dialect, any display of rhetoric, which I have never learned, or any excellence of composition, which I have never practiced, or any beauty and persuasiveness of style, to which I make no pretensions" (*Against Heresies* 1.pref.3). This seems contrary to the proposition made earlier about the possibility of his education, but the quality and form of his works speaks louder than his humility at this point.

[23] See the following article to see Irenaeus' heart for pastoral ministry within his doctrinal stances and methodology for refuting heresy. Michael Slusser, "The Heart of Irenaeus' Theology," in *Irenaeus: Life, Scripture, Legacy*, ed. Sara Parvis and Paul Foster (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2012), 133-139.

Irenaeus was not above of the influence of the philosophy of his era. In Irenaeus'

rejection of Middle Platonist perspectives in his opponents, he articulates a non-Platonic

division between man and the creator. While the Middle Platonists generally viewed God

as a "transcendent and distant being unable to interact with material creation," Irenaeus

brings God into a near engagement with the *plasma* of man through the works of Christ.[24]

He does this while also rejecting the "spatial notion of divinity" (which we will observe

clearly in Irenaeus' opponents).[25] He instead promotes a "non-spatial notion of divinity

sustained by the concept of 'spirit.'"[26] In the Irenaean schema, God is ontologically

spiritual in his essence, but he is not far from his own creation. In these efforts Irenaeus

opposes speculative dualism and overapplication of Platonic thought, while still

maintaining the creature-creator distinction.[27]

Irenaeus' pragmatic approach to philosophy possibly arose from his

understanding of divine revelation (as wholly distinct from human reason).[28] It is clear

from *AH* that Irenaeus had a rich comprehension of the eclectic 'gnostic' Middle

Platonism and other philosophies which were foundational to his opponents thought. But

his works also reveal an awareness of the works of Plato and Xenophanes,[29]

Aristophanes, Homer, Anaxagoras, Anaximander, Empedocles, Aristotle, Hippolytus

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[24] Jackson Lashier, *Irenaeus on the Trinity* (Boston, MA: Brill, 2014), 54.

[25] Ibid., 55.

[26] Ibid.

[27] John Lawson, *The Biblical Theology of Saint Irenaeus* (London: The Epworth Press, 1948), 70-71.

[28] *Encyclopedia of Early Christianity*, 1:588. Cf. *AH* 2.13.3.

[29] Irenaeus use of Xenophanes is especially observable in his Christianized use of the "cosmic mind."

(though, possibly also Pseudo-Plutarch, Plutarch, and Diogenes).[30] He uses most of these authors to point out the errors of the Valentinian theology. In this regard, Irenaeus' concern with his opponents is that they have grossly and uncritically absorbed the pagan philosophies resulting in the rejection of the apostolic teaching of the gospel message.[31]

Irenaeus' pragmatic approach to philosophy has resulted in two different trends in scholarship. On one hand, some scholars have critically assumed a diminished knowledge of philosophy in his works. On the other hand, some scholars have scoured his works for evidence for major contemporary philosophical themes (at times superimposing unnecessary frameworks on *Against Heresies*).[32] Fundamentally, Irenaeus is not a

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[30] Schoedel, 22-32. Cf. Robert M. Grant, "Irenaeus and Hellenistic Culture." *HTR 42.1.* (1949): 41-52. Irenaeus' use of philosophers is somewhat debated since he almost never uses direct citations. Instead, many have made it a project to scour his works for allusions to other contemporary philosophers (or philosophers who were readily available to him at this point). I have included Plato because of some similarities between *Adversus Haereses* and *Timaeus* noted in Robert Grant's work (also see Dennis Minns, *Irenaeus: An Introduction* [Great Britain: T&T Clark International, 2010], 109). But I have also chosen to add Xenophanes (esp. *On* Nature) because of similarities observable in *AH* 1.12.2; 2.13.3; 2.28.4-5. This consideration stems from Robert M. Grant's work but is furthered in the following resource: Winrich Löhr, "Christian Gnostics and Greek Philosophy in the Second Century," in *Early Christianity*, No.3 (2012), 361.

[31] Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, 2.14.1-9. Cf. Löhr, 350. Also see Hippolytus who connects Valentinianism to *Timaeus* and Egyptian wisdom. He says this, "The heresy of Valentinus is certainly, then, connected with the Pythagorean and Platonic theory. For Plato, in the *Timæus*, altogether derives his impressions from Pythagoras, and therefore Timæus himself is his Pythagorean stranger. Wherefore, it appears expedient that we should commence by reminding (the reader) of a few points of the Pythagorean and Platonic theory, and that (then we should proceed) to declare the opinions of Valentinus. For even although in the books previously finished by us with so much pains, are contained the opinions advanced by both Pythagoras and Plato, yet at all events I shall not be acting unreasonably, in now also calling to the recollection of the reader, by means of an epitome, the principal heads of the favorite tenets of these (speculators). And this (recapitulation) will facilitate our knowledge of the doctrines of Valentinus, by means of a nearer comparison, and by similarity of composition (of the two systems). For (Pythagoras and Plato) derived these tenets originally from the Egyptians and introduced their novel opinions among the Greeks. But (Valentinus took his opinions) from these, because, although he has suppressed the truth regarding his obligations to (the Greek philosophers), and in this way has endeavored to construct a doctrine, (as it were,) peculiarly his own, yet, in point of fact, he has altered the doctrines of those (thinkers) in names only, and numbers, and has adopted a peculiar terminology (of his own). Valentinus has formed his definitions by measures, in order that he may establish an Hellenic heresy, diversified no doubt, but unstable, and not connected with Christ" (Hippolytus, *Haer* 16).

[32] On this, it must be noted that our knowledge of 2nd century philosophical schools is fragmentary, so any philosopher, work, or philosophy applied to Irenaeus must be done so with an epistemological humility. With each of the philosophers noted above, only some are directly cited. We should not attribute a full knowledge of each work cited (or alluded to) within Irenaeus, nor should we assume only a partial

philosopher, but the study of his appropriation of contemporary philosophy and rhetoric can at times be fruitful for understanding the methodology and nuanced aim of his works and sections therein.[33]

These considerations on Irenaeus' awareness of philosophy pertains to this thesis in two ways. First, it is in response to the Middle Platonist forms of dualism that Irenaeus develops his soteriological-anthropology (wherein the perfect man consists of body, the breath of God, and the Spirit).[34] Second, Irenaeus' division between image and likeness in the *imago Dei* either stems either from his awareness of the philosophical use of εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις, from his opponents, or from both in effort to communicate his soteriological-anthropology and his economy of salvation.[35]

1.4.   Irenaeus and Biblical Theology

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knowledge, rather we ought to attend to the usage of Irenaeus' citation (or allusion) with the hope of understanding the aim of his intended use. Our study on Irenaeus' understanding of philosophy at the time must apply a framework which allows for 'degrees of plausibility,' there is little assurance to be had in the exploration of how little (or how much) philosophy Irenaeus engaged with during his lifetime.

[33] A great example of this is found in Anthony Briggman's work wherein he studies Irenaeus' application of philosophical thought to his polemic argument in *Against Heresies* 3.24.2. and 3.25.5. Anthony Briggman, "Revisiting Irenaeus' Philosophical Acumen," in *Vigiliae Christianae*, no. 65 (January 2011): 115-124. Also see the following resource. William R. Schoedel, "Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Adversus Haereses of Irenaeus," *Vigiliae Christianae* 13 (1959): 22-32. For a more subdued approach to philosophy in Irenaeus also see the following: H. B. Timothy, *The Early Christian Apologists and Greek Philosophy: Exemplified by Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Clement of Alexandria* (Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1972), 23-29.

[34] It should be noted that, while Irenaeus has a theological anthropology, his anthropology is usually so conflated with his soteriology that he primarily presents a "salvific anthropology." Purves, J. G. M. "The Spirit and the Imago Dei: Reviewing the Anthropology of Irenaeus of Lyons." *Evangelical Quarterly* 68 (1996): 105. For this reason, I will usually refer to Irenaeus' soteriological-anthropology.

[35] Given Fantino's work on the development of the terms (εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις) in the beginning of his work, it seems that the third category is most likely. See Jacques Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu: chez saint Irénée de Lyon* (Cerf, 1986), 5-44.

At times Irenaeus has been called a biblical theologian—while this is true in one sense, it would be more precise to label him as a biblically rooted apostolic theologian. At the time of his writing the biblical canon was not closed, but it seems to have been loosely recognized. Irenaeus views the OT as pointing to Christ while the NT holds the trustworthy account and teachings of the apostles.[36] This may be observed as foundational for Irenaeus by his frequent references to the scriptures themselves in *AH*, *Dem*, and in many of the remaining fragments of his other works. However, he does not attribute the biblical teachings to be the basis of his position rather he understands the authority of his interpretation to stem from the Apostles themselves.[37]

Irenaeus' canon at the time looks very similarly to ours. Because of his use of the LXX it is possible that he accepted the apocrypha as inspired—but that may be an unnecessary speculation.[38] His citations and allusions to NT texts cover numerous works including: the four Gospels; Acts; the epistles of Paul; 1 Peter; 1 John; and Revelation.[39] He is not working from a set list, but rather, likely he uses works that are acknowledged

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[36] Parvis, 20.

[37] For more, see Behr's research on the matter. Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology*, 28-33.

[38] I say this for two primary reasons. First, too little is known about what variants were available concerning the LXX at this time to say with certainty that Irenaeus believed the apocrypha was canonical for this reason. This said, even cases where the LXX includes the Apocrypha (i.e., Vaticainus and Alexandrinus) it is uncertain whether these books were held to the same esteem as other books accepted by the MS tradition (as in the case with Eusebius or Jerome). Second, Irenaeus' use of the apocryphal books (Wisdom 9:13,17; Hist. of Susanna 56 [?]; Ecclesiasticus 4:31 [?]) never give the reader any hint of his view of their authority. They do not seem to be used with the same sense of gravity that he uses with the other biblical passages. I write these things to push back against the assertion that Irenaeus' use of these texts and the LXX assures us that he accepted the apocrypha as equally vital to, say, the Pentateuch, Isaiah, the Gospels, or Pauline epistles (all of which are fundamental to his argument and receive numerous quotations and allusions). If a compelling argument surfaces that shows Irenaeus' submission to apocryphal teachings, then more work would need to be done in addition to this thesis to determine whether or not Irenaeus utilizes Sirach 17:1-4, 2 Esdras 8:44, and Wisdom 1:13-14, 2:23 (apocryphal texts pertaining to the *imago Dei*).

[39] Parvis, 20.

by many to be authoritative (possibly likened to an early notion of successive apostolic *sensus plenior*).[40]

The benefit of Irenaeus' awareness of the canon noted above is his access to the various biblical texts pertaining to the *imago Dei*. Gen. 1:26-27; Rom. 8:29; 1 Cor. 11:7, 15:49; 2 Cor. 4:4, 3:18; and Col. 1:15, 3:10 were all available texts for Irenaeus. His use of passages from each of these books and letters confirms this. Additionally, it is possible that he had access to, and utilized James, giving him access to the NT ethical use of the *imago Dei* (Js. 3:9). The only text that Irenaeus may have had no access to is Heb. 2:6-10, but this is mere speculation.

1.5. Irenaeus and his Opponents: A Primer

Irenaeus acted as a bridge between the east and the west in a number of regards.[41] One of which was his constant position of the unified position of the apostolic teaching, which may be seen in positive affirmations of unified doctrine, as well as his labors in addressing heresies which arose out of both areas. The heresies associated with 'gnostic' thought were a particular danger to the Church. Irenaeus viewed 'Gnosticism' as a heresy with numerous flexible principles with a unified origin in one teacher: Simon Magus (*AH*

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[40] Irenaeus emphasizes that his interpretation is passed down from apostolic succession—this may be why he roots his teachings to Polycarp. But he also takes time to work out why there might be four gospels and why there are no more or less (*Against Heresies,* 3.11.8). Eusebius seems to think of Irenaeus as a trustworthy source for observing what biblical texts are used as well (*Historia Ecclesiastica* 5.8.2-15). Cf. Parvis, 19-21.

[41] Roberts, Donaldson, and Coxe, 1:310. Cf. Cross and Livingstone*,* 852.

1.22. Cf. Acts 8:9-24).[42] The notion that Simon Magus was the teacher who brough about 'gnostic' principles may have been adopted from Justin Martyr's *Treatise Against All Heresies,* but it is uncertain for this document is now lost.[43]

While it is true that Valentinus, Basilides, and many other Valentinian teachers were not labeled explicitly as 'Gnostics,' Irenaeus is clear that these teachers use 'gnostic' principles in their teachings.[44] These principles were adopted and used by Valentinus, as well as various students of the Valentinian school of thought.[45] Irenaeus presents numerous heretical systems of though in book I and II of *Adversus haereses*. A full list of the teachers and sects that Irenaeus addresses is as follows: Valentinus, Basilides, Marcion, Carpocrates, Bardesanes, Saturninus, Marcus, Tatian,[46] Cerinthus,

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[42] The notion that 'Gnosticism' had a set homogenized system of thought is now seen as false. However, at the time of Irenaeus' writings, 'Gnosticism' had particular "principles" which Valentinus used to form his own theological notions.

[43] Dennis Minns, *Irenaeus* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1994), 22.

[44] It should be noted that by saying "set principles" I propose—alongside many others—that the flavor of 'Gnosticism' at the time of Irenaeus had enough of a consistent structure for Irenaeus to say that the Valentinians used 'gnostic' principles without being 'Gnostics'. Cf. *AH* 1.11.1. "…The first of them, Valentinus, who adapted the principles of the heresy called 'Gnostic' to the peculiar character of his own school…" Osborn writes a helpful appendix on the subject. He points out that there are six general characteristics which the 'Gnostics' adhere to. They are as follows. 1) There is a "cosmic dualism" which considers the material essence to be morally evil and the spiritual essence to be morally good. 2) There is a "most-high, unknown God" who is separate and distinct from the "God who created this world." The God who created the world is revealed to us in the OT, but through secret teachings, the higher God may be made known. 3) Not all humans contain the potential for salvation. Only those who bear the "divine spark" have the potential for salvation. 4) "The human condition and desire for freedom are explained by a myth of a pre-cosmic fall." 5) Gnosis is the key to salvation for those to whom salvation is offered—only secret knowledge of the internal essence which is associated with the divine spark offers salvation (though many who have the divine spark to a greater degree within their essence require no knowledge of the divine spark for salvation). 6) Only some have the spiritual spark within their essence that allows for salvation. For the exact list that I have used to write this section see the following resource. Osborn, *Irenaeus of Lyons,* 256.

[45] Ferguson, 308.

[46] While Tatian's use of the *imago Dei* is not presented in *Adversus Haereses*, he does indeed make use of the *imago Dei* in *Or. Graec.* 7, 12, and 15. According to Irenaeus, he was orthodox while Justin Martyr lived, but after Justin's death he became a teacher who proposed concepts that Irenaeus deemed dangerous to the Church (*AH* 1.28.1). It may be that Tatian, for a time, was an influence on Irenaeus, but this is difficult to discern, and I have seen very few sources that unpack a likeness of Tatian's thought in Irenaeus

Cerdo, as well as the Simionians, Archontics, Encratites, Nicolatians, Naasenes, Sethians, Caninites, Ophites, and Ebionites. It should be mentioned that not all of these sects are associated with 'Gnosticism'. Rightly so, for many of the sects should not be generally classified as 'Gnostic'.[47] However, as I have mentioned above, Irenaeus clearly states that Valentinianism is associated with 'gnostic' principles. For this reason, I will continue to use the terms 'gnostic' and 'Gnosticism' throughout this paper in the way that Irenaeus uses them.[48] With this said, 'Gnosticism' is a generally "inadequate classification," for it assumes continuity between 'gnostic' sets.[49]

Because Ptolemaic-Valentinianism is the primary heretical group that Irenaeus treats, I must necessarily introduce a primer to the Valentinian system of thought here. Some central tenets are as follows: the material world came about from sin; there are thirty spiritual deities (*Aeons*) who comprise the fullness of the divine (*pleroma*); there are three classes of men (*hylic*, *psychics*, and *pneumatics*); there are three fundamental

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(or, for that matter, Irenaeus' thought in Tatian). On the whole, Tatian's use of the *imago Dei* is minimal in comparison to Irenaeus, but Tatian's association between the *imago Dei* and the requirement of a person's union with the Holy Spirit may be worth exploring in another thesis. As to his connection with Irenaeus pertaining to the *imago Dei*, see section 3.1. of this thesis.

[47] Ibid. cf. isolated examples of Valentinianism and Marcionism in Irenaeus, *AH* 1.11.1-5 & 1.27-28. Additionally, see the relevant section on Corporates and his followers as well as the Barbelotes or Barborians, who are presented as a self-styled 'Gnostics' (*AH* 1.25.6, 1 29.1-4). Also, on the consideration that the Marcionites and Ebionites are two other categories arise as particularly important authors, see the following resource. James G. Bushur, "Joining the End to the Beginning: Divine Providence and the Interpretation of Scripture in the teaching of Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons" (PhD diss., University of Durham, 2009), 2, http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/319/

[48] I align with John Behr on the continued use of the terms. Many scholars are right in pointing out the abuse of the terms throughout the history of the church. While I agree that Valentinus is not strictly 'Gnostic', and that the Marcionites and Ebionites may not be 'gnostic' either (though they also adhere to some 'gnostic' principles) it is clear that he uses 'Gnosticism' (as Irenaeus points out). So, it would be a false inclination to not use Irenaeus' terms throughout the paper in association with Valentinian thought.

[49] Bushur, 2. For more on the 'Gnostic' category, see the following seminal study which has changed the field drastically. M. A. Williams, *Rethinking 'Gnosticism'—An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

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substances within the cosmos, 1) passion, which is the material cosmos, 2) the ensouled substance, and 3) the spiritual substance; the *pneumatics* have access to the divine spark available through *gnosis*; lastly, this *gnosis* was handed down by secret oral tradition (*viva voce*) through the apostles.[50] These points will be unpacked below when I discuss the Valentinian cosmogeny, eschatology, anthropology, and their view of the *imago Dei*.

Valentinian 'Gnosticism, being superficially 'Christian' in flavor, posed a more immediate threat to the patristic fathers than some of the other forms of 'Gnosticism' (which were deemed as equivalent to other pagan philosophies). Indeed, in its early stages it must have been so alike Christianity that Valentinus was expected to become the bishop of Rome.[51] The damage wrought was significant. The cosmogony associated with Valentinianism "reversed the logic of Genesis by making creation consequent upon fall."[52] The material world was a broken shadow of the *Pleroma* which inhibited genuine association with the spiritual matter of the divine *Aeons*. Redemption was not available for the material world, for in their minds, the material world and the *hylic* animating substance was incapable of imaging the invisible spiritual matter (and even the fluid matter [οὐσία]).[53] Redemption was only available for the soul and the fluid invisible

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[50] For an expanded list introducing the topic, review the following resource. George A. Maloney, *Man, The Divine Icon: The Patristic Doctrine of Man Made According to the Image of God* (Pecos, NM: Dove Publications, 1973), 32-34.

[51] Tertullian, *Adversus Valentinianos*, 4. Though it is also possible that Valentinus was more orthodox at this time—it is also possible that he was entirely orthodox, and the rejection of the Bishopric (c. A.D. 140-156) may have spurred him to reject the apostolic notions of orthodoxy at the time. The date is proposed by Hitchcock, 322.

[52] Michael Reeves, "The Glory of God: The Christological Anthropology of Irenaeus of Lyons and Karl Barth" (PhD Thesis, King's College, 2004), 10, https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/

[53] Olson notes that 1 Cor. 15:50 ("Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God") occurs "more often than any other verse from the Pauline corpus." As we will see below, the Valentinians and Irenaeus have a strong disagreement over the nature of the material world. I will thoroughly discuss the distinctions between these authors perspectives concerning the material world from the exploration of the grammar of

substance in which the soul was contained. This was attained through the secret knowledge (γνῶσις) which could "distinguish the deep self from the psyche."[54]

      Within Valentinianism, it seems that there are various sects which arose under particular teachers. Some of these sects follow Theodotus, Ptolemaeus, Heracleon, or Marcus. The teachings of these authors appear faithfully presented, which is surprising, considering the polemic aim of Irenaeus' work—his academic honesty in this endeavor is honorable to say the least.[55] In order for Irenaeus to maintain the orthodox teachings and to maintain the unity of the Church, he deemed it necessary to challenge the corruption being caused by these teachings. The background of the Valentinian 'Gnostics' will be explored more below with the aim of unpacking how Irenaeus uses the *imago Dei* as a conduit for apostolic teaching within his economy of salvation.

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imaging, anthropology, and cosmogeny. For an assessment of the Valentinian use of 1 Cor. 15:50 and how it differs from Irenaeus see the following resource. Mark Jeffrey Olson, *Irenaeus, The Valentinian Gnostics and the Kingdom of God (A. H. Book V): The Debate about 1 Corinthians 15:50* (Lewiston, NY: Mellen Biblical Press, 1992).

[54] Ibid.

[55] Several sources have compared the findings of Valentinian 'Gnosticism' in the Nag Hammadi cache only to observe that Irenaeus was accurate—though admittedly pejorative—in his portrayal of the Valentinian belief system. While his aim was to destroy the notions that underpinned the belief system (rather than to sympathize with it) he managed to understand it enough to present it faithfully and to effectively refute the central tenets. For more on this see Parvis, 16. Cf. Ferguson, 301. Esp. see Marry Anne Donovan, "Alive to the Glory of God" *Theological* Studies 49 (1988): 284. With this said, there are also some, especially those who are proponents of a revitalization of Valentinian theology, who believe that *Adversus Haereses* should no longer be used as a resource on Valentinianism. It may be true that Irenaeus' does not present the three substances with the utmost clarity, but this is a very early representation of a very early theological perspective: it is unlikely that Valentinianism had worked out all the kinks of their anthropology and soteriological-metaphysics by the time of Irenaeus' writing. But proponents of the Valentinian system may have their say. I would recommend the reader consider the following work. Christoph Markschies and Einar Thomassen eds., *Valentinianism: New Studies* (Boston, MA: Brill, 2020).

1.6.   Irenaeus' Writings

Only two of Irenaeus' numerous works have reached us in near totality, though there are several other fragmentary writings.[56] The first is *Adversus Haereses* (Ἔλεγχος καὶ ἀνατροπὴ τῆς ψεθδωνύμου γνώσεως). This is the primary text wherein Irenaeus develops his understanding of the *imago Dei* in contradistinction to his opponents.[57] Since this text was well regarded in the patristic period (esp. the first two volumes) it also may be a text that was used by other patristic authors concerning the *imago Dei*.[58]

The manuscript of *Adversus Haereses* is available to us primarily in a Latin translation from the Greek which is occasionally so barbarous that a reverse hypothetical translation to Greek is required to understand what Irenaeus may have intended to mean.[59] This Latin translation was likely completed before 421 AD (since it is cited by Augustine).[60] There are fragments of what may be the original Greek in Hippolytus of Rome, Eusebius, Theodoret of Cyr, and Epiphanius.[61] Also, there are currently 23 Syriac

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[56] *Encyclopedia of Ancient Christianity*, 2:350. The other known writings are as follows: *A letter Against Blastus, on Schism; A Letter Against Florinus, On the Monarchy*; *On the Ogdoad*; a letter to Victor of Rome; *On Knowledge Against the Pagans;* and a book of various discourses. There are also 9 fragments with questionable authenticity. See Parvais and Foster, xi-xiii.

[57] There are several concise references to the *imago Dei* in *Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching* that will be discussed below.

[58] Irenaeus and his works are referenced by numerous authors including the anti-nicene fathers: Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Lactantius. Numerous Nicene and post Nicene fathers also refer to Irenaeus or his works. Some argument could be made based on some thematic similarities (concerning the distinction between image and likeness in the *imago Dei*, recapitulation, and the economic trinity) that Commodianus and possibly Origen utilized his works as well, but these are far less certain, and the associations have not been made in the majority works concerning Irenaeus. If a connection between Origen and Irenaeus could be solidified, the discussion on the *imago Dei* during the early church fathers would be greatly benefitted.

[59] Roberts, Donaldson, and Coxe, 1:312.

[60] John Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 26.

[61] *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, 7:570. For the Augustine citation see the following, Augustine, *Answer to Julian* I.3.5. Of special importance is the text we have received from Epiphanius (the bishop of Salamis):

fragments and an Armenian translation of books 4-5 that was likely translated in Constantinople in the 6th century.[62] The result is a limited capacity for text critical work and subsequent limitations for clarifying obscure sections. This limitation will be considered when determining which key texts are of use in unpacking Irenaeus' sense of the *imago Dei*.

Against Heresies is a compilation of five books. Each of these books are written to Irenaeus' "dear friend" who is noted in the preface of each. In the preface of each book Irenaeus explicitly presents the aim of that particular book while also commenting on the previous works in the series. In the first book, Irenaeus humbly presents his pastoral motivations for countering the Valentinians. Irenaeus then goes on to state that he will—in this first book—present the doctrines of this group and to occasionally make comment on the implausibility of their beliefs. The aim of the first book then is primarily descriptive with the intended purpose of presenting the numerous contradictions within their worldview and interpretations of the scriptures.[63] In the second book Irenaeus

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Seu Adversus LXXX Haereses. It was probably written between 375 and 377. This work presents more than three quarters of *Against Heresies* book 1. Because of this resource, I will present the Latin text alongside the Greek text where possible. For more on this see J. T. Nielsen, *Adam and Christ in the Theology of Irenaeus of Lyons: An Examination of the Function of the Adam-Christ Typology in the Adversus Haereses of Irenaeus, Against the Background of the 'Gnosticism' of his Time* (Netherland: Royal VanGorcum Ltd, 1968), 2. I will be accessing these primarily through Harvey's work (though I will also refer to Rousseau).

[62] Ibid. Also, in regard to the Armenian translation see Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement*, 25. Also note that the numerous fragments are a testimony to just how widely read Irenaeus was. Cf. *Encyclopedia of Ancient Christianity,* 2:350. Even a Greek manuscript was accessible in Egypt within a decade of its writing. C. H. Roberts, *Manuscript, Society and Belief in Early Christian Egypt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1979), 53. This may also be observed by reading later Patristic authors who clearly refer to concepts found in Irenaeus' works though it should be observed that there are very few citations of Irenaeus within these authors (Cf. Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement*, 27).

[63] In saying that the book is primarily 'descriptive,' I do not intend to portray Irenaeus as wholly neutral. The aim of the five volumes is to present the opponents views as untenable (which he does comically at times) by direct argument (book 2) and by expounding the apostolic teaching of the faith in line with his "rule of truth" (especially in the last three books).

continues his task by arguing more firmly against the positions which he has expounded

in the first book. Irenaeus in this book does continue the process of making clear their

doctrines, but now it is less descriptive and more polemic: Irenaeus attempts "a complete

demolition of those heresies which he has already explained."[64] In the third through fifth

book Irenaeus shifts attention again to emphasize and expound the apostolic teaching as

rooted in the scriptures themselves. He continues to apply these texts to the primary

heretical views to point out the stark difference between apostolic faith and the 'gnostic'

worldview.[65] These last three books are where the majority of his biblical references and

expositions may be found. In summary, while *AH* is polemical, "it is also exegetical

rather than analytical: it demonstrates from scripture, that there is but one God, one

Christ, one Spirit, and one human race in which the one economy is enacted, as unfolded

in Scripture."[66] The polemic nature of the work does not necessarily imply a struggle for

power at this point between Irenaeus' opponents and Irenaeus himself—Osborn rightly

notes that Irenaeus' irenic approach dismisses the notion of a power struggle here.[67]

    The second work is *Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching*. It was uncovered

in Armenia at Erevan in 1904—prior to this, the work was only known from Eusebius'

Ecclesiastical History. This work is a limited collection of Christian teachings, with the

aim of apologia and the literary form of catechesis.[68] Since *Dem* was likely written after

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[64] Roberts, Donaldson, and Coxe, 1:311.

[65] i.e., *AH* 3.4.3, 3.11.1-9, 3.15.1-3, 4 3.1, 4.33.1-7, etc.

[66] Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement*, 86.

[67] Osborn, *Irenaeus of Lyons*, 5.

[68] Ibid. cf. *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, 7:570. Cf. Parvis, 18.

the completion of *AH,* it should be considered a mature development of Irenaeus'

theology. Though the pertinent texts in *Dem* will add nothing new to the Irenaean schema

of the *imago Dei*, they will be given more weight in the final considerations and summary

of Irenaeus' schema of the *imago Dei*.[69]

1.7. The Role of Typology in Irenaeus and his Opponents

One interpretative consideration that should be taken into account is the role of

typology in the biblical texts available to Irenaeus. For the sake of the paper, I will use

the following definition of typology: typology is "the determination of the

correspondence between persons, events, facilities and objects of an earlier time with

certain of a later time."[70]

'Gnosticism' used a rigorously allegorical interpretive framework in conjunction

with their typology. Indeed, the heretics in question seem to view the scriptures as "no

more than an illustration of the true, deeper or higher action taking place in the *Pleroma*,

hence the 'Gnostics' attach no value to history."[71] Any number or name within the

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[69] This will be especially true in discerning the substance of the *imago Dei* in Irenaeus' schema. In *Dem* Irenaeus is quite clear that the incarnate Word of God is the very image of God after whom man was fashioned in Gen. 1:26-27. Though this is also observed in *AH*. This category of thought concerning the *imago Dei* will later be categorized as the ontological *imago Dei*.

[70] This quote is a translation of the German "die Feststellung des Entsprechungsverhältnis es von Personen Geschehnissen Einrichtungen und Gegenständen einer früheren zeit mit bestimmten einer späteren Zeit: Adam-Christus, Moses-Christus." G. T. *Armstrong, Die Genesis in der alten Kirche* (Tübengen: 1962), 7. Quoted in Nielson, 4.

[71] Nielson, 5.

scriptures could be taken to indicate the number of *Aeons*, their names, or other associated events with the *Pleroma*.[72]

On the other hand, Irenaeus views the scriptures as fundamentally historical.[73] Because of the concrete historical nature of the Scriptures, Irenaeus and the Valentinians are going to have drastically different positions on how typology is used and where it should be limited. It should be noted that Irenaeus' typology is limited in-so-far as it seemingly attempts to mirror the extent and aim to which numerous biblical authors use typology.[74] The typology of Irenaeus becomes subsumed and encapsulated by his Christocentric theory of recapitulation.[75] Irenaeus will use his theory of recapitulation to portray Christ as the prototype and archetype of the human person.

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[72] *AH* 1.3.1-6 is a good example of the typological associations made by the 'Gnostics'. If the reader has questions arising concerning the interpretive method of the Valentinians. *AH* 1.3.1-6. expands the biblical root of the Valentinian position. Their hermeneutic allows for a stretched allegorical interpretation which bends the sources into agreement with their own style. For more on the interpretive methods of the Valentinians, one helpful source to consider is a Dissertation by Jacqueline Williams. Though, this is a degree removed from our work at hand since she is analyzing the *Gospel of Truth* rather that Irenaeus' presentation. Jaqueline A. Williams, *Biblical Interpretation in the 'gnostic' Gospel of Truth from Nag Hammadi* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1988), 175.

[73] I do not intend to superimpose some notion of historicity here—rather I intend to point out that Irenaeus views the scriptures as rooted in concrete events which occurred. These historical events then had significance (soteriological, eschatological, and immediately physical concerning the Church) for the time of his writing.

[74] Esp. see the summary on Adam-Christ typology as a case study for his understanding of typology concerning Irenaeus' use of 1 Cor. 15 in the following resource. Nielson 79-88. Though it is possible that here, in the face of the 'gnostic' understanding of flesh and blood, Irenaeus clings too tightly to his idea of the *Plasma* of man (form-substance handiwork) and may have departed from Paul. But it is difficult to say. I have not given a full treatment to this issue, nor to Irenaeus' use of typology. There will be occasional discussion below as it connects with the topic of the *imago Dei*, but I should give no more attention to it here. Suffice to say, typology is often (though not always) limited to the topics which are typologically presented within the scriptures. Contrary to the Valentinians who impose topics upon non-typological texts.

[75] See the following resource for a treatment on the Irenaean concept of recapitulation. Holsinger-Friesen, 35-57.

2. IRENAEUS' OPPONENTS AND THE *IMAGO DEI*

2.1. The Ptolemaic-Valentinian Perspective

Before we are able to unpack Irenaeus' understanding of the *imago Dei*, we will need to present the Valentinian view of the *imago Dei* as portrayed by Irenaeus. It is possible that some of the distinctions which exist within Irenaeus' view of the *imago Dei* stem from his interaction with his opponent's theological frameworks.[76] Since Irenaeus' view is the primary aim of this thesis I will present his opponents perspective by analysis of the Irenaean works rather than consulting the Nag Hamadi texts.[77] The aim of Irenaeus' work is quite extensive, and he has done well to distinguish, at times, between

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[76] One of the most important considerations will be Irenaeus' understanding of image and likeness having two referents (a notion that is present within Valentinianism as he understood it). As will be discussed throughout the paper, it is unclear whether this notion originates with the Valentinians, with Irenaeus, or some other source, but it is commonly accepted that Irenaeus is the origin of the image/likeness distinction that plagued the church into the 15th century. For example, see the following resource, Albert B. Collver III, "Who is Man: Image and Likeness in Irenaeus," *Concordia Student Journal* (Epiphany 1999), 29. It is possible that this interpretation was originally due to a more natural reading in the LXX and Vulgate (given that "and" was placed between the two terms ["κατ᾽ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν" cf. "imaginem et similitudinem"]). However, that may not be the case. It is also possible that there is an intertestamental background, but preliminary studies have shown that intertestamental authors do not distinguish between image and likeness I believe that John F. Kilner misunderstands Gerald Bray on this point (Kilner, 126. Cf. Gerald Bray, "Image of God," in *New Dictionary of Biblical Theology*, ed. T. Desmond Alexander and Brian S. Rosner [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001], 575). Additionally, see the concise work done by Fantino concerning the distinction between image and likeness in Hellenistic philosophy. Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu,* 5-8.

[77] There are generally three sources to consider here: *The Gospel of Truth*, *The Treatise on the Three Natures*, and the *Tripartite Tractate* (this work is not noted by Irenaeus, but it is dated to the mid fourth century, making it an interesting [though not exact] parallel for Valentinian 'Gnosticism'). However, it is not necessary that this work would be done here, as Bushur points out, the Nag Hammadi cache contains fourth century Coptic translations of Valentinian texts (Bushur, 4). It strikes me as academically irresponsible to compare the Valentinian opponents of Irenaeus' time to the Valentinian works of the Nag Hammadi cache without an appropriate recognition of the possible development between the dates of these two sources. Especially when the rapid changes in the system of thought within the Valentinian system are observable within one generation of teachers (Tertullian, *AV* 4. These texts likely have far more import upon the church fathers of the 4th century—at which point the following resource would be a helpful introduction. Frances Young, "God's Image: The 'Elephant in the Room' in the Fourth Century?" Studia Patristica 50 (2011): 57-71.

general Valentinianism and what can be known about particular teachers of the Valentinian school of thought.

Immediately below I will address the Valentinian cosmogeny in order to present their position of the *imago Dei* within the proper anthropological, theological, and soteriological-metaphysical framework. I will also set apart two sub-sections to address a particular Valentinian teacher (Marcus) and a non-Valentinian teacher who both use the notion of the *imago Dei*.[78] This will be done to retain the differentiations of each system of thought. It should be noted that there are inherent limitations to this project, because Irenaeus' portrayal of the Valentinian view may not be an exacting parallel of the views held by the Valentinian 'Gnostics' themselves. Though many have noted that Irenaeus' portrayal is unexpectedly accurate when compared to content of the few possible Valentinian texts available to us.[79] I will end the whole section with a conclusion that points out some important parallels to Irenaeus' writings, alongside some questions that will be answered throughout the section on Irenaeus' view of the *imago Dei.* We will find

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[78] I have chosen these two other writers because of their use of εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις (*imago* and *similitudo*). Some work could also be done on the Sethians (*AH* 1.30). However, the Sethians only use εἰκών once in relation to man as the image of the higher powers. It is very unlikely that Irenaeus possibly received any notions on imaging from interaction with the Sethians and so I have decided to leave them out of this study. For their view see *AH* 1.30. Cf. Fantino, 75-76. Also, thought Fantino has chosen to analyze the *Apocrypha of John* I have determined not to. The *Apocrypha of John* has long been accepted as one of Irenaeus' sources—however, Irenaeus never cites or alludes to the *Apocrypha of John*. Since it is uncertain whether or not Irenaeus actually used the source, I am not compelled to address the notions of imaging within said source. My critique leveled against the use of the *Apocrypha of John* stems from the following source. M. C. Steenberg, *Irenaeus on Creation: The Cosmic Christ and the Saga of Redemption* (Boston, MA: Brill, 2008), 13 n.33.

[79] Though the Nag Hamadi cache may not contain an exact presentation of the Valentinianism of Irenaeus' time, it has been helpful to support Irenaeus' presentation of many of his opponents. This is especially true of the Valentinians. Irenaeus is generally fair in his presentation of his opponents with a few exceptions. See the following source for a more thorough engagement of the issue. M. C. Steenberg, *Irenaeus on Creation: The Cosmic Christ and the Saga of Redemption*, 11-15.

during this study that there are some interesting parallels between Irenaeus and his opponents concerning the *imago Dei*.

One last note before diving into the labor at hand. In doing the background work on Valentinianism and other teachings, I do not intend to portray Irenaeus as only being understood through his response to heresies. Irenaeus understands his own theologies as having been handed down through apostolic succession of teachers. We would do him a severe injustice if we assumed that the majority substance of his theology was solely formed in polemic response. Here I am attempting to observe whether it is possible that certain aspects of Irenaeus' biblical apostolic theology have been sharpened, honed, emphasized, or altered in response to his opponents in *AH*. This is especially important when considering Irenaeus' unnatural distinction between image and likeness, as well as his emphasis on physicality in reference to the *imago Dei*.[80] The intent of this section is not only to point out areas where Irenaeus may have borrowed from his opponents, but also to discern where he may have changed his position or articulation of the *imago Dei* in response to his opponents.[81]

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[80] Irenaeus' distinction between image and likeness may have been borrowed from his opponents whereas his emphasis on physicality may have been brought about by response to the Valentinians' emphasis against physicality as image (note the division between form and substance in his opponents). This recognition that a division between image and likeness has been made previously in Irenaeus scholarship by Eric Osborn, Gustaf Wingren, Emil Bruner, and Karl Prümm. For Osborn see the following resource, Osborn, 258. For Wingren, Bruner, and Prümm, see the following resource. Gustaf Wingren, *Man and the Incarnation: A Study in the Biblical Theology of Irenaeus*, trans. Ross Mackenzie (Philadelphia, PA: Muhlenberg Press, 1959), 16n.

[81] For example, in defense of the "bodily nature of man" against his opponents' position ("flesh and blood will not inherit the kingdom of God"), Irenaeus brings the body and soul into close proximity with one another. Peter Forster, "God and the World in Saint Irenaeus: Theological Reflections" (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 1985), 311. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/6785

2.1.1. A Summary of the Valentinian Cosmogeny and Eschatology

We must now turn our attention to the presentation of the Valentinian cosmogony. The reader may be at this point wondering why this is necessary. It is necessary because the soteriological-metaphysical and anthropological background to the *imago Dei* is encapsulated in their cosmogeny. Each of the primary Valentinian texts which concern the *imago Dei* fit within their soteriological- metaphysical presentation of the cosmos— which stems from their cosmogony. In order to get to the primary texts concerning the Valentinians and Marcosians' view of the *imago Dei*, I will attempt to summarize the context that leads up to the first references of the *imago Dei.* I will now attempt to summarize the flow of thought which poses as the cosmological, metaphysical, and anthropological background to the *imago Dei*.

The Valentinians believed that a certain *Aeon* existed prior to the creation of the cosmos as the first being.[82] Since this *Aeon* is before and above all others, by his nature and his position he is both "invisible and incomprehensible."[83] His name is *Proarche* (προαρχή: first-beginning), *propator* (προπατήρ: first father), and *Bythus* (βυθός: profundity).[84] Somehow, alongside this *Aeon*, there also existed *Ennoea* (ἔννοια: thought).[85] It is unclear in the presentation whether this *Ennoea* is a separate *Aeon* at this point, or simply a metaphysically united emanation or extension of *Bythus* himself. It seems most likely that there must be some metaphysical separation between the two

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[82] *AH* 1.1.1.

[83] *AH* 1.1.1.

[84] *AH* 1.1.1. From here onward he will be only referred to as *Bythus*.

[85] *AH* 1.1.1.

because of what follows.[86] *Bythus* then decides to create additional *Aeons* by producing

something like a seed and emanating (προβαλλέσθαι) that seed into Ennoea.[87] *Ennoea*

becomes 'pregnant' and produces *Nous* (νοῦς: mind) who is also known as the

Monogenes (μονογενής: only-begotten), and *Pater* (πατήρ: father), and the beginning of

all things.[88] Simultaneous to the birth of *Nous*, we find the birth of another *Aeon*: namely

Aletheia (ἀλήθεια: truth). These are the first four *Aeons* from whom all other *Aeons* come

into being. They are known as the "Pythagorean Tetrad."[89]

     Monogenes later produces *Logos* (λόγος: word) and *Zoe* (ζωή: life) out of a

recognition of his duty in the process of creation. Interestingly, Irenaeus does not say that

Logos and *Zoe* emanate from him in conjunction with his partner (*Aletheia*), but it should

be assumed that his partnership with *Aletheia* brought these two forth.[90] It was the role of

Monogenes to bring about the *Pleroma* (πλήρωμα: fullness [more will be said on this

later]). *Logos* and *Zoe* then join to produce *Anthropos* (ἄνθρωπος: man) and *Ecclesia*

(ἐκκλησία: Church). These eight *Aeons* together are known as the first Ogdoad (ὀγδοάς:

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[86] The lack of clarity here does not seem dependent on a lack of knowledge on Irenaeus' part—the same confusion seems to exist in the Nag Hamadi texts as well. It may be possible that the over personification of the thought of this first *Aeon*—*Bythus*—led to the confusion of this concept. If *Ennoea* did exist as a contemporary with *Bythus* then *Bythus* was not the first *Aeon*. If *Ennoea* was emanated from the thought of *Bythus*—thereby becoming metaphysically distinct in personhood—then this was the first creation and the narrative which follows is not cohesive. However, if it is an unclarified over-personification of the very thought of *Bythus*, then it is possible that this narrative may be cohesive—however it is unclear how this *Bythus* was able to emanate a seed of creation into his own thought without the emanation coming from *Ennoea* her. Regardless of the lack of clarity here, *Ennoea* is presented as an *Aeon* later.

[87] *AH* 1.1.1.

[88] *AH* 1.1.1.

[89] *AH* 1.1.1.

[90] Why should it be assumed? Because when *Sophia* (as we will see later) bears a new creation without partnership, it brings about a corruption. Only the first *Aeon* (*Bythus*) is able to do this, and even he does this through some partnership with *Ennoea* (the difficulty therein has already been noted in a footnote above).

eight primary *Aeons*) in the Valentinian system. Each of these *Aeons* are male or female and paired off with one another.[91]

Then, in order to glorify the *Bythus* for their creation, *Logos* and *Zoe* emitted ten other *Aeons*. They are as follows: *Bythius* (βύθιος: profound) and *Mixis* (μίξις: mingling), *Ageratos* (ἀγήρατος: ageless) and *Henosis* (ἕνωσις: union), *Autophyes* (αὐτοφυής: self-producing) and *Hedone* (ἡδονή: pleasure), *Acinetos* (ἀκίνητος: immobile) and *Syncrasis* (σύγκρασις: blending), *Monogenes* (only begotten) and *Macaria* (happiness).[92] With *Anthropos* and *Ecclesia* they produced a total of 12 *Aeons*.

Anthropos and *Ecclesia* then also produce 12 *Aeons*. They are as follows: *Paracletus* (παράκλητος: advocate) and *Pistis* (πίστις: faith), *Patricos* (πατρικός: paternal) and *Elpis* (ἐλπίς: hope), *Metricos* (μητρικός: maternal) and *Agape* (ἀγάπη: love), *Ainos* (αἶνος: praise) and *Synesis* (σύνεσις: understanding), *Ecclesiasticus* (ἐκκλησιαστικός: of the Church) and *Macariotes* (μακαριότης: bliss), *Theletos* (θελητός: desired) and *Sophia* (σοφία: wisdom).[93] This is the creation of the thirty *Aeons* which predate the material world as we know it. These thirty *Aeons* are a triad in that they come in three major groupings: the ogdoad (ὀγδοάς), the decad (δεκάς: a group of 10 [emanated from *Logos* and *Zoe*]), and the dodecad (δώδεκα: a group of 12 [emanated

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[91] "For each of these is masculo-feminine, as follows: Propator was united by a conjunction with his Ennoea; then Monogenes, that is Nous, with Aletheia; Logos with Zoe, and Anthropos with Ecclesia" *AH* 1.1.1.

[92] *AH* 1.1.2. The addition of another *Monogenes* adds a layer of confusion with later references to this particular *Aeon*.

[93] *AH* 1.1.2.

from *Anthropos* and *Ecclesia*]).[94] It is these thirty *Aeons* which consist of the *Pleroma*:

for these thirty are the fullness of deity.[95]

Even though these unified thirty are the *Pleroma*, there is a hierarchy between

them—a gulf exists between *Bythus* and the rest of the *Aeons*. *Bythus* is only knowable to

Monogenes who is also called *Nous* (though it is also assumed that *Ennoea* also knows

Bythus).[96] To the rest of the *Aeons*, *Bythus* is incomprehensible and invisible. *Monogenes*

desired to make *Bythus* known to the other *Aeons* but was hindered from doing so by

Ennoea because she desired the *Aeons* to develop their own will and desire to seek out

knowledge of *Bythus*.[97] This desire was present in other *Aeons* to a small degree—but in

Sophia the desire to know *Bythus* was very great. *Sophia's* desire to know *Bythus* was not

purely from affection—but rather from a presumptuousness and overconfidence in her

ability to reach into the depths of *Bythus*.[98] She had attempted to plunge into infinity and

was bought to great agony by the impossible task that she had set herself to. This resulted

in the near loss and subsumption of *Sophia* into the very essence of *Bythus*, but some

power known as *Horos* (ὄρος: limit) was able to restrain her.[99]

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[94] *AH* 1.1.3. Cf. *PGL*, 336, 394.

[95] These thirty *Aeons* are exegetically defended by the Valentinians by an allegorical interpretation of Matthew 20:1-7 (the parable of the laborers in the vineyard). The total number of hours taken to send the laborers adds up to thirty (1+3+6+9+11=30). They also back their claims by "wonderful and unutterable mysteries." *AH* 1.1.3. It should be noted here that the system of thought breaks down as more *Aeons* enter the picture. The creation of Christ, the Holy spirit, and Jesus throws off the numerology. Their system is far from airtight—as Irenaeus points out throughout his work.

[96] *AH* 1.2.1.

[97] *AH* 1.2.1.

[98] *AH* 1.2.2.

[99] *AH* 1.2.2.

Now, at this point in the cosmogeny, Irenaeus already makes a differentiation between this teaching and another sect, which seems to draw the cosmogeny further by saying that the return of *Sophia* also brought about another substance—but the sect remains un-named and the reader is left with the notion that the Valentinians are not unified.[100] This substance was not wholly formed and was lacking in its essence. *Sophia* then entreated the father alongside the other *Aeons* to plead for the completion of this substance. It seems that this plea must have been answered because these Valentinians state that this substance becomes the origin of the material substance. There is a parallel here to consider. The emanation of *Bythus* was proper spiritual *Aeons*—the emanation of *Sophia* in her state of presumptuousness and ignorance was the material substance. For this reason, the spirit is in moral alignment with the *Pleroma*, whereas the material world is the antithesis of the spiritual essence and is fundamentally evil.

The order of events in *AH* 1.2.4 does not fully align with the order of events in *AH* 1.2.3. But the content of *AH* 1.2.3 does have some continuity. It is possible that this is the differentiation between the sects mentioned above. In any case, in *AH* 1.2.4 Irenaeus says that *Bythus* pairs with *Monogenes* in order to bring about the above-mentioned Limit (*Horos*). Interestingly the Valentinians believed that *Bythus* produced *Horos* in his own image (*in imagine sua*).[101] *Horos* also has other names: *Stauros* (σταυρός: stake [or a cross]) and *Lytrotes* (λυτρωτής: redeemer), and *Carpistes* (καρπιστής: reaper or

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[100] *AH* 1.2.3.

[101] Here it is possible that the image is in reference to the origin of *Horos*—for he was created directly by *Bythus* without the need of a consort (since *Bythus* is apparently bi-sexual and does not create in the same fashion as the other *Aeons*). But it is unclear. The comments about *Bythus'* bi-sexual nature may have nothing to do with the image. I will not make further comment on imaging here, there are more clear texts that will be explored below.

emancipator), *Horothetes* (ὁροθέτης: one that determines boundaries), and *Metagoges* (μεταγωγεύς: restorer). It was *Horos* who was able to bring back *Sophia* from the brink of total loss and she is restored to the *Pleroma*.[102] *Horos* then fences out *Sophia's enthymesis* (ἐνθύμησις: idea), which is a spiritual substance, alike to the *Aeon* but without form.[103] This clarifies that the "material" mentioned above is this spiritual substance—formed from fear and arrogance.

At this point *Monogenes* determines—within the will of *Bythus*—to create Christ (χριστός: messiah or anointed person) and the Holy Spirit (πνεῦμα ἅγιον) in order to keep the rest of the *Aeons* from making the same error of *Sophia*.[104] Christ taught the *Aeons* that *Bythus* is incomprehensible and invisible and may only be known by *Monogenes* (the only begotten).[105] The Holy Spirit taught the *Aeons* to "give thanks that they all had been made equal" and he showed them "true rest."[106] Then out of thankfulness, all of the *Aeons* determined to bring forth from themselves the greatest aspect of their own

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[102] *AH* 1.2.4.

[103] *AH* 1.2.4.

[104] *AH* 1.2.5.

[105] *AH* 1.2.5. Here we can see that Christ is not the only begotten Son—instead he, alongside the H. S. is the last created *Aeon* who bring balance to the *Aeons* through teaching. Christ brings knowledge that aligns with the nature-bound limitations of the incomprehensibility of *Bythus*. Meanwhile, *Monogenes* is seen to be the only begotten Son who may reveal the will of *Bythus* by his relational connection. This is an important point in understanding the Valentinian Christology—especially in reference to the role and mission of Christ on earth. Indeed, later we will see Christ as distinguished from Jesus—Christ seems to set the typological role that Jesus later fulfills.

[106] *AH* 1.2.5.

beauty—all aspects were then blended together to honor *Bythus* (τέλειος καρπός ὁ

Ἰησοῦς).[107] The result was the "star of the *Pleroma*" who is Jesus (Ἰησοῦς).[108]

This is the cosmogeny of the spiritual sphere, the narrative then turns to address

the cosmogeny of the material world. After *Enthymesis* was hedged off from the *Pleroma*

by *Horos*, she was sent into the vacuous darkness.[109] There Christ had mercy on

Enthymesis and overcame *Horos* in order to bring her into a formation of substance.[110]

Christ then left her, and she became aware of her distance from the *Pleroma*. *Enthymesis*

desired to know the *Pleroma* but was restrained by *Horos* and was left in the suffering of

her own ignorance. In this suffering she brought about the components of the world—

though unformed: moisture from her tears, light from her laughter, and all other corporeal

substances.[111] *Enthymesis* (who is also known as *Achamoth* which is likely derived from

חָכְמָה: wisdom) then supplicated Christ—in response Christ sent Jesus (who is also known

as Savior and Christ) to be an advocate on her behalf. Jesus condescended and formed in

her knowledge—separating her from these passions and leaving those passions as

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[107] *AH* 1.2.5.

[108] Now, this Jesus should by no means be confused with the Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus of Nazareth is brought about later and exists of four components. He was brought about by the *Demiurge* in the *psychic* essence. He received his *pneumatic* essence from *Achamoth*. An element was received from οἰκονομία (*dispositio*) which is unspecified. And lastly, he received the element which accords with the shape of the dove that descended upon him. He is somehow created after the type "of the firstborn and the first four *Aeons*." In the Valentinian system of though, Jesus of Nazareth was a type who revealed this higher Jesus that we are now discussing. Much of this information comes from the following resource, but I have made appropriate changes where the author slightly erred. Nielson, 30-31.

[109] *AH* 1.4.1. The *Enthymesis* amorphous because it did not receive form from both male and female, but female only.

[110] *AH* 1.4.1.

[111] *AH* 1.4.2.

unorganized matter.[112] This matter—the material world—was partly in the image of

Enthymesis (being ensouled substance and bringing forth physical matter) and partly in

the image of Jesus (being wholly spiritual in essence and removing the passions which

brought about two other forms of matter). *Enthymesis* was then determined to give form

to the ensouled substances in the image of the *Pleroma*.[113] The first form that she made

was the *Demiurge* (δημιουργός) "who is father and king of all things."[114] He is spatially

located outside of the *Pleroma*.

 This cosmogeny then makes a distinction between three different primary

procosmic substances: 1) the spiritual substance (πνευματικός), 2) the substance

emanating from amendment with *Sophia*, the ensouled substance (ψυχικός), 3) the

substance of passion which is material (ὑλικός: *materialis*) and stems from *Enthymesis*.[115]

These forms of matter are not sense perceptible—that comes later under the creation of

man by the *Demiurge*—rather, they are invisible and fundamental essences to the nature

of the creation itself. These substances function as animating powers behind the curtain

of the visible world.

 This *Demiurge* (being psychic—ψυχικός) then takes the available components of

the material world (ψυχικός and ὑλικός) and begins to make all of the "ensouled and

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[112] *AH* 1.4.5.

[113] Marry Anne Donovan, *One Right Reading?: A Guide to Irenaeus* (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1997), 33.

[114] *AH* 1.5.1. Now, concerning the term *Demiurge*, it is a term that the Valentinians use concerning the Deity who believes he made the world of his own will and power. In the Valentinian system, the *Demiurge* was incorrect on this point, because he stems from *Aeons* who are far above him and the seed for the spiritual nature of man comes from *Enthymesis*. However, it is also a term that Irenaeus uses concerning the true God (*AH* 5.17.1)—but the character, person, and nature of the deity behind δημιουργός is radically different from the δημιουργός of the Valentinians.

[115] *AH* 1.5.1.

material creatures," as well as the "heavenly and earthly things."[116] He also forms the seven heavens—some of which are personal angelic beings—over which he reigns.[117] However, from the *Demiurge* through grief, comes the devil, who is also the ruler of the world (*Cosmocrator*).[118] The last of his creatures appears to be mankind. Man was not formed from dust, but rather from invisible substance—his animal nature was then breathed into him by the *Demiurge*. In this way, man was made in the Image and likeness of the *Demiurge*.[119] The image reflects the material element (ὑλικός), while the likeness reflects the ensouled element (ψυχικός). However, unbeknownst to *Demiurge*, *Enthymesis* had been the root cause of the creation of mankind. She had placed these offspring within him so that he could bring them about.[120] So mankind also has the spiritual element (πνευματικός).[121] Lastly mankind is clothed in a "skin like garment" which is the aspect of man that may be perceived by the senses.

This leads to the initial presentation of the Valentinian Anthropology. These three substances inform the three types of people that exist within the created world under *Demiurge*. The first and highest category of humans are the *pneumatics* (πνευματικός).[122]

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[116] *AH* 1.5.2.

[117] *AH* 1.5.2.

[118] It is unclear here whose grief brings about the devil and the demons—but there is a likely association with the evil of the material ὑλικός realm. *AH* 1.5.4.

[119] *AH* 1.5.5.

[120] *AH* 1.5.6.

[121] Here it seems that all persons receive the *pneumatic* essence, but later it is clarified that only the elect receive this *pneumatic* essence.

[122] *AH* 1.6.1. Cf. 1.5.6.

These persons consist of "a material, a *psychic*, and a *pneumatic* part."[123] They have absolute free will and are the primary recipients of the gift of salvation through gnosis. Regardless of the *pneumatics* actions on this earth, they are destined for salvation because it is in their nature to be saved.[124] The second category of human persons are the *psychics* (ψυχικός) though they are also called the animal men (ψυχικός—*animalis*).[125] These are the people of the Church. The will of the *psychics* are not wholly free, but they are partially carnal. Their salvation will rest upon their decision to adhere to good works and faith—but they are not granted the perfect knowledge allotted to the *pneumatics*. The salvation offered to them is also lesser than the salvation offered to the *psychics*, and their material part must perish because of the incompatibility between the material part and immortality.[126] The last category of human persons are the *hylics* (ὑλικός). These are the persons who are entirely of a lower animating material substance. These persons have no will: their destiny is determined by their nature.[127] No salvation is offered to the *hylics* and they will pass into destruction: for their material nature is fundamentally evil and will be cast off at the eschaton.[128]

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[123] Nielsen, 28.

[124] *AH* 1.5.2-3.

[125] *AH* 1.5.2.

[126] Nielsen, 29.

[127] *AH* 1.7.4.

[128] The same fate is offered for all of those *psychics* who do not engage in the proper works that lead to salvation.

Now, I turn my attention from the cosmogeny and turn briefly to address the eschatology of the Valentinians.[129] The end and aim of salvation are essentially rooted in these three fundamental essences, materials, or substances which have been mentioned above. Those people who were created after the *pneumatic* material and have received full knowledge concerning *Achamoth* (i.e., those who have paid their dues and have been permitted into the deepest memberships with the Valentinian teachers) will be saved and brought into the *Pleroma*.[130] These people have put off their *hylic* and *psychic* parts—as they were destined to do[131]—and now exist eternally within the fullness of all other strictly spiritual beings (*pneumatics*).[132] What is the mode of the salvation? The mode of salvation is the acceptance of true knowledge—the *gnosis* that the *pneumatic* person is divine in their highest essence.[133] Knowledge has removed the impurities of the *psychic* and the *hylic.* Achamoth, at the eschaton, will leave the void—which she has filled with beings—and will be allowed to enter into the *Pleroma* to meet her partner. *Demiurge* will move up into this middle place that *Achamoth* had inhabited prior, and there all of the

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[129] I owe a great debt to the concise clarity of Nielsen's work here. Nielsen, 29-30.

[130] *AH* 1.7.1.

[131] The illustration used by the Valentinians for the pre-determined salvation of the elect is that they are like "gold" which is not damaged when deposited in "mud," for gold is of such a far surpassing element that anything lesser cannot distort it. Their moral actions and engagements have nothing to do with their salvation—their salvation comes about solely through the knowledge that they are divine, and being divine, they have been destined to have their *psychic* and *hylic* substances removed.

[132] Minns views the doctrine of soteriology as primary for the Valentinians. Certainly, they go to great lengths to bring evidence from their cosmogeny, metaphysics, and anthropology to support the soteriology. The other areas are "peripheral." I do think he has a point here, the areas that are most confusing and the least coherent are the metaphysical and cosmographical structures which are presented in support to their soteriology. Whereas their soteriology is quite clear. It is possible that this is due to an error on Irenaeus' part, but I am not certain. See Minns, *Irenaeus*, 14.

[133] Minns, *Irenaeus*, 14.

psychic humans (whose deeds brought them into a higher plain) will experience rest. These *psychic* individuals have also been offered salvation to the degree possible for them—these *psychic* persons are the members of the Christian Church. *Demiurge*, the angels, and the humans who now dwell below the *Pleroma* will never enter the highest realm—that alone exists for the true *pneumatics* and is not permitted to be entered by the *psychics*. Lastly, all beings which exist within the *hylic* substance (πᾶσα ὕλη—*universa materia*) will be consumed by fire.[134]

2.1.2. The Valentinian Position on the *imago Dei*

Now that the Ptolemaic-Valentinian cosmogeny is presented, we will take a closer look at the passages relevant to our task at hand. In doing so I hope to present some concepts that may help clarify the presentation on Irenaeus' view of the imago Dei. The aim of this exploration is to present the ways in which Irenaeus was possibly shaped by, or borrowed from, his opponents.[135] This first text that we will discuss concerns the grammar of imaging within the Valentinian system of thought.[136] The block quotations

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[134] Ibid. cf. Nielsen, 30.

[135] Several authors consider the ways in which Irenaeus has borrowed from his opponents. Esp. see the following resource on this matter. Matthew C. Steenberg, "The *Gospel of Truth* and the Truth of the Gospel: Assessing the Scope of Valentinian Influence on the Thought of St Irenaeus," Studia Patristica 50 (2011): 89-103. However, this has not been sufficiently explored in regard to the *imago Dei*. I will say here that the extent of continuity between Irenaeus and his opponents is far outweighed by the discontinuity. Borrowing, as we will see, is minimal.

[136] By "grammar of imaging," here and throughout this thesis, I intend to portray the rules by which an object may serve as an image to a subject. The ways in which an object may be defined as an image with respect to another object is quite sensible and intuitive when the object and subject are both corporeal (e.g. a painting [object] as a visual presentation of an individual [subject], or a coin that is stamped [object] with the image of an emperor [subject]). However, it becomes complicated when the object does not share the same metaphysical ontology as the subject. The Valentinians do not share, in every respect, the grammar of imaging that Irenaeus holds to. This will be explored further throughout the thesis.

from *Adversus Haereses* below will come from either Roberts and Donaldson, or Unger with some edits made by review of Harvey, Rosseau, and Harnack-Shcmidt where relevant.[137]

"These three kinds of existence, then, having, according to them, been now formed—one from the passion, which was matter (ὕλη—*materia*); a second from the conversion, which was animal (ψυχή— *animale*); and the third, that which she (*Achamoth*) herself brought forth, which was spiritual (πνευματικός—*spiritale*) she next addressed herself to the task of giving these forms (μόρφωσιν —*forma*). But she could not succeed in doing this as respected the spiritual existence, because it was of the same nature with herself. She therefore applied herself to give form to the animal substance which had proceeded from her own conversion, and to bring forth to light the instructions of the Savior. And they say she first formed out of animal substance him who is Father and King of all things, both of these which are of the same nature with himself, that is, animal substances, which they also call right-handed, and those which sprang from the passion, and from matter, which they call left-handed. For they affirm that he formed all the things which came into existence after him, being secretly impelled thereto by his mother. From this circumstance they style him *Metropator*, *Apator*, *Demiurge*, and Father, saying that he is father of the substances on the right hand, that is, of the animal, but *Demiurge* of those on the left, that is, of the material, while he is at the same time the king of all. For they say that this *Enthymesis*, desirous of making all things to the honor of the *Aeons*, made images (εἰκών—*imago*) of them, or rather that the Savior did so through her instrumentality. And she, in the image (εἰκών—*imago*) of the invisible Father, kept herself concealed from the *Demiurge*. But that one[138] was in the image (εἰκών—*imago*) of the only-begotten Son, and the angels and archangels created by him were also in the [image] of the rest of the *Aeons*."[139]

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[137] This will also be the case for the rest of the paper. The lexicons used will be reflected in the Bibliography, but for the following sections I will primarily use Lampe's *Patristic Greek Lexicon*, and Reynders *Lexique Comparé du Texte Grec et des Versions Latine, Arménienne et Syriaque*.

[138] This either has the *Demiurge* or *Achamoth* as the subject. This paper tentatively takes the position that *Achamoth* is the subject. See the discussion below.

[139] *AH* 1.5.1. "Τριῶν οὖν ἤδη τούτων ὑποκειμένων κατ᾿αὐτούς, τοῦ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ πάθους, ὃ ἦν ὕλη τοῦ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς, ὃ ἦν τὸ ψυχικὸν τοῦ δὲ ὃ ἀπεκύησε, τουτέστι τὸ πνευματικὸν, οὕτως ἐτράπη ἐπὶ τὴν μόρφωσιν αὐτῶν. Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πνευματικὸν μὴ δεδυνῆσθαι αὐτῇ μορφῶσαι, ἐπειδὴ ὁμοούσιον ὑπῆρχεν αὐτῇ τετράφθαι δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν μόρφωσιν τῆς γενομένης ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς αὐτῆς ψυχικῆς οὐσίας, προβαλεῖν τε τὰ παρὰ τοῦ Σωτῆρος μαθήματα. Καὶ πρῶτον μεμορφωκέναι αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς ψυχικῆς οὐσίας λέγουσι τὸν Πατέρα καὶ βασιλέα πάντων, τῶν τε ὁμοουσίων αὐτῷ τουτέστι τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἃ δὴ δεξιὰ καλοῦσι πάντα γὰρ τὰ κατ᾿αὐτὸν φάσκουσι μαμορφωκέναι, λεληθότως κινούμενον ὑπὸ τῆς Μητρὸς ὅθεν καὶ Μητροπάτορα, καὶ Ἀπάτορα, καὶ Δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν, καὶ Πατέρα καλοῦσι τῶν μὲν δεξιῶν πατέρα λέγοντες

In order to address how *imago* functions within this citation, we must first consider the aim and context of the text itself. Here, Irenaeus intends to portray the Valentinian cosmogeny. The primary concern is the origin of these three essences that we have addressed above: *pneumatic*, *psychic*, and *hylic*. Where did these substances arrive from? Through the process beginning with the first emanation of *Bythus*, then from the folly of *Sophia*, and finally from the actions of *Achamoth* (*Enthymesis*). The *psychic* and *hylic* essences were without form and were given form by *Achamoth*. The context presents the unfolding cosmogeny which I have taken great care to portray above. This section nears the end of the cosmogeny and portrays the transition from the "life within the *Pleroma*" to "life outside the *Pleroma*."[140] The term image (εἰκών—*imago*) is used three times within the end of the section quoted above, we will now address the first use.

αὐτον, τουτέστι τῶν ψυχικῶν τῶν δὲ ἀριστερῶν, τουτέστι τῶν ὑλικῶν, δημιουργὸν, συμπάτων δὲ βασιλέα. Τήνγὰρ Ἐνθύμησιν ταύτην βουληθεῖσαν εἰς τιμὴν τῶν Αἰώνων τὰ πάντα ποιῆσαι, εἰκόνας λέγουσι πεποιηεκέναι οὐτῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν Σωτῆρα δι᾽ αὐτῆς καὶ αὐτὴν μὲν ἐν εἰκόνι τοῦ ἀοράτου Πατρὸς τετηρηκέναι μὴ γινωσκομένην ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ τοῦτον δὲ τοῦ μονογενοῦς υἱοῦ, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν Αἰώνων τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων γεγονότας Ἀρχαγγέλους τε καὶ Ἀγγέλους. "*tria igitur hæc cum subsistant secundum eos, unum quidem ex passione, quod erat materia, alterum vero de conversione, quod erat animale: alterum vero quod enixa est, quod est spiritale, sic conversa est in formationem ipsorum. Sed spiritale quidem non potuisse eam formare, quoniam ejusdem substantiæ ei erat. Conversam autem in formationem ejus, quæ facta erat de conversione ejus, animales substantiæ, emisisse quoque a Salvatore doctrinas. Et primo quidem formasse eam de animali substantia dicunt Deum Patrem, et Salvatorem, et Regem Omnium ejusdem substantiæ ei, id est, animalium, quas destras vocant; et eorum quæ ex passione et ex materia, quas sinistras dicunt. Ea enim quæ post eum sunt, eum dicunt formasse latenter motum a matre sua. Unde et Metropatorem, et Apatorem, et Demiurgum eum, et Patrem vocant: destrorum quidem Patrem dicentes eum, id est, Psychicorum; sinistrorum vero, id est, Hylicorum, Demiurgum: omnium autem Tegem. Hanc enim Enthymesin volentem in Æonum honorem omnia facere, imagines dicunt fecisse ipsorum, magis autem Salvatorem per ipsam. Et ipsam quidem in imagine invisibilis Patris conservasse incognitam a Demiurgo. Hunc autem unigeniti Filii: reliquorum vero Æonum eos, qui ab hoc facti sunt Angeli et Archangeli.*"

[140] The distinction here between life within and outside of the *Pleroma* is helpfully noted by the following resource. Donovan, 29, 33.

The first reference to *imago* in this section concerns the offspring of *Achamoth* (*Enthymesis*) which are the formed substances.[141] *Achamoth*—being a product of the folly of *Sophia*—was originally of a lesser tainted substance because she was *psychic* in nature. She later became *pneumatic* through the mercy and condescension of Jesus.[142] Because she was *pneumatic* the text states that *Achamoth* was unable to give form to other *pneumatic* essences. These offspring created by *Achamoth* (or through *Achamoth* as an instrument of *Soter*) are her "spiritual offering" to the *Aeons*.[143] But they are only formed of the *hylic* and *psychic* substances. They were made in the image of the angelic attendants who were with *Jesus*. It is unclear just who these angelic beings are, but it is possible that they are the *Aeons*, either way they are likely to be *pneumatic* in essence.[144]

Thus far, in this first use of *imago*, we may observe that the primary connection between created subject and object is not fundamentally metaphysical in nature. It fundamentally refers to form as distinct from essence or material substance. So, in what way is *Achamoth's* creation in the image of these higher beings? The most likely possibility is form.[145] The *Demiurge* does not image the *Aeons* in his essence (for he is

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[141] "For they say that this *Enthymesis*, desirous of making all things to the honor of the *Aeons*, formed images of them, or rather that the *Savior* did so through her instrumentality." This section (*AH* 1.5.1) is a clarified recapitulation of *AH* 1.4.5 with emphasis on the nature of the beings that she formed.

[142] Though *Achamoth* is *pneumatic*, she is not allowed entrance into the *Pleroma* until the eschaton. She is still barred by *Horos*.

[143] *AH* 1.4.5 says, "…But when Achamoth was freed from her passion, she gazed with rapture on the dazzling vision of the angels that were with him (Jesus); and in her ecstasy, conceiving by them, they tell us that she brought forth new beings, partly after her own image, and partly a spiritual progeny after the image of the Savior's attendants."

[144] It is possible that these lights are other *Aeons*, but they are described as angelic hosts rather than *Aeons*.

[145] I do not believe it is wise to impose a narrow philosophical use of form here. One should not imply a strictly Platonic understanding of forms (for we do not know how technical Irenaeus' use [or the Valentinian's use] of the terms are. What is important to note here is that the Valentinians distinguish between form and substance, but Irenaeus appears hesitant to make such a distinction. Additionally, when I

psychic), but rather in his form he is a lesser image or copy of the *Aeons*. He is not an emanation as the *Aeons* are, but rather a lesser substance formed after the *Aeons*. One illustration of this concept might be the physical idol which is cast after the image of a man or after a beast as a metaphysically distinct copy. The idol is not created using the substance of the subject, but rather using of another substance (wood or stone) after the form of the subject.

This notion of εἰκών is not wholly distinct to the Valentinians at this time. Indeed, Philo also sees εἰκών as clarification of the term ὁμοίωσις in reference to form. In *On the Creation* §71 Philo says this, "besides adding the words 'after the image' to the expression 'according to the likeness' to emphasize the exact impression, having precise form."[146] For Philo, the εἰκών of God is clarified to be the λόγος which emanated from the mind of God.[147] The λόγος acts as the stamp and archetypal plan of the whole cosmos—for this reason Philo views the whole cosmos as the image of the λόγος. But the clearest εἰκών of God is observed in the invisible man who is in the intelligible realm— first of all creatures to be made under the archetypal λόγος. The later sense perceptible man is still an εἰκών of God, but to a lesser degree. The sense perceptible man is the image of the εἰκών—he is a copy of the form of the invisible man who was a copy of the

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use the term form in association with εἰκών it generally intends to denote similarity in the sum total parts of the object's appearance. I do not mean sense perceptible appearance—since it is highly unlikely that the *pneumatic* beings are sense perceptible from the human standpoint. Rather that their general form in the *pneumatic* essence is imitated or copied into the lower essence.

[146] Philo, *On the Creation*, §71. "προσεπεσημήνατο εἰπὼν τῷ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα τὸ καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν εἰς ἔμφασιν ἀκριβοῦς ἐκμαγείου τρανὸν τύπον ἔχοντος."

[147] See Appendix A.

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λόγος. For Philo, the closer the object (εἰκών) is to the subject (λόγος) the better the copy is.

The similarity between the Valentinian and the Philonic usage of εἰκών should not be dismissed. For the Valentinians, the *hylic* substance is near to *Demiurge*, the metaphysical nearness is partially associated with the quality of the εἰκών, but it is not the primary association—rather, form is. I do not propose that the Valentinians received this notion of image from Philo with any certainty (nor is that the aim of this thesis). Rather, here I utilize Philo as a parallel source which serves to illuminate the background for the use of εἰκών in the 1st Century.

What of the second reference?[148] What is similar between *Achamoth* and *Bythus* in this scenario concerning the second reference to the image?[149] There is a dynamic similarity which concerns *Achamoth's* self-concealment. The father *Bythus* is concealed in his fullness by nature from all of the *Aeons* within the *Pleroma* (and certainly to all below them as well). The only *Aeon* who has some knowledge of *Bythus* is *Monogenes*— *Sophia* pursued a similar knowledge but was almost consumed by the act. Compare this to *Achamoth's* act of self-concealment from *Demiurge*. She creates *Demiurge*, yet she hides herself from him because of her superior procosmic substance. *Demiurge* is only aware of, and able to engage with, the *psychic* and *hylic* substances; the appearance of the *pneumatic* substances come through the unseen aid of *Achamoth* and is of another sphere

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[148] The clause is as follows, "καὶ αὐτὴν μέν ἐν εἰκόνι τοῦ ἀοράτου Πατρός τετηρηκέναι μὴ γινωσκομένεν ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ."

[149] "And she, in the image of the invisible Father, kept herself concealed from the *Demiurge*."

all-together. It is the self-concealment of *Achamoth* which parallels the self-concealment of *Bythus*.

This is a rather unusual use of εἰκών, but it appears correct and is within the range of use for the term.[150] Here, εἰκών illustrates the concealment of both *Bythus* and *Achamoth* in parallel comparison. *Bythus,* the archetype is imitated by *Achamoth*. So, while the first reference strictly concerns the form as a copy, this second reference has to do with parallel actions in typological repetition.[151]

The third reference is quite difficult to understand.[152] When it says, "he was in the image," who is it referring to? Unger believes that "he" refers to *Demiurge* as the subject. However, Harvey believes that *Achamoth* is the subject. If the subject is *Demiurge*, then in what way has he "preserved the image of *Monogenes*?" It is unlikely that image could refer to parallel relational patterns (*Bythus* → *Monogenes* contrasted with *Achamoth* → *Demiurge*) as it did above in the second reference since there is a stark discontinuity between the two. *Bythus* is known by *Monogenes*, whereas *Demiurge* has no awareness of *Achamoth*. Is it possible that the image could refer to a metaphysical distinction? It is unlikely here. In what way could *Demiurge* (being *Psychic* and possibly *hylic*)

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[150] During the Hellenistic period, one use of εἰκών was to illustrate typological patterns and relationships between archetypes, types, and ectypes. See Fantino, 6-7. This sense either uses εἰκών as a likeness in attributes or actions or as a manifest representation of the deity who is being imaged by action (TDNT, 2:389). An example of this might be Athenagoras, *Supplicatio*, 26, which says "ἃ γὰρ ἡ εἰκὼν λέγεται νῦν ἐνεργεῖν." This use is implicit in the view that the *imago Dei* refers to dominion over creation as an attribute or role which is rooted in God as the archetype. Cf. the following resource as an example Basil, *homiliae de hominis structura*, G. 1. 324. Irenaeus also uses type in association with image as parallel terms while introducing the Ptolemaic view. See *AH* 1.12.1.

[151] Though I have gained much from Fantino's work, he overlooks this example of *imago* and thus emphasizes that form is the only way in which *imago* is used by the Valentinians.

[152] "But he was in the image (εἰκών—*imago*) of the only-begotten Son, and the angels and archangels created by him were in the image (εἰκών—*imago*) of the rest of the *Aeons*."

metaphysically be in the image of *Monogenes*? In form, possibly, but in what way? What if the subject is *Achamoth* as Harvey proposed? In what way could she have been in the image of the only begotten Son? *Monogenes* was the father of all the *Aeons* and the first born of *Bythus*—is there a parallel between *Achamoth*/*Jesus* and *Demiurge* in this regard? She is the producer of the *Demiurge*, who goes on to create the cosmos as we know it. This is more thematically likely than the position that it refers to the *Demiurge,* and it would help explain how the "angels and archangels created by him were in the image of the rest of the *Aeons*," because this exactly parallels what is said concerning the beings that came from *Achamoth* and *Jesus* in *AH* 1.4.5. There is no simple answer to this. It is either repeating what was said in *AH* 1.4.5 in a confounding way, or it is setting up the *Demiurge* in an inconsistent parallel to *Achamoth*. For our purposes, we will only maintain the first two references to imaging, and we will allow some other thesis to work out this confusion.

What may be gleaned from *AH* 1.5.1? Imaging for the Valentinians can bear notions of metaphysical distinctions that are bridged by some notion of form (as with the first reference) and parallel actions/relationships within a typological imitation (as with the second reference). These considerations will carry over into other texts concerning the Valentinian perspective of the *imago Dei*—but only in the function of imaging, not in the essence of the image itself.

Why might this be important for our understanding of Irenaeus? First, we will later observe that Irenaeus also denotes a connection between man and God through the true *imago Dei* concerning form. However, Irenaeus does not distinguish between form

and substance.[153] The form of man is made after the form of Christ who acts as a

metaphysical intermediary (being both man and God in form-substance unity). This

aligns with the grammar of the first Valentinian use that we discussed above, but for

Irenaeus the grammar is applied within a different metaphysical and theological

framework. Irenaeus' position on form-substance unity with regards to the *imago Dei*

becomes a defense of his claims concerning the incarnation of the Word of God as a

recapitulation of his own creation and the resurrection of the body.[154] Second, the

grammar of the second Valentinian use of εἰκών discussed above will come into play for

Irenaeus. There is a typological relationship with Christ concerning the *imago Dei*. Christ

is the prototypal and Archetypal *imago Dei* after whom we are created. Third, we will

observe how Irenaeus' presentation of the *imago Dei* is used (and possibly developed) in

intentional contradistinction to the Valentinians.

AH 1.5.5.

We now turn to our second text (*AH* 1.5.5). This section has a direct impact on the

Valentinian anthropology and their understanding of the *imago Dei*. Here Irenaeus says

this in his presentation of the Valentinian position:

> "Having formed the world, he (*Demiurge*) in turn made the earthly [element] of
> man. He did not make him from this dry earth, but from the invisible substance,
> from the fusible and fluid matter (*ab inuisibili substantia et ab effusibili et* [οὐσία]
> *fluida materia*); then, they decree, into this part he breathed the ensouled element.
> This is he who was made after the image and likeness (κατ᾽ εἰκόνα καὶ
> ὁμοίωσιν—*imaginem et similitudinem*). The material element (ὕλης—*hylicum*) is
> after the image (*secundum imaginem quidem hylicum esse*), by which it comes
> near to God, though it is not of the same substance as he; the ensouled element

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[153] We will see later under the section concerning Justin Martyr that this likely stems from his work. Justin Martyr views the *imago Dei* as referring to the form of man in his physicality. Justin Martyr, *Fragments of the Lost Work of Justin on the Resurrection*, 7. Cf. *Justin's Horatory Address to the Greeks*, 34.

[154] Donovan, *Alive to the Glory of God*, 294.

(ψυχικὸν—*psychic*) is after the likeness. Hence his substance was also called the Spirit of life, since it came from a spiritual emission. Finally, he was clothed in a skin-like garment (δερμάτινον χιτῶνα—*dermatinam tunicam*); and this, they say, is the fleshly element that can be perceived by the senses."[155]

What is the aim and context of this text? Again, we see that the aim of this text concerns the presentation of the substances which undergird the Valentinian anthropology and subsequently their soteriology.[156] This section situates the formation of the human person within the Valentinian cosmogeny, metaphysical structure, and soteriology. The human person is formed by the *Demiurge* in two substances (*psychic* and *hylic*) and is affected by this received nature. Additionally, *Achamoth* introduces the third *pneumatic* substance to the human person unbeknownst to the *Demiurge*. The terms "image" and "likeness" here are associated with the two substances received from *Demiurge* and both terms are rooted in him (rather than *Achamoth* or the *Pleroma*). The physical/corporeal body is associated with death (as we will also see below) and has no part in the Valentinian schema of the *imago Dei*.

The context directly concerns the formation of the *Demiurge* and mankind, but there is a difficulty which arises from an apparent contradiction between *AH* 1.5.5 and

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[155] Esp. see the following subsection within *AH* 1.5.5. "Δημιοθργήσαντα δὴ τὸν κόσμον πεποιηκέναι καὶ τὸν ἄνθροπον τον χοϊκόν, οὐκ ἀπὸ ταύτης δὲ τῆς ξηρᾶς γῆς, ἀλλ᾿ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀοράτου οὐσίας ἀπὸ τοῦ κεχυμένου καὶ ῥευστοῦ τῆς ὕλης λαβόντα καὶ εἰς τοῦτον ἐμφυσῆσαι τὸν ψυχικὸν διορίζονται. Καὶ τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν κατ᾿εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν γεγονότα. Κατ᾿εἰκόνα μὲν τὸν ὑλικὸν ὑπάρχειν, παραπλήσιον μὲν, ἀλλ᾿οὐχ ὁμοούσιν τῷ θεῷ. Καθ᾿ὁμοίωσιν δὲ τὸν ψυχικὸν, ὅθεν καὶ πνεῦμα ζωῆς τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἰρῆσθαι, ἐκ πνευματικῆς ἀπορροίας οὖσαν. Ὕστερον δὲ περιτεθεῖσθαι λέγουσιν αὐτῷ τὸν δερμάτινον χιτῶνα. Τοῦτο δὲ το αἰσθητὸν σαρκίον εἶναι λέγουσι." Cf. "Quum fabricasset igitur mundum, fecit et hominem choicum, non autem ab hac arida terra, sed ab invisibili substantia et ab effusibili et fluida materia accipientem; et in hunc insufflasse psychicum definiunt. Et hunc esse secundum imaginem et similitudinem factum: secundum imaginem quidem hylicum esse, proximum quidem, sed non ejusdem substantiae esse Deo: secundum similitudinem vero psychicum, unde et spiritum vitae substantiam ejus dictam, cum sit ex spiritali defluitione. Post deinde circumdatam dicunt ei dermatinam tunicam: hanc autem sensibilem carnem esse volunt."

[156] Though I say subsequently here, I do not intend to state what comes first—but rather what is of first importance to the section.

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AH 1.6.1-3. The next section (*AH* 1.6.1-3) will clearly state that there are three classes of

men. Their fate is determined by the presence or absence of the *psychic*, *hylic*, and/or

pneumatic elements within their constitution. Though it is not perfectly clear if this is a

metaphysical distinction or if it is simply a metaphorical tool to expound their theology.

The contradiction between *AH* 1.5.5 and *AH* 1.6.1-3 is observed in the notion that

mankind receives the *pneumatic*, the *psychic*, and the *hylic* elements into their created

ontology in *AH* 1.5.5 but then in *AH* 1.6.1-2 particular individuals are associated with

only one or two of these three parts.[157] It is likely that the language in *AH* 1.6.1-3 is a

metaphorical or symbolic support of their soteriology. However, the metaphorical

presentation of the three types of people is so concretely categorized that it appears as if

there are three different human races.[158] Each human individual contains all three parts in

the cosmogeny (*AH* 1.5.5), but there are three classes or races of people who fall into one

of the three material categories in the soteriological sections (*AH* 1.6.1-4, 1.7.5). The text

at hand (*AH* 1.5.5) deals with the material which comprises the human individual. The

later sections (*AH* 1.6.1-3 cf. 1.7.5) may deal with soteriological categories.[159]

      We have addressed the three fundamental substances of the Valentinian

anthropology above, but here I will give a refresher. The Valentinians have three

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[157] See the language of *AH* 1.5.6 contra. 1.6.1-4 and 1.7.5.

[158] Those who favor the Valentinian presentation seem to chafe at the idea that there are three distinct people or races, yet Irenaeus scholars throughout the generations have generally used the language. While it is possible that the Valentinian perspective does not actually present three types of people, it is not clear in Irenaeus' work—which is the focus of this paper.

[159] I must note, as Donovan does, there is no consensus on this matter. There is a lack of clarity concerning the distinction between the presentation of the human person (as containing the three essences) and the soteriological classes associated with those three essences. Donovan, 38-39. Also see the following resource to note parallels between the three types, classes, or races of people in association with other Valentinian texts. Cf. *The Tripart Tractate*, 104, 4-140.

fundamental substances: 1) the spiritual substance (πνευματικός [*pneumatic*]), 2) the

substance emanating from amendment with *Sophia*, the ensouled substance (ψυχικός

[*psychic*]), 3) the substance of passion which is material (ὑλικός [*hylic*]: *materialis*) and

stems from *Enthymesis*.[160] The distinction between these three substances and the "skin-

like garment" (*dermatinam tunicam*) seem to be in their position within the proposed

metaphysical hierarchy. The "skin-like garment" is soteriologically paralleled with the

hylic material in that they will both meet the same end in the eschatological judgement:

they will both be consumed by fire and fully blotted from the cosmos. But the difference

is that the *hylic* material is an animating essence which is underneath the sense

perceptible "skin-like garment." The three fundamental substances are higher material

while the "skin-like garment" is gross/base matter: in other words, even the *hylic*

substance is categorically spiritual in its ontology.[161] It should be emphasized here that

the three substances are categorically spiritual.

     Because of the material distinctions made within the Valentinian cosmology, it is

not possible to interpret Gen. 2:7 as actual "dust" because that would require acceptance

of the claim that the sense perceptible realm preexisted the fall (which contradicts a

central pillar of 'Gnosticism'). For this reason, Irenaeus notes that the Valentinians claim

that the "dust" was actually a fluid matter (οὐσία).[162] It is the vessel that receives the

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[160] *AH* 1.5.1.

[161] See the following text for the division between "gross" matter and higher matter. Harvey, cxxxix. Also, in reference to the term "spiritual," I am not using this term with the same sense as the *pneumatic* substance. I am using it as a general metaphysical category that distinguishes between the sense perceptible and the non-sense perceptible. I am following Donovan's lead in this usage. Donovan, 133.

[162] The issue at hand which causes the division is this: how can man be made in the image of God (Gen. 1:26) and be made from sense perceptible dust or gross matter (Gen. 2:7)? These two notions do not fit within the Valentinian interpretation. The solution here is to determine that the dust is not actually dust, but rather a fluid vessel (οὐσία). This is likely a misunderstanding and improper appropriation of 1 Cor. 15:50

psychic substance from *Demiurge's* breath. It is important to recognize here that the

Valentinian cosmogeny presents the sense perceptible realm as associated with the

wickedness of the fall (Gen. 3:21) instead of the creation account (Gen. 2:7). The

association here is explicit—we are clothed in death: our corporeal bodies are

fundamentally evil. This Ptolemaic-Valentinian position results in the rejection of any

associations between man and God in the corporeal body. Irenaeus however will take an

opposing position. For Irenaeus, the form-substance body of man is made after the

incarnate body of Christ who serves as the ontological *imago Dei*.

Now, on to the use of image and likeness of this text. Both the image and likeness

are in direct reference to *Demiurge*. It is possible that the Valentinians believed

themselves to be in the image of the *Pleroma* because of their *pneumatic* nature. But this

is not clarified here by Irenaeus' presentation.

Let us start with the image. The *imago* here is directly associated with a particular

substance: *hylic*. This is strange because *AH* 1.5.5 makes it clear that *Demiurge* is not

created in the *hylic* substance—though it is very "near" to him. Thus, *imago* here has

some metaphysical connection to the lesser substance which was formed by *Demiurge*

himself. The human person is in the image of *Demiurge* by his/her connection to the

substance which was formed by the *Demiurge*. The human person is not the image itself,

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(which Orbe notes is a common saying among the Valentinians). Antonio Orbe, *Anthropologia De San Ireneo* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1997), 53-57. This is a point that Irenaeus severely discredits in his refutations by presenting the creation of man through a unified interpretation of Gen. 1 and 2. Anders-Christian, "The Importance of Genesis 1-3 in the Theology of Irenaeus," in *Journal of Ancient Christianity* 8, no. 2 (2004): 304. Later, we will see that the Marcosians reconcile the issue by presenting Gen. 1:1-2:3 as separate creation accounts from 2:4-2:24. Holsinger-Friesen makes some helpful remarks concerning the issues of interpretation here for the two presented creation accounts (though he portrays an unhelpful and less nuanced of the Marcosian understanding of the *imago Dei*). Thomas J. Holsinger-Friesen, "Irenaeus and Genesis: A Study of Competition in Early Christian Hermeneutics" (PhD diss., University of Aberdeen, 2006), 154-155.

but rather formed in the material which is associated with the image.[163] This material is noted to be "near to God" though "not of the same substance" as him. It seems then that the *imago Dei* is rooted in the basest of substances for the Valentinians. This may imply that even the *hylics* (who are destined for destruction) are created in the *imago Dei*. Again, εἰκών acts as a bridge between the object (man) and the subject (*Demiurge*). However, this time the emphasis is on the metaphysical nature of the image rather than form.

Now we will turn to likeness (ὁμοίωσις—*similitudo*). Again, both image and likeness refer to the creation under *Demiurge*. The *imago* referred to the *hylic* substance being near to *Demiurge*, but the likeness differs. The likeness is associated with the ensouled substance: *psychic*. This is the substance of *Demiurge*. The likeness here then has a direct metaphysical connection to *Demiurge*. Interestingly, image is the weaker of the two terms in the Valentinian system. The likeness refers to the material, which is shared between the *psychics* and *Demiurge* himself, while the image is a lesser substance formed by *Demiurge*.[164]

What may be gleaned from this text? First, and most importantly, there is a distinction between image and likeness. This is a distinction that does not appear to occur

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[163] This is fascinating, because Irenaeus, as we will see later, occasionally makes a similar distinction in his grammar of imaging: image and likeness may be used with different meanings (see Thesis Section 4.3.2.3). We are not the *imago Dei*, rather we are created after the image of the *imago Dei*. The *imago Dei* is Christ himself for Irenaeus. He exists between us and God the father. Likewise, here, the image is not directly associated with *Demiurge*, but rather associated with the material substance created by *Demiurge*—the *hylic* substance is then the *imago Dei* in reference to *Demiurge*. This consideration possibly stems from Philo, but I am not in a position to state that with any confidence. There are some who have considered the Valentinians to be rooted in Philonic thought (esp. Harnack). See the following resource as well as the appendix on Philo's view of the *imago Dei* at the end of this paper. David T. Runia, *Philo in Early Christian Literature: A Survey* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), 50, 123.

[164] Fantino makes similar claims. Fantino, 81.

in Christian writings previous to Irenaeus.[165] It is not entirely surprising to see this distinction in the Valentinian perspective, since the developed nuance between εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις is observable in a few other Platonized writers prior to Valentinus. But this Valentinian position seems to be a further development of the division of these two terms. Second, εἰκών for mankind is connected to the *hylic* substance, which was created by the *Demiurge*, but is not likely to be of the same essence of *Demiurge*.[166] Third, likeness is associated with the *psychic* substance that is shared between mankind and *Demiurge.* Fourth, the nature of this metaphysical connection to the *Demiurge* has nothing to do with the physical matter of the "skin like garment" but instead has to do with the two procosmic substances received from the *Demiurge*. Both image and likeness are connected to metaphysical components or animating essences. The nature of these essences is invisible and, to put it simply, spiritual. The essence of our likeness is not rooted in character, ethics, or even the rational capacity, but rather in the metaphysical nature of the human person in relation to *Demiurge*.[167] Fifth, likeness is a stronger term in the Valentinian system than image.

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[165] By "Christian" I mean those in the NT era who adhered to some sense of apostolic orthodoxy. Certainly, as we have seen thus far, numerous authors who have claimed to adhere to the Christian faith developed the doctrine of the *imago Dei*. Additionally, there is a Jewish tradition of interpretation that develops the doctrine as well.

[166] It is possible, as Fantino believes, that the image of *Demiurge* is stamped in the *hylic* material which mankind is associated with. However, I did not believe that this position is tenable because of the direct association between the image and the material element (rather than the image of the material element). The sense here has to do with the nearness of man to the *Demiurge*, but this reference places greater emphasis upon the metaphysical essence than other references. Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 81.

[167] It is possible that there are some characteristics that may also be connected to these essences (as they are spoken of in *AH* 1.6.1-3 and 1.7.1) but that is not the direct aim of this particular text and so we should not make that claim here.

Why is this important to our understanding of Irenaeus? First there is an observable distinction between image and likeness in both the Valentinians and Irenaeus. This distinction between *imago Dei* and *similitudo Dei* is observed hereafter in nearly every patristic author. Second, the essence of the *imago Dei* is not narrowly located in the human, nor in the deity, but rather to something in-between the two. For Irenaeus, we will see that the image is rooted in the incarnate Word of God.[168] Third, in contradistinction to his opponents, Irenaeus consistently roots the grammar of imaging into sense perceptible physicality. It is not the spirit in man that images God but rather the form-substance body. This directly opposed to the Ptolemaic-Valentinian perspective which views the image as something rooted in the categorically spiritual *hylic* substance created by *Demiurge*. It seems likely, but preliminary, that Irenaeus developed this position in contradistinction to his opponents. While the parallels are intriguing and may help us to understand his doctrine more fully, we should not emphasize the continuity at the cost of ignoring the stark discontinuity which sets Irenaeus (and the apostolic teachings) apart from the Valentinians.

In conclusion to this section, we should lament that only two sections are worth exploring in relation to the Valentinian view of the *imago Dei*. It is an important background to the development of Irenaeus' intellectual thought on the image and likeness of God. Much has been learned from these two limited sections (being read and understood within the whole Valentinian system) which will benefit our understanding of Irenaeus. This will be the case for the similarities of usage as well as the stark differences between Irenaeus and his opponents. The parallels and distinctions between Irenaeus and

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[168] *Dem* 22.

the Valentinians will be further clarified when Irenaeus' position is expounded below in chapter four of this thesis.

2.2. A Valentinian Sect: The Marcosian Position on the *imago Dei*[169]

In order to do justice to the work of Irenaeus we must, as afore mentioned, make a distinction between the heretical teachers that he presents and refutes. Less work will be done on the Marcosian sect (as well as Saturninus) than on Valentinus. This is not because I believe that Irenaeus deals less with this sect, to the contrary Irenaeus appears to consider the Marcosians as a great danger to the Church and he engages with their views nearly as much as the Ptolemaic-Valentinian perspective.[170] Rather, I will present less background on this sect because it is derived from the Ptolemaic-Valentinian view and shares numerous components. Here we turn to the teachings of Marcus who has supposedly "improved" upon the doctrine of Valentinus.[171]

AH 1.17.1.

The initial section in *Adversus Heresies* concerning Marcus introduces his conceited liturgical and ethical practices: he puffs up prophetesses and spurs them to

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[169] I include Marcus in the Valentinian sect because of the assessment made by Hippolytus, *Haer*. 6.3.9. There is some confusion concerning the Latin text available to us and whether or not Irenaeus considered Marcus to follow Ptolemy or Valentinus. It seems most likely that he follows both through reception of Valentinus (since Valentinus was Ptolemaic), though he diverges significantly from Ptolemaeus. This is also in agreement with Rousseau. See the following resource, Unger, *Against the Heresies*, Book 1, 202.

[170] For another author who notes the importance of the Marcosians in *Adversus Haereses* see the following resource, Holsinger-Friesen, 66.

[171] *AH* 1.13.1.

speak vainly,[172] he amasses great wealth from his religious endeavors,[173] he promotes the inclusion of eroticism,[174] and he (as well as his sect) is prone to boasting of knowledge.[175] *AH* 1.14-21 turns away from his character and ethical failures in order to portray the Marcosian system of thought. Marcus claimed that he received his knowledge and ability from the Tetrad who descended to him in the form of a woman.[176] This deity then presents a numerologically and symbolically rooted cosmogeny wherein the invisible Father (whose name is *Arche* [ἀρχή: being four letters]) creates *Logos*. *Arche* then presents a number of other names concerning himself with different lengths of letters: the sum total name consisted of thirty letters with four combinations. It is these names that are the *Aeons* of Marcus' system.[177] The Tetrad then shows Marcus the *Aeon Aletheia* (truth): each of her physical parts align with Greek letters which have numerological associations.[178] The numerical system is as follows: the "nine mute letters" are of Father and *Alethia*, the "eight semivowels" are of *Logos* and *Zoe*, the seven "vowels" are of *Anthropos* and *Ecclesia*, and there are also three double letters which are counted twice

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[172] *AH* 1.13 2-4.

[173] *AH* 1.13.4.

[174] *AH* 1.13.3, 1.13.5.

[175] *AH* 1.13.6. It should also be noted that *AH* 1.13.6 primarily concerns the disciples of Marcus.

[176] *AH* 1.14.1. The *Aeons* were produced by a tetrad (being *Anthropos*, *Ecclesia*, *Logos*, and *Zoe*). The emphasis upon the first tetrad is similar to Valentinianism, but in the Valentinian model the names and priorities are different and *Bythus* (the first profundity) is included in the Tetrad. The changes within the cosmogeny are only subtle shifts—on the whole they are fairly similar.

[177] *AH* 1.14.2.

[178] *AH* 1.14.3.

(making a total of thirty).[179] These letters and numbers—in allegorical connection to the *Aeons*, the father, and Jesus Christ—are the key to their interpretation.[180] This emphasized use of numerology is supported by their use of gematria, "which is a numerological method of connecting texts," to various biblical passages and names within the scriptures.[181]

Why would the Marcosians (or the Valentinians for this matter) take such great effort to present these frameworks? It seems that they are primarily attempting to reconcile their Platonic dualism with the Christian faith. The Valentinians and the Marcosian are explaining how a spiritual God came to create a *hylic* essence, and further the sense perceptible matter.[182] This is observed in *AH* 1.17.1-2. where the emphasis is on the reconciliation of the invisible and the visible. The visible world is made after the pattern of the invisible *Aeons* behind the veil.[183] For this reason we will see that image language is used concerning lesser material elements which parallel the higher spiritual realm:

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[179] *AH* 1.14.5. Cf. Foerster, 199.

[180] *AH* 1.14.6-7. The emphasis upon numerology is greater than in the Valentinian system. This, alongside the difference between the primary invisible deity are, for our purposes, the key differentiations to make between these sects. One additional, and secondary, division is worth noting. The Marcosian view of the *imago Dei* seems to mirror Philonic and Platonic considerations to a greater degree than the Valentinian view. This will be observed below with respect to the senses of the mind and the notion that the mind is closer to the *imago Dei*.

[181] Nearly any text with a number they can associate with the Ogdoad, Tetrad, or Triacontad is attached through this interpretive method. See the following resource. Presley, "The Intertextual Reception of Genesis in 1-3 in Irenaeus of Lyons," 212.

[182] Themistocles Adamopoulo, "Σοφια, the Creator and the Created Cosmos: Early Christian Cosmogonic and Cosmological Polemics," in *Phronema* 8 (1993): 34.

[183] This is observed concerning Jesus Christ of Nazareth—these systems often portray Jesus as a symbol of the higher unseen spiritual realm. Even reflecting a higher Jesus, Christ, or other *Aeon*.

"I wish to explain to you how they claim that this creation was made after the image of the invisible (εἰκόνα τῶν ἀορατων—*imaginem invisibilum*) beings by *Demiurge's* Mother, who used him as an instrument, thought he was ignorant of this. They assert first, that the four elements, fire, water, earth, and air, were emitted as images (εἰκόνα—*imaginem*) of the Tetrad on high. Now if the energies of these four elements—namely cold and heat, dryness and humidity—are added together, they show forth the Ogdoad exactly (ἀκριβῶσ ἐξεικονίζειν τὴν ὀγδάδα— *diligenter imaginare Ogdoadem*). Out of this they enumerate ten powers as follows: seven spherical bodies, which they also call the heavens; then the sphere that encircles these, which they name the eighth heaven; after these, the sun and the moon. Since these amount to ten, they claim that they are the images (εἰκόνας— *imagines*) of the invisible Decad which proceeded from Word and Life. The dodecad is indicated by the so-called zodiacal circle; for according to them, the twelve zodiacal signs most clearly foreshadow the Dodecad, the daughter of Man and Church. And since the highest heaven was linked to the movement of the whole group and bore down on their sphere, and by its gravity acted as a counterbalance to their speed, the result was that it made the cycle from one sign to another in thirty years. So, they claim it is an image (εἰκόνα— *imaginem*) of Limit who encircles their Mother, whose name is Thirty. The moon, in turn, since it encircles its own heaven in thirty days, expresses (ἐκτουποῦν— *significare* [the Greek is here preferred over the Latin])[184] the thirty *Aeons* by the number of days. The sun, too, since it runs through its orbit in twelve months and, returning to its starting point, completes the circle, manifests the Dodecad by its twelve months. And even the days, since they are measured by twelve hours, are a type of Dodecad. But even the hour, the twelfth part of a day, they assert, is arranged in thirty parts as an image of the Triacontad (εἰκόνα τῆς τριακοντάδος— *imaginem triacontadis*)."[185]

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[184] Harvey, 165n2.

[185] *AH* 1.17.1. "Βούλομαι δε σοι καὶ ὡς αὐτὴν τὴν κτίσιν κατ᾽εἰκόνα τῶν ἀορατων ὑπο τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, ὡς ἀγνοοῦντος αὐτοῦ, κατεσκευάσθαι διὰ τῆς Μητρός λέγουσι, διηγήσασθαι. Πρῶτον μὲν τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖά φασι, πῦρ, ὕδωρ, γῆν, ἀέρα, εἰκόνα προβεβλῆσθαι τῆς ἄνω [πρώτης] τετράδος τάς τε ἐνεργείας αὐτῶν συναριθμουμένας, οἷον θερμόν τε καὶ ψυχρόν, ξηρόν τε καὶ ὑγρόν, ἀκριβῶς ἐξεικονίζειν τὴν ὀγδάδα. ἐξ ἧς δέκα δυνάμεις οὕτως καταριθμοῦσιν. ἑπτὰ μὲν σωματικὰ κυκλοειδῆ, ἃ καὶ οὐρανοὺς καλοῦσιν. ἔπειτα τὸν πεπιεκτικὸν αὐτῶν κύκλον, ὃν καὶ ὄγδοον οὐρανὸν ὀνομάζουσι πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἤλιόν τε καὶ σελήνην. Ταῦτα δέκα ὄντα τὸν αριθμόν, εἰκόνας λέγουσιν εἶναι τῆς ἀοράτου δεκάδος, τῆς ἀπὸ Λόγου καὶ Ζωῆς προελθούσης. Τὴν δὲ δωδεκάδα μηνύεσθαι διὰ τοῦ ζωδιακοῦ τοῦ καλουμένου κύκλου. Τὰ γὰρ δώδεκα ζώδια φανερώτατα τὴν τοῦ Ἀνθρώπου καὶ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας θυγατέρα δωδεκάδα σκιαγραφεῖν λέγουσι. Καὶ ἐπεὶ ἀντεπεζεύχθη, φασὶ, τὴν τῶν ὅλων φορὰν ὠκθάτην ὑπάρχουσαν, οὗπερ ὁ χρόνος [Η. Καὶ ἐπεὶ ἀνεζεύχθη, φησί, τῇ τῶν ὅλων ἀναφορᾷ ὠκυτάτη ὑπαρχούση ὁ ὕπερθεν οὐρανὸς] ὁ πρὸς αὐτῷ τῷ κύτει βαρύνων, καὶ ἀντιταλαντεύων τὴν ἐκείνων ὠκύτητα τῇ ἑαυτοῦ βραδυτῆτι, ὥστε αὐτὸν ἐν τριάκοντα ἔτεσι τὴν περίοδον ἀπὸ σημείου ἐπὶ σημεῖον ποιεῖσθαι, εἰκόνα λέγουσι αὐτὸν τοῦ Ὅρου τοῦ τὴν τριακοντώνυμον Μητέρα αὐτῶν περιέχοντος. Τὴν σελήνην τε πάλιν ἑαυτῆς οὐρανὸν ἐμπεριεχομένην τριάκοντα ἡμέραις, διὰ τῶν ἡμερῶν τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν τριάκοντα Αἰώνων ἐκτουποῦν. Καὶ τὸν ἥλιον δὲ ἐν δεκαδύο μησὶ περιεχόμενον [l. περιερχ], καὶ τερματίζοντα τὴν κθκλικὴν αὐτοῦ ἀποκατάστασιν, διὰ τῶν δώδεκα μηνῶν την δωδεκάτην [Η. Δωδεκάδα] φανερὰν ποιεῖν. Τὰς δὲ [Η. Καὶ αὐτὰς δὲ τὰς] ἡμέρας δεκαδύο ὡρῶν τὸ μέτρον ἐχούσας, τύπον τῆς φαεινῆς δωδεκάδος εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὴν ὥραν φασὶ, τὸ δωδέκατον τῆς ἡμέρας, ἐκ τριάκοντα μοιρῶν κεκοσμῆσθαι διὰ τὴν εἰκόνα τῆς τριακοντάδος…" Cf. "*Volo*

This is not the whole quote, but it is sufficient to support the claim made above. The primary aim of the Marcosians is intellectual reconciliation between the visible and the invisible realms within the system as a whole. Visible and sense perceptible substances image invisible beings. Imaging here, much like in the first Valentinian reference, is used to present the connection and relationship between the higher deities and the physical realm. The four earthly elements image the higher Tetrad, the ten powers image the Decad, the lunar cycle images the Mother and the Triacontad. We observe here that the grammar of imaging remains unchanged from the Valentinians to the Marcosians. Here the use of εἰκών serves the purpose of bridging the visible sense perceptible cosmos with the invisible realm of the Aeons. Εἰκών functions to establish a correspondence between two realities: indicating the existence of a process which is alike between the two as well as similarities to certain characteristics.[186] The difference

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autem tibi referre quemadmodum et ipsam conditionem secundum imaginem invisibilum a Demiurgo, quasi ignorante eo, fabricatam per Matrem dicunt. Primo quidem quator elementa dicunt, ignem, quam, terram, et aërem, imaginem emissam esse superioris quaternationis: et operationes eorum cum eis annumeratas, id est calidum et frigidum, humectum et aridum, diligenter imaginare Ogdoadem, ex qua decem virtutes sic enumerant: septem quidem corporea circumlata, quæ etiam cælos vocant: post deinde continentem eos circulum, quem octavum cælum vocant: post deinde solem et lunam. Hæc cum sint decem numero, imagines dicunt esse invisibilis decadis ejus, quæ a Logo et Zoe progressa sit. Duodecadem autem ostendi per eum, qui Zodiacus vocatur circulus. Xii enim signa manifestissime Hominis et Ecclesiæ filiam duodecadem, quasi per quandam umbram pinxisse dicunt. Et e contrario superjunctum inquiunt, universorum oneri, cum sit velocissimum, quod superpositum est cælum, qui ad ipsam concavationem aggravat, et ex contrarietate moderatur illorum velocitatem sua tarditate, ita ut in xxx anis circuitum a signo in signum faciat, imaginem dicunt eum Hori ejus, qui trgesimam nominus illorum matren circumtinet. Lunam quoque rursus suum cælum circumeuntem xxx diebus, per dies numerum xxx Æonum significare. Et solem autem in duodecim mensibus circumeuntem et perficientem circularem suam apoctastasin, per duodecim menses duodecadem manifestare. Et ipsos autem dies duodecim horarum mensuram habentes, typum non aparentis duodecadis esse. Sed et horam dicunt, quod est duodecimum diei, ex triginta partibus adornatam propter imaginem triacontadis."

[186] See the following resource. Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 69. "La notion d'image établit par consequent une correspondence entre deux réalités indiquant à la fois l'existence d'un processus qui fait passer de l'une à l'autre, l'émanation, et d'une similitude quant à certaines caractéristiques."

between the Valentinian and the Marcosian use of εἰκών is not in the grammar of the concept, but rather the narrow usage of the Marcosians.

For the Marcosians, in this text, εἰκών narrowly refers to the symbolic nature of the lower realm. When proper knowledge is attained, a Marcosian can observe the higher realm exactly through the parallel symbolic forms which exist in the sense perceptible realm. The emphasis on the symbolic (esp. numerological) nature of the lower realm in the way it images the higher realm is quite different from the Valentinians (who root the εἰκών in the procosmic *hylic* substance). The Valentinians use εἰκών in regard to metaphysical substances or parallel actions, while the Marcosians use εἰκών in regard to symbolic forms.

The impact of this text upon our reading of Irenaeus will be minimal. Irenaeus uses εἰκών with a similar grammar (as nearly all references that we will explore), but with a completely different substance, framework, and τέλος regarding his theology, cosmogeny, philosophy, anthropology, and soteriology. His view of the *imago Dei* rejects the Marcosians' hyper-symbolic view and instead sees the image of God as being rooted in the form-substance of Christ incarnate. Indeed, he also explicitly rejects their overly symbolic hermeneutic and interpretive method in general.[187] Irenaeus does point out symbolic parallels in other areas of his work—but not in a way that is related to the *imago Dei* and not in a form similar to the Marcosians.[188]

AH 1.18.1-2.

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[187] *AH* 2.24.1-6.

[188] For examples of Irenaeus using explicit symbolism see the following *AH* 3.11.8, 4.16.1, 4.21.2. and 5.13.1.

We turn now to the second, and last, text concerning the Marcosians (*AH* 1.18.1-2). The context of this section concerns Irenaeus' presentation about the Marcosian cosmogeny from their interpretation of the Genesis account. In this section there is a greater emphasis on the human person as being created in the image of the Triacontad. Irenaeus says this concerning the Marcosians:

> "…Moreover, man too, who was formed (πλαστὸν— *formatium*) according to the image of higher power (ἄνω δυνάμεως—*superioris virtutis*), possesses in himself a power that comes from one source (ἀπὸ τῆς μιᾶ πηγὴν—*ab uno fonte*). This source is situated in the region of the brain (ἐγκέφαλον— *cerebro*), from which flow four powers in accordance with the image of the Tetrad on high (εἰκόνα τῆς ἄνω τετράδος—*imaginem supernæ tetradis*), and which are called first, sight; second, hearing; third, smell; fourth, taste.[189] Moreover, the Ogdoad, they assert is revealed (μηνύεσθαι—*significari*) by man in this: he has two ears and two eyes, two nostrils and a double taste—bitter and sweet. Besides, the entire man, they teach, possesses the entire image (εἰκόνα— *imaginem*) of the Triacontad in this way: he bears the decad in the fingers of his hands; he bears the Dodecad in his entire body, which is divided into twelve members. But they divide the body just as they divide the body of Truth (Ἀληθείας—*Veritatis*)[190]…The Ogdoad, in turn, is manifested as follows: they say that man was formed on the eighth day—sometimes they hold he was made on the sixth day, sometimes on the eighth day, unless they mean that his earthly (χοϊκὸν[191]—*choicum*) part was formed on the sixth day, but his fleshly (σαρκικὸν—*carnalem*) part on the eighth day; as a matter of fact, they distinguish those two things. Some also hold that one man was made masculo-feminine (ἀρσενόθηλυν—*masculo foemineus*) after the image and likeness of God (κατ᾽εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν θεοῦ—*secundum imaginem et similitudinem Dei*), and he is the spiritual (πνεθματικὸν—*spiritalem*) man; the

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[189] It is unlikely that the fifth element is left out from ignorance, but rather from the use of *Timaeus*. Plato does discuss the body and its perceptions, but he does not discuss "touch" as a sense in the way we use it.

[190] Note here that *Veritas* is a personal being, one of the Marcosian *Aeons*.

[191] It is uncertain where this term is derived from. Some propose that it is used from a reading of 1 Cor. 15:47. This may be true, but if it is the term that the Marcosians used, and they appropriated its use from 1 Cor. 15:47, then it would seem that they did not use anything other than the term from the text. The presentation of the passage ("the first man was from the earth, a man of dust; the second man is from heaven") directly opposes their perspective in regard to their cosmogeny (which is the referent of its use here in *AH* 1.18.2). It is more likely that their use of χοϊκὸν here is stemming from a history of usage (see *PGL*, 1526).

other one was formed from the earth (ἐκ τῆς γῆς πλασθέντα—*ex terra plasmatus*)."[192]

There are three primary considerations to pull from this text concerning man being in the *imago Dei*: man imaging the *Tetrad* in his mind, man imaging the whole *Triacontad* in his entire being, and a heavenly man imaging God in his masculo-feminine nature (Gen. 1:26 contra. Gen. 2:7).[193] We will turn to these each in order.[194]

First, we will discuss the man who images the Tetrad in his mind. Before we address the text, we must consider some background/parallel sources for the Marcosian

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[192] *AH* 1.18.1-2. "Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸν πλαστὸν ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽εἰκόνα τῆς ἄνω δυνάμεως ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς μιᾶ πηγὴν [l. πηγῆς δύναμιν]. Ἱδρῦσθαι δὲ ταῦτα [ταῦτην] ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον τόπῳ. ἀφ᾽ἧς ἀπορρεῖν δθνάμεις τέσσαρας, κατ᾽εἰκόνα τῆς ἄνω τετράδος, καλοθμένας, τὴν μὲν ὅρασιν, τὴν δὲ ἀκοήν, τὴν δὲ τρίτην ὄσφρησιν, καὶ τετάρτην γεῦσιν. Τὴν δὲ Ὀγδοὰδα φασὶ μηνύεσθαι διὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὕτως ἀκοὰς μὲν δύο ἔχοντας, καὶ τοσαύτας ὀράσεις, ἔτι τε ὀσφρήσεις δύο, καὶ διπλῆν γεῦσιν, πικροῦ τε καὶ γλυκέως. Ὅλον δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον πᾶσαν τὴν εἰκόνα τῆς τριακοντάδος οὕτως ἔχειν διδάσκουσιν ἐν μὲν ταῖς χερσὶ διὰ τῶν δακτύλων τὴν δεκάδα βαστάζειν ἐν ὅλῳ δὲ τῷ σώματι εἰς δεκαδύο μέλη διαιροθμένῳ τὴν δωδεκάδα. Διαιροῦσι δὲ αὐτὸ, καθάπερ τὸ τῆς Ἀληθείας διῄται παρ᾽αὐτοῖς τοῖς σώμασι…Τὴν δὲ ὀγδοάδα πάλιν δείκνυσθαι οὕτως ἐν τῇ ὀγδόῃ τῶν ἡμερῶν πεπλάσθαι λέγουσιν τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Ποτὲ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν τῇ ἔκτῃ βούλονται γεγονέναι, ποτὲ δὲ τῇ ὀγδὸῃ, εἰ μὴ τὸν μὲν χοϊκὸν ἐν τῇ ἔκτῃ τῶν ἡμερῶν ἐροῦσι πεπλάσθαι, τὸν δὲ σαρκικὸν ἐν τῇ ὀγδόῃ διέσταλται γὰρ ταῦτα παρ᾽αὐτοῖς. Ἔνιοι δὲ ἄλλον θέλοθσι τὸν κατ᾽εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν θεοῦ γεγονότα ἀρσενόθηλυν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν πνεθματικὸν ἄλλον δὲ τὸν ἐκ τῆς γῆς πλασθέντα…" Cf. "*Nec non et formatium hominem secundum imaginem superioris virtutis, habere in se eam, quæ sit ab uno fonte, virtutem. Constitutam autem eam esse in eo, qui sit in cerebro locus, ex quo defluant virtutes quator secundum imaginem supernæ tetradis, quæ vocantur, una quidem visio, altera autem auditus, tertia odoratus, et quarta gustatio. Octonationem autem dicunt significari per hominem sic: aures quidem duas habentem, et totidem visus, adhunc etiam odorationes duas, et duplicem gustationem, amari et dulcis. Totum autem hominem omnem imaginem triacontadis sic habere docent: in manibus quidem per digitos decadem bajulare: in toto autem corpore, um in membra dividatur, duodecadem. Dividunt autem illud, quemadmodum Veritatis apud eos divisum est corpus, de quo prædiximus… Octonationem rursus ostendi sic: in octavo dierum formatum dicunt hominem. Aliquando enim volunt eum sexto de factum, aliquando autem in octavo, nisi forte choicum quidem in sexto dierum dicunt formatum, carnalem autem in octavo: distincta sunt enim hæc apud eos. Quidam autem et alterum esse volunt qui secundum imaginem et similitudinem Dei factus est homo masculo fœmineus, et hung esse spiritalem: alterum autem qui ex terra plasmatus sit.*"

[193] The careful reader will notice that I have left out the use of μηνύω in the body of the paper. Because of the following reasons I have decided to leave the term out of the body of the paper: in this section μηνύω functions in continuity with the general grammar of εἰκών in order to point out how man images a particular grouping of Aeons; no essential changes are made to the notion of imaging in the Marcosian system, numerological connections are still emphasized; and μηνύω is a term with less technical baggage than εἰκών.

[194] A special thanks here must be given to Holsinger-Friesen, a portion of his thesis benefited my understanding of this section greatly. See Holsinger-Friesen, 153-157.

position. How did they come to see the mind as an image of the higher realm? The notion

that the mind is the highest portion of the soul likely stems from Plato's *Timaeus* 90a.

where he says this, "now we ought to think of the most sovereign part of our soul as

god's gift to us…this, of course, is the type of soul that, as we maintain, resides in the top

part of our bodies (our mind)…for it is from heaven, the place from which our souls were

originally born, that the divine part suspends our head…"[195] Plato goes on to set the

developmental goal, associated with τέλος of the human person, in the dedication of the

self toward that which is immortal and divine (being wisdom and knowledge).[196] Since

the mind and its senses are the gateway to wisdom and knowledge then the devotion of

one's mind to attain greater knowledge and wisdom is the path of salvation within the

Platonic system.[197]

Much later we observe that Philo presents the image of the *imago Dei* as spatially

existing in the mind of man.[198] This, alongside other considerations, has led some to draw

parallels between Philo's work and particular Alexandrian 'gnostic' principles. These are

two possible backgrounds to the Marcosians who also view the mind as representing the

higher deities—though certainly more authors could be proposed alongside these two.[199]

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[195] Plato, *Timaeus* 90a. see also the implantation of the "divine seed" (being the mind) in *Timaeus* 73d.

[196] Plato, *Timaeus* 90b-d. Though this shouldn't be taken as an opposition to the care or value of the body, but rather the surpassing value of eternal things (see *Timaeus* 88 b-c).

[197] Plato, *The Apology,* 38a.

[198] Philo, *Who is the Heir of Divine Things* §184.

[199] It can be argued that the mind, which contains the four senses, reflects the highest of the four Aeons. Because the mind here numerologically images the highest of the aeons there is an intuitive parallel—in the Marcosian system, the mind likely has the highest capacity for imaging.

The point of continuity between Philo, Plato, and the Marcosians is the emphasis upon the mind as an image of the heavenly realm. The discontinuity between the Marcosians and these other authors is the way in which the mind is perceived to reflect the heavenly realm (or here, the Tetrad). For the Marcosians, the image is rooted in the numerological association between the four listed senses, which are spatially located in the mind, and the four Aeons of the Tetrad.

We will now turn to explore the four senses which the Marcosians spatially locate in the mind of man. The four senses listed are sight, hearing, smell, and taste. It is not entirely certain how the Tetrad is related to these four senses from the Marcosian perspective. It may be stated with certainty that some connection exists between the elements associated with the Tetrad (fire, water, earth, and air) and the four senses available in the mind.[200] But how would they be associated? Again, the concrete parallels in *Timaeus* concerning the senses illuminate the connections.[201] We should consider §53 and §65-68 of *Timaeus*. In these sections Plato discusses these four essences and how they interact with these four senses. Each of the four senses mentioned align with one or more of the essences in *Timaeus*. Taste deals with the essences of moisture and earth, sight deals with fire (being essentially luminous), smell deals with air, and hearing also deals with air. It is possible that Irenaeus is unaware of the background for the Marcosian position here, after all, Irenaeus does not draw out the parallels between the senses and

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[200] *AH* 1.17.1.

[201] However, the parallels between *Timaeus* and the Marcosians should not be overstated here and read into Irenaeus' understanding of the Marcosian position. The background should be explored so that a better understanding of the Marcosians' view of *imago* here may be portrayed to explore whether or not parallels to Irenaeus' views on the *imago Dei* may be observed.

the essences, but rather suffices to let it be known that four senses of the mind image the

four primary deities of the Tetrad by a parallel of power (δύναμις—*virtus*). But it would

be mere conjecture to assume what Irenaeus knows and does not know about *Timaeus*

from this one section.[202] The point is that the Marcosians receive their understanding of

the mind and the four senses from an over-interpretation and syncretic application of

Plato's *Timaeus*.[203]

For the Marcosians, the four senses of the mind have a connection to the image of

the tetrad. But why is this? Because of the concrete parallels between *Timaeus* and the

Marcosian position, Plato's *Timaeus* may help us to understand the how the four senses

are connected to the tetrad.[204] Plato proposes a differentiation between the higher realm,

the lower realm, and space. The invisible realm (as a first thing) "cannot be perceived by

the senses" but may be known by the sense perceptible lower realm (as a second thing

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[202] It very may well be that it was not in Irenaeus' intended scope to make the connections between *Timaeus* and the Marcosian position here. It seems very likely (as we have discussed above) that Irenaeus has an awareness of *Timaeus* and its contents—but again his pragmatic approach does not always aim to do full justice to the backgrounds of his opponents. Indeed, Marcus would very likely dismiss that his notions came from anywhere other than the Tetrad.

[203] Given the specificity with which they use the senses and elements, this is far more likely than the proposed allusion to the four rivers of Eden. Stephen O. Presley, "The Intertextual Reception of Genesis in 1-3 in Irenaeus of Lyons" (PhD Diss., University of St. Andrews, 2012), 43, http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3167

[204] For Plato, it should be recognized that his use of 'image' takes on a technical meaning—it applies to abstract concepts and acts as a bridge or connection between the sense perceptible world and the intelligible realm. But for Plato, the term is not generally anthropological. In classical Greek thought mankind is not in the image of God. Though in the Hellenistic era, the theme of image develops further and becomes a common (and crucial) term to understand metaphysical and anthropological systems. During this time a shift occurs within the Greek framework for imaging: at the time of Plato, image functions formally, but not substantively, whereas the 'Gnostics' and Irenaeus use the term to denote metaphysical relationship between the object and the subject (even when spanning the higher and lower realms). The shift began in cosmology and turned to later be used with anthropology. See the following resource for more on this matter. Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu,* 5-7.

which "resembles" the higher realm).[205] He then uses image as an example by saying, "since that for which an image has come to be is not at all intrinsic to the image, which is invariably borne along to picture something else, it stands to reason that the image should therefore come to be *in* something else, somehow clinging to being, or else be nothing at all…"[206] The higher realm clings to the lower realm as the subject in the image clings to the image itself. He goes further to explain that there were four elements of the higher realm that were sorted into the lower realm: fire, water, earth, and air.[207] So while the connection is rooted in numerology, there is also a connection between the subject (Tetrad) and object (the mind of man) which is determined by form. The form of the four elements of the higher tetrad is received by the four senses which stem from the mind.

Through researching *Timaeus*, we may observe how the Marcosians may have considered the senses to be associated with the mind and the higher realm. The mind engages with the physical elements of fire, water, earth, and air, partially through the senses of sight, hearing, taste, and smell. These four senses are connected to the mind (in their perspective) just as the four elements are connected to the higher realm. In this reference the Marcosians use image to parallel the highest portion of man to the highest elements associated with the Tetrad through a twofold use of form: 1) numerological association, and 2) association between the four higher elements and the senses which receive and engage these higher elements.

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[205] Plato, *Timaeus* 52c.

[206] Plato, *Timaeus* 52c.

[207] Plato, *Timaeus* 53a-b.

Let us turn now to the second use of εἰκών. Man, in the inherited symbolic nature of his body, images the whole Triacontad in his entire being. This is stated to occur in a similar way to the "body of Truth."[208] In what way is the "body of Truth" divided?[209] In *Adversus Haereses* 1.14.3. Irenaeus expounds the Marcosian notion of the body of truth while presenting the cosmogeny as received by the Tetrad who appeared to Marcus. A personal being known as Truth was shown to Marcus. Truth was unveiled before him and had the Greek alphabet upon her body:[210] "her head on high, *α* and *ω;*[211] her neck, *β* and *ψ;* her shoulders with her hands, *γ* and *χ;* her breast, *δ* and *φ;* her diaphragm, *ε* and *υ;* her back, *ζ* and *τ;* her belly, *η* and *σ;* her thighs, *θ* and *ρ;* her knees, *ι* and *π;* her legs, *κ* and *o;* her ankles, *λ* and *ξ;* her feet, *μ* and *ν.*"[212] We see that the body of truth may be numerically and symbolically divided into separate parts. So too, in the Marcosian system, may man's body be divided to image the Triacontad (which are thirty personal *Aeons*). This is not expounded by Irenaeus, but rather simply presented as is. It is not stated which fingers or parts of the body relate to which specific *Aeons*, though Irenaeus does speculate that the bowels may image Ogdoad since the bowels are hidden and not spoken of.[213]

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[208] *AH* 1.18.1 cf. 1.14.3.

[209] *AH* 1.18.1-2.

[210] I should make it clear to those readers who are unaware of this: the Greeks had no numerical symbols and used their lettering system for numerical designations. There were also three other signs that were no longer used in the Greek system.

[211] See here the parallel again to *Timaeus* in emphasizing the head as being "on high."

[212] *AH* 1.14.3.

[213] *AH* 1.18.1. Here we have a prime example of Irenaeus' classic tongue in cheek sarcasm.

For the Marcosians, the body itself does not image the *Aeons*, but rather, the symbolic nature associated with the body is the image of the *Aeons* in the higher realm. This usage is in the same territory as the preceding use εἰκών immediately before (as discussed above). In the Marcosian system, numerology and form are rooted in symbolic connections to the forms of the higher realm.

It is difficult to see the Marcosian perspective as an improvement upon Valentinianism—at least in Irenaeus' presentation of their thought.[214] They seem to have brought the world of forms into a nearer engagement with the *pneumatic* realm, but they still root the importance of the world of forms solely in what it symbolically reveals about the higher realm. Irenaeus, as we will see does not accept the same categorical divisions. The body and its essence (form and substance [*plasma*] is of importance to God for it is the intimate creation of his hands. This is the case for Irenaeus who also acknowledges the metaphysical distinctions between man and God.[215] Indeed, for Irenaeus the metaphysical distance is bridged by Christ who is the *imago Dei* in fullness of form and substance.

The third use of εἰκών concerns a belief only held by some Marcosians.[216] Here some Marcosians propose that the image and likeness of God refers to some masculo-

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[214] *AH* 1.13.1.

[215] Irenaeus' anthropology (body and soul [additionally Spirit for those redeemed by God]) clearly acknowledge the spiritual realm, but he locates both in the *plasma* of man—for this reason, Briggman proposes that Irenaeus borrows from the stoic notion of "mixture theory." See the following resource on the matter: Anthony Briggman, *God and Christ in Irenaeus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 152-162.

[216] Here it seems that Holsinger-Friesen may have overlooked some information. Irenaeus states that only some Marcosians make this claim; what is said here does not necessarily concern the whole Marcosian view. See Holsinger-Friesen, 155. Cf *AH* 1.18.2. ("Ἔνιοι δὲ ἄλλον θέλουσι").

feminine man (ἀρσενόθηλυν [elsewhere ἀρρενόθηλυς]—*masculo fœmineus*).[217] In the

Ptolemaic-Valentinian system, many Aeons are presented as masculo-feminine. The

parallel is rooted in the reference of the masculo-feminine man and the masculo-feminine

deity. How is it that some humans may be masculo-feminine? There are two options here.

The first option considers the masculo-feminine person to be a sense perceptible human.

In this case then the masculo-feminine distinction likely refers to sex acts and style of

dress rather than the physical ontology of their *pneumatic* essence—for this reason Unger

translates ἀρσενόθηλυν as bi-sexual. This may be a step too far, for this rendering

emphasizes the sexual implications of the term rather than the general sense of the term.

The strength of this position is in the fluid sexual ethics of the Marcosians themselves,

but the term would still be better translated as hermaphrodite or masculo-feminine in this

first option.[218] The second option views the masculo-feminine person as an archetypal

being who exists in the intelligible realm. If this second option is the case, then the

masculo-feminine man is truly *pneumatic* in the sense of the Valentinian metaphysical

hierarchy and likely is an archetypal being rather than a physical being. If this is the case,

then some aspect of the Marcosian is ontologically two sexes. Whether that ontological

aspect is present solely in the present age or in the eschaton is unclear.[219]

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[217] Note that the terms image and likeness are not explained individually here but are coreferential, speaking of the *pneumatic* masculo-feminine person. This may support Fantino's claim, that the terms image and likeness are linked in the whole system of thought, but this is difficult to say. And if we say it here, it must also be said for Saturninus. See Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 70.

[218] *PGL*, 229.

[219] It is also possible that this is an eschatologically rooted ontology which influences the sex ethics of the present age, even though the fullness of the *pneumatic* ontology has not yet been achieved (here we drift into the Marcosian soteriology). But this is less likely.

So, who is this masculo-feminine person? We now turn to explore which of the two options are the most likely. The first option would be likely if homosexual acts were accounted for in Irenaeus' presentation of nefarious deeds of Marcus. However, there is no mention elsewhere concerning same sex acts—the licentiousness that Marcus and his followers are condemned for concern their behaviors with women. Indeed, in reference to Marcus directly, the opposite seems to be true. Irenaeus states that Marcus "devotes himself especially to women…speaking to them with seductive words…"[220] The result of this, according to Irenaeus, is often sexual union.[221] The first option is unlikely.

We now turn to the second option. This distinction between the *pneumatic* and the earthly man attempts to reconcile the creation accounts concerning their anthropology. These creation accounts are interpreted as separate events by the Marcosians.[222] The Marcosians likely read Gen. 1:26-28 as a presentation of the higher man who is the *pneumatic* archetype of all mankind, while Gen. 2:7 is separate, revealing the lower man who is made of earth and shrouded in the sense perceptible world.[223] This reading seems very likely since they distinguish between the days that the *pneumatic* and the earthly man are created.[224] It is possible that this division between the creation accounts comes from the allegorical interpretation of Philo, but it is not entirely possible to determine the exact source for the Marcosians here with much confidence—even still, the parallels are

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[220] *AH* 1.13.3.

[221] *AH* 1.13.3.

[222] This is how the following resources view the case. Holsinger-Friesen, 155. Cf. Presley, "The Intertextual Reception of Genesis in 1-3 in Irenaeus of Lyons," 43-45.

[223] Ibid.

[224] *AH* 1.18.2.

worth exploring.[225] Philo views the man of Gen. 1:26 as the one who is most like the

imago Dei, for he is the image of the divine λόγος (which for Philo *is* the essence of the

imago Dei).[226] The man of Gen. 2:7 retains the image, but is now a third image, being

created after the archetype (who is the invisible masculo-feminine man of Gen. 1:26) who

was created after the λόγος of God.

The parallels between Philo and the Marcosians with respect to the *imago Dei* is

striking. It is only this first archetypal man who is made exactly after the *imago Dei*. The

sense-perceptible person formed by the earthly substance is not made after the *imago Dei*

to the same degree. The Marcosians adapt this notion into the Valentinian position on the

three substances discussed above (*pneumatic*, *psychic*, and *hylic*). Though not explicit

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[225] It is also possible that they are not directly receiving this distinction from Philo, but rather from a previous source. For this notion see the following resource. Michael Goulder, "Exegesis of Genesis 1-3 in the New Testament," in *Journal of Jewish Studies* 43 no. 2 (1992): 228. Also see Holsinger-Friesen, 152. Who proposes that this division is also present with the Ophites as presented in *AH* 1.30. Regardless of the origin, the parallels in Philo are fascinating. Philo, *Her* §230-233 says this, "(230) Therefore, after he has said what is becoming on this subject, he proceeds to add, "But the birds he did not divide;" meaning, by the term birds, the two reasonings which are winged and inclined by nature to soar to the investigation of sublime subjects; one of them being the archetypal pattern and above us, and the other being the copy of the former and abiding among us. (231) And Moses calls the one which is above us the image of God, and the one which abides among us as the impression of that image, "For," says he, "God made man," not an image, "but after that image." So that the mind which is in each of us, which is in reality and truth the man, is a third image proceeding from the Creator. But the intermediate one is a model of the one and a copy of the other. (232) But by nature, our mind is indivisible; for the Creator, having divided the irrational part of the soul into six portions, has made six divisions of it, namely, sight, taste, hearing, smelling, touch, and voice; but the rational part, which is called the mind he has left undivided, according to the likeness of the entire heaven. (233) For in this, also, there is a report that the outermost sphere, which is destitute of motion, is preserved without being divided, but that the inner one is divided into six portions, and thus completes the seven circles of what are called the planets; for I imagine the heaven is in the world the same thing that the soul is in the human being. They say, therefore, that these two natures, full of reason and comprehension—that, I mean, which exists in man and that which exists in the world—are both at all times entire and indivisible." Cf. Philo, *Opif* §134-135. It is also possible that the distinction arises from their exegetical reading (as Presley promotes), however this seems far less likely. The natural reading, even with a Platonized system of thought, does not necessarily lead to a distinction between the two creation accounts. It is more likely that this narrow hermeneutic was derived from a particular author (predating Valentinus who received it from somewhere). Given the parallels between Philo's distinction and the Marcosians, he seems the likeliest candidate, yet I am hesitant to state this with any more certainty than I have.

[226] See appendix concerning Philo.

here, it is the man made after the *pneumatic* substance who received the *imago Dei* and the masculo-feminine ontology. This ontology may be present in the current age, yet the eschaton will purify the ontology.[227] Meanwhile, those of the *psychic* substance who cast off wisdom, and those of the *hylic* substance who are determined for destruction are not formed after the *imago Dei*.

Though I reached this conclusion concerning the Marcosian view of the *imago Dei* in *AH* 1.18.1-2 by considering overlap in the Platonic and Philonic literature, the same conclusion may be reached by a critical assessment of their interpretation of Genesis 1:1-2:3 and 2:4-2:24.[228] For these Marcosians, Gen. 1:26 refers to the wholly *pneumatic* man who is ontologically masculo-feminine in the image of *Bythus*.[229]

The issue at hand, which leads the Marcosians to divide between Gen. 1:1-2:3 and Gen. 2:4-24, is this: how can man be made in the image of God (Gen. 1:26) and be made from dust (Gen. 2:7)? These two notions do not fit within the Marcosian, Valentinian, or other hyper-dualist 'gnostic' systems of thought. As we saw above, the solution for the Valentinians was to claim that the dust was a fluid vessel (οὐσία) rather than physical earth. However, the Marcosians attempt to reconcile the issue by presenting Gen. 1:1-2:3

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[227] *AH* 1.21.2. This will occur when those who are redeemed enter the *Pleroma*. This is likely the same soteriology as the Valentinians.

[228] Presley, "The Intertextual Reception of Genesis in 1-3 in Irenaeus of Lyons," 43-45. There is a vast difference between Presley and Holsinger-Friesen on this matter. Presley views Gen. 1-2 as unified in the Marcosian system—the fleshly element is added in Gen. 3 (like the Valentinian system). Holsinger-Friesen, on the other hand, proposes the division to be between Gen. 1 and 2. Holsinger-Friesen is more supported by the vast majority of scholarship on this point and Presley does not properly support his proposal. I take this as a point on which the Marcosians differ from the Valentinians and likely move towards a Philonic division between Gen. 1 and 2 in support of Holsinger-Friesen. Regardless, the claims made above concerning the *Pneumatic* substance and the *imago Dei* may be supported by either argument.

[229] *AH* 1.2.4. Cf. 1.11.5.

as separate creation account from 2:4-2:24. It is the *pneumatic* masculo-feminine person of Gen. 1:26 who is made after the i*mago Dei*.

In this third reference the *imago Dei* has ontological implications for the future of the redeemed Marcosian. They will become fully *pneumatic*. As *pneumatic* creatures in the *Pleroma*, they will share in the masculo-feminine nature. It is in this way that εἰκών is used in reference to mankind and the *Pleroma*. There is minimal impact from this view on Irenaeus who views the creation accounts as unified parallels.

How are these three Marcosian considerations of the *imago Dei* relevant to our understanding of Irenaeus? We will address them one at a time below.

The first consideration had to do with the human person's mind (primarily concerning the four senses) which image the Tetrad by association with the four essences (earth, fire, water, air). The connection here was fundamentally symbolic. Irenaeus does not make any similar symbolic association between mankind and God concerning the mind. The closest Irenaeus comes to associating the mind with the *imago Dei* is in his use of the term *similitudo* (likeness), which can refer to the human will. If the Marcosian perspective influenced Irenaeus on this point, then it may only be polemically observed in Irenaeus insistence on a wholistic anthropology.

The second Marcosian use of εἰκών concerned the symbolic division of the body as an image of the Triacontad in form. It is possible that these overly symbolic interpretations, paired with the Valentinian approach to the *imago Dei*, pushed Irenaeus toward a physical (form-substance) approach to the *imago Dei*.[230]

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[230] *AH* 5.6.1, cf. *Dem* 22.

The third view, which some Marcosians held, concerned the division between the

creation accounts wherein only the *pneumatic* masculo-feminine man was created after

the *imago Dei* (Gen. 1:26). The lower man created from the earthly material (Gen. 2:7)

did not receive the benefits of the *imago Dei*. Irenaeus does not make this distinction and

rejects this exegetical approach as well as the hermeneutic behind the view.[231] Irenaeus

presents a "non-Platonic ontology," but it is undetermined whether this stems from his

engagement with these opponents, from apostolic teaching, or from his engagement with

the biblical texts.[232] It is likely a mix of the three.

This concludes the section on the Marcosians. The Marcosian position is not

substantively unique by any means in structure or content—it is only slightly distinctive

from the Valentinians within the proposed cosmogeny and heightened emphasis on

numerology (a system likely stemming from the Pythagoreans).[233] This sect seems to

have less of an impact upon Irenaeus' view of the *imago Dei*, except maybe through the

additional pressure to present a non-Platonic structure. He also strongly opposes the

Marcosians' heightened hermeneutical emphasis upon numerology and symbolic

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[231] *AH* 4.20.1, cf. 2.25-28. Holsinger-Friesen, 156.

[232] Holsinger-Friesen, 156. Though as I will argue later, the same non-Platonic distinctions are observed in Justin Martyr's use of the *imago Dei*. It is most likely that Irenaeus' allergic response to overly 'gnostic' Platonized systems was both inherited from the church fathers immediately preceding him as well as formed through his personal engagement with his opponent's concepts. It should also be noted that Irenaeus, though non-Platonic in his ontology, was likely influenced by Platonic thinking because of the general waters of Middle-Platonism in which he waded. This distinction recognizes that Irenaeus non-Platonic in his "accounts of body, physical world, incarnation, and history" while also noting that there will be some Platonic frameworks in his writing—Osborn calls this the "Platonic paradigm." Osborn, *Irenaeus of Lyons*, 17. Because Irenaeus lives amidst the era of the "Platonic paradigm," various aspects of Platonic thought will be observable in his work. Osborn notes that Irenaeus utilizes Plato's concept of participation in explaining his anthropology by maintaining that the spirit is the bridge between mankind and God.

[233] *AH* 2.14.6.

attachments to the higher invisible realm.[234] Indeed, this sort of nonsensical interpretation is just what Irenaeus sees as a great threat to the Church, and so it should be expected that the parallels and borrowed notions would be either diminished or absent. However, his engagement with this sect surely sharpened his arguments and presentation of the apostolic teaching—thus we must engage with it to some degree.

2.3.   A Non-Valentinian Sect: Saturninus' Position on the *imago Dei*

Saturninus (or Saturnilus) was one of the first known Christian 'Gnostics' (prior to A.D. 150).[235] He was a pupil of the Samaritan school with Basilides.[236] He retained a substantive portion of the cosmogeny of Menander (c. A.D. 60-70).[237] He believed that there was "one father unknown to all" who consisted of pure δύναμίς. This God made angels, archangels, powers, and potentates.[238] It was these beings who then formed the world and mankind, but they lacked the power to bring about the man's proper form.[239] Out of pity for this created being, the unknown father descended as a "shining image" and imparted some of his power to the creature in the spark of life (*scintilla vitæ*), this

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[234] *AH* 1.24.6.

[235] Foerster, 34.

[236] Harvey, lxxxviii.

[237] Foerster, 34.

[238] *AH* 1.24.1.

[239] *AH* 1.24.1. Cf. Foerster, 41.

gave mankind their proper form in the beginning.[240] This narrative stems from the Magian perspective of the heavenly spark which Basilides also adopted.[241] Saturninus, concerning his soteriology, taught that spark of life is only given to some and that Christ only delivers those who have this spark.[242] The god of the Jews was considered in this system to be an angel, and Christ appeared to destroy this god.[243] Christ himself was not an angel, but rather an "unbegotten, incorporeal, and formless" who came in the appearance of a man.[244]

AH 1.24.1-2.

There is only one pertinent text which we must consider for Saturninus. It presents the Saturninan cosmogeny and uses the notion of imaging twice. Once in reference to the image of the unknown father, and once in reference to the creation of man (referencing Gen. 1:26).[245] We now turn to *AH* 1.24.1-2.

> "Arising among these men, Saturninus (Σατορνῖλος—*Saturninus*)—who was of
> Antioch which is near Daphne—and Basilides laid hold of some favorable

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[240] *AH* 1.24.1.

[241] Harvey, lxxxix.

[242] Here we have a conflict within the system, a faulty portrayal by Irenaeus, or an absence of information concerning the system. It is uncertain how all who have form received the divine spark, yet only those who have the divine spark receive salvation from Christ. It is unlikely that Saturninus is a universalist, for he is the first to distinguish between two types of persons: one with the divine spark and one without. The contradiction between the creation account and the metaphysical-soteriology was also observed in the Valentinian system.

[243] Foerster, 41.

[244] *AH* 1.24.2.

[245] We have here (alongside the two other Valentinian positions above) an example of the incorporation of scripture into the 'gnostic' cosmogeny. The texts are never considered within the interpretative framework of the original audience, nor within their literary context, nor with any notion of intertextuality—rather, the context is expunged in support of the system of thought. The end result is a very shallow reading and interpretation of the texts themselves. See the following essay which secondarily addresses this issue. Stephen O. Presley, "Irenaeus and the Exegetical Roots of Trinitarian Theology," in *Irenaeus: Life, Scripture, Legacy*, Sara Parvis and Paul Foster eds. (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2012), 165-172.

opportunities and promulgated different systems of doctrine: the one in Syria, the other at Alexandria. Saturninus, like Menander, set forth one father unknown to all (*unum Patrem incognitum omnibus ostendit*), who made angels, archangels, powers, and potentates. The world, again, and all things therein, were made by a certain company of seven angels. Man, too, was the workmanship of angels. When a shining image (*lucida imagine*) appeared from above from the sovereign Power, and they could not keep hold of it because it immediately darted upwards again, they exhorted each other, saying, "Let us make man after his image and likeness" (Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθροπον κατ᾽εἰκόνα καὶ καθ᾽ὁμοίωσιν—*Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem*). He was formed, yet was unable to stand upright, through the inability of the angels to convey to him that power but wriggled on the ground as a worm. Then the power above taking pity upon him, since he was made after his likeness (ὁμοιώματι— *similitudinem*), sent forth a spark of life (ἔπεμψε σπινθῆρα ζωῆς—emisisse *scintillam vitæ*), which gave man an erect posture, compacted his joints, and made him live. He declares, therefore, that this spark of life, after the death of a man, returns to those things which are of the same nature with itself, and the rest of the body is decomposed into its original elements. He has also presented as a truth, that the savior was without birth, without body, and without and without figure, but was, supposed as a visible man—he also maintained that the God of the Jews was one of the angels, and on this account, since all of the powers wished to destroy his father, Christ came to destroy the God of the Jews, but to save those who believe in him (that is, those who have the spark of his life)."[246]

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[246] *AH* 1.24.1-2. The Greek text from Hippolytus is valuable here, but not nearly as exacting as previous parallel texts noted above. "Τοῦτον ποιήσαντα ἀγγέλους, ἀρχαγγέλοθς, δυνάμεις, ἐξουσίας. Ἀπὸ δὲ ἑπτὰ τινων ἀγγέλων τὸν κόσμον γεγενῆσθαι, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον δὲ ἀγγέλων εἶναι ποίημα, ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τῆς αὐθεντίας φωνῆς εἰκόνος ἐπιφανείσης, ἣν κατασχεῖν μὴ δυνηθέντες διὰ τὸ παραχρῆμὰ φησιν ἀναδραμεῖν ἄνωθεν, ἐκέλεθσαν ἑαυτοῖς λέγοντες Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθροπον κατ᾽εἰκόνα καὶ καθ᾽ὁμοίωσιν, οὗ γενομένοθ, φηςὶν, καὶ μὴ δυναμένου ἀνορθοῦσθαι τοῦ πλάσματος διὰ τὸ ἀνδρανὲς τῶν ἀγγέλων. ἀλλὰ ὡς σκώληκος σκαρίζοντος, οἰκτείρασα αὐτὸν ἡ ἄνω δύναμις διὰ τὸ ἐν ὁμοιώματι αὐτῆς γεγονέναι. ἔπεμψε σπινθῆρα ζωῆς, ὃς διήγειρε τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ζῆν ἐποίησε. Τοῦτον οὖν τὸν σπινθῆρα τῆς ζωῆς μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν ἀνατρέχειν πρὸς τὰ ὁμόφυλα λέγει, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ, ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, εἰς ἐκεῖνα ἀναλύεσθαι, τὸν δὲ Πατέρα [Σωτῆρα] ἀγέννητον ὑπέθετο, καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ ἀνείδεον, δοκήσει δὲ ἐπιπεφηνέναι ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸν τῶν Ἰουδαίων θεὸν ἕνα τῶν ἀγγέλων εἶναί φησι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο βούλεσθαι τὸν Πατέρα καταλῦσαι πάντας τοὺς ἄρχοντας, παραγενέσθαι τὸν Χριστὸν ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ τῶν Ἰουδαίων θεοῦ, καὶ ἐπὶ σωτερίᾳ τῶν πειθομένων αὐτῷ εἶναι δὲ τούτους ἔχοντας τον σπινθῆρα τῆς ζωῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς…"
"*Ex iis Saturninus, qui fuit ab Antiochia ea quæ est apud Daphnen, et Basilides, occasiones accipientes, distantes doctrinas ostenderunt; alter quidem in Syria, alter vero in Alexandria. Saturninus quide, similiter ut Menander, unum Patrem incognitum omnibus ostendit, qui fecit Angelos, Archangelos, Virtutes, Potestates. A septem autem quibusdam angelis mundum factum, et omnia quæ in eo. Hominem autem Angelorum esse facturam, desursum a summa potestate lucidia imagine apparente, quam cum tenere non potuissent, inquit, eo quod statim recurrerit sursum, adhortati sunt semetipsos, dicentes: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem: qui cum factus esset, et non potuisset erigi plasma propter imbecillitatem Angelorum, sed quasi vermiculus scarizaret, miserantem ejus desuper Virtutem quoniam in similitudinem ejus esset factus, emisisse scintillam vitæ quæ erexit hominem, et articulavit, et vivere fecit. Hanc igitur scintillam vitæ post defunctionem recurrere ad ea quæ sunt ejusdem generis, dicit: et reliqua ex quibus facta sunt in illa resolvi. Salvatorem autem innatum demonstravit, et incorporalem, et sine figura, putative autem visum hominem. Et Juæorum Deum unam ex Angelis esse ait: et propter hoc quod*

The first reference to the luminous image (*lucida imago*) refers to the unknown father, who seemingly descends into the presence of the created angels and then ascends when the angels attempt to control it. Here it is likely that the *lucida imago* is a metaphysical extension of the unknown father from the higher realm of his domain to the lower realm which the angels inhabit.[247] Though this father is invisible by nature, his power was visible to the angels by luminosity. Saturninus' mental framework allowed the father to be considered invisible and unknowable, and simultaneously allow his power to be visibly luminous (an apparently paradoxical position). The *lucida imago* is a metaphysical extension of the unknown father—the unknown father has made himself known by a manifest extension of his nature (which is δύναμίς). Since the *lucida imago* was perceived by these angelic beings it is required that we observe this occurrence to include the notion of form. This unknown deity manifested his δύναμίς or a portion of himself by metaphysical extension resulting in visible luminous form—the image of this unknown deity was his luminous power.

Is it possible that this use has any connection to Irenaeus' understanding of the *imago Dei*? Well, for Irenaeus, Christ is the *imago Dei* in fullness. The invisible and all-powerful creator, who has made himself known through his covenants, dispensations, people, and revelation is most clearly perceived in the physical representation of Christ. The parallel here between Saturninus and Irenaeus is weak but present. For Irenaeus, where Christ is, so too is the *imago Dei*—for Saturninus, where this *lucida imago* is, so

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dissolvere voluerint Patrem ejus omnes principes, advenisse Christum ad destructionem Judaeorum Dei, et ad salute credentium ei; esse autem hos, qui habent scintillam vitae ejus..."

[247] Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 75.

too is the presence of the invisible unknown father. If there is a point of continuity

between Irenaeus and Saturninus, then it is this: the image is connected to the deity itself

by metaphysical extension being present in form (a non-Platonic distinction). There is far

more discontinuity between these two writers on this matter, but on this one point, the

parallel may have some continuity.[248]

The second reference concerns an allusion to Gen. 1:26. Both *imago* and

similitudo are used here. The context has to do with the creation of man by these angels.

Though man is made by the angels, they proclaim that they will make man after the

image of the *lucida imago* which had previously descended into their midst and then

ascended. Man is made after the image and likeness of the unknown father's

metaphysical extension from the higher realm. For this reason, when the angels fail to

properly form man, the unknown father has pity and places a spark of life (*scintilla vitæ*)

within the human.

It is possible that the angelic beings created man's form while the substance of the

likeness was received in the *scintilla vitæ*, but this is unclarified in the text. What is clear

is the way in which Saturninus distances the created man from God by invention of a

hierarchical cosmology (God→ angelic beings→ man).[249] Amidst this formulated

distancing, man is possibly drawn nearer to the unknown father by the presence of the

spark of life, since this spark of life consists of the power of the unknown father. Though

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[248] In noting the continuity between Irenaeus and Saturninus here I do not intend to propose that Irenaeus borrows from Saturninus. Nor would I say that he formed his position in contradistinction to the *lucida imagine*. It is less likely that Irenaeus was formed by his response to Saturninus to the same degree that he was formed in response to the Ptolemaic-Valentinian perspective.

[249] This isn't necessarily the full presentation of the Saturninan cosmology. There may have been additional layers that aren't mentioned here in Irenaeus' work.

it is also possible that the divine spark may have nothing to do with the essence of the *imago* and *similitudo*—the text does not directly associate the spark of life with the *imago* or *similitudo*.

How are we made in the image and likeness of the *lucida imago*? In a shoddy fashion: mankind is presented as a sloppy idol created by inept craftsmen only to be properly formed by the *scintilla vitæ*.[250] The precise use here again likely has to do with the form of man after the visible form of the *lucida imago*. This is Irenaeus' presentation the position of the *imago Dei* under Saturninus.

This reference will have little to no impact upon our reading of Irenaeus. Irenaeus points out that God is quite near to man, and that man should look no further than God to perceive who fashioned mankind. He also clearly illustrates the quality of the workmanship of God in his act of creation. All of which reveals no borrowing from Saturninus here.

In conclusion, the benefit to this section concerning Saturninus is that we observed a possible parallel between Irenaeus' view of metaphysical closeness between the true imago Dei and God himself (i.e., between form and substance). The other considerations from this section fall to the wayside and only act as further examples of the Middle-Platonic 'gnostic' disposition which intends to distance mankind from God and multiply the metaphysical layers between our physical material and the spiritual realm. Saturninus' notion of imaging follows the particular grammar associated with the

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[250] Here we also have a contradiction between the cosmogeny and the soteriological position. The *scintilla vitæ* was required to give man form. But later in the presentation of their soteriology, the *scintilla vitæ* is vital in the role of soteriology. Not all people have the spark of life, and those who find themselves void of this divine spark have no hope of salvation. *AH* 1. 24. 2. Cf. Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 75.

term, but mankind is nothing more than a poorly crafted idol after the image of the *lucida imago*.

2.4.   A Summary of Irenaeus' Opponents' View of the *imago Dei*

Let us summarize the Valentinian use of εἰκών (*imago*) and ὁμοίωσις (*similitudo*).[251] As we have explored above εἰκών may be used with some diversity in the Valentinian system. In *AH* 1.5.1, the first sense of εἰκών has to do with form. Εἰκών is used to refer to an object which has been stamped in form to appear like the subject. When this use was in play, there was a set metaphysical distinction between the object (e.g. man as *hylic*) and the subject (e.g. *Demiurge* as *psychic*). This metaphysical distinction can be emphasized (as it was in *AH* 1.5.5) or intuitively deduced (as it was in *AH* 1.5.1), but it is always present in the grammar of εἰκών for the Valentinians. Irenaeus, in his representation of his opponents thought, also clarified that the substance of the εἰκών which imaged *Demiurge* was strictly *hylic*. It is this substance in which the form of the *Demiurge* is cast. The second sense of εἰκών had to do with typological relationships. We explored how the Valentinians also use εἰκών to denote particular similarities in actions—such as when *Achamoth* hid herself from *Demiurge*, enacting a dynamic parallel to *Bythus* who hides himself from the *Aeons* (*AH* 1.5.1). *Bythus* served as an archetype to

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[251] I have left out other terms that are similar in the 'likeness' category. For example, *AH* 1.5.6. uses the term ὅμοιος instead of ὁμοίωσις. This use of a slightly less burdened technical term denotes a loose similarity (being near to a 1-1 correlation). ὁμοίωσις is a more nuanced term that may be used with other narrow senses (e.g., form, appearance, likeness of attributes, figure or simile, in reference to metaphysical, typological, or characteristic spheres). Because of the context of ὅμοιος and the lack of impact that it will have on the overall discussion I have determinedly left out the term. Another term is ὁμοίωσμα, this term is used synonymously with *imago* and *similitudo* at different points (*AH* 1.24.1 [cf. 1.14.6]). For discussion on these terms see Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 72, 75, 81-82.

be imitated by *Achamoth*. The relationship between these two *Aeons* was typological (rather than being metaphysical or having to do with form). Now, for ὁμοίωσις, the sense was narrower.[252] In the usage that we explored, ὁμοίωσις denoted a metaphysical likeness between man and *Demiurge*. The ὁμοίωσις was firmly rooted in the *psychic* material which is received from *Demiurge*. Interestingly then, for the Valentinians ὁμοίωσις is the stronger term since it denotes the shared substance between the greater beings and the lesser beings, whereas εἰκών implies a greater to lesser metaphysical distinction and possible parallel actions. One major takeaway was the vast difference between these two terms—they are seemingly used as narrow technical terms with major distinction though they function within the grammar of imaging to make similar connections.

We now turn to summarize the Marcosian perspective on the *imago Dei*. They used εἰκών as a technical term to serve the purpose of bridging the sense perceptible cosmos with the invisible realm of the Aeons. They used the term to narrowly refer to the symbolic nature of the lower realm. The εἰκών of the higher realm is observed in the symbolic numerological form of the lower realm which exactly images the symbolic numerological form of the realm of the Aeons. These symbolic associations may be used in reference to the mind (*AH* 1.18.1), in reference to the symbolic division of the human body (*AH* 1.18.1), or in reference to the ontologically *pneumatic* masculo-feminine man (rather than the ontologically earthly man [*AH* 1.18.2]). The use of εἰκών under the Marcosians is distinct from the use of ὁμοίωσις. However, the text that we explored

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[252] This may be due to the limited usage of ὁμοίωσις. It is possible that the Valentinians had a broader understanding or multiple uses for the term. But the term is only used twice in his presentation of their though, and in *AH* 1.5.2. the use is not worth considering because it is far less technical and in a more speculative presentation of their thought.

(which used Gen. 1:26) did not make an explicit division between the two terms. Because of this (and the dubious nature of that particular Marcosian view) we can make no distinctions here concerning the Marcosian view of the *imago Dei* and their particular use of ὁμοίωσις. Instead, I chose only to speak to their particular use of εἰκών concerning the *imago Dei* and their grammar of imaging. The grammar of imaging remained the same between the Valentinians and the Marcosians with an emphasis on the nature of the symbolic forms.[253]

Lastly, we turn to summarize Saturninus' position on the *imago Dei*. The distinction for Saturninus between image and likeness was either absent from the teachings or poorly portrayed by Irenaeus. The angels made mankind after the image and likeness of the unknown God which they beheld as the *lucida imago*. However, the angels were incapable of properly forming mankind, so the unknown God takes pity on the decrepit nature of the human persons for they were made in his likeness (note that image is not mentioned) and he gives them an upright form. The grammar of imaging again has to do with form, but the distinction between the Saturninans and the Valentinians is the nearness of form to substance in the first referent concerning the *lucida imago*. The *lucida imago*, as an extension of the power of the unknown God, was form and substance conjoined. Mankind was poorly formed after the image and likeness of the *lucida imago* and so required the spark of life (*scintilla vitæ*) from the unknown God.

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[253] I say this excluding the one example in the Valentinian perspective that utilizes εἰκών in referent to parallel actions.

These three opponents have different nuances concerning their aim and use of image and likeness. However, as a general rule they follow a particular grammar—the grammar of imaging—wherein the relationship between the higher realms and the lower realms are explored. We have also observed that the *imago Dei* generally refers to a state of being which has little to no effect upon the ethical frameworks of the people but a great effect upon the soteriological framework of each perspective.[254]

I now turn to point out some preliminary areas wherein continuity between the opponents of Irenaeus and Irenaeus himself may be observed.[255] First, we have observed a fairly consistent grammar to the *imago Dei* and imaging. Image and likeness are generally used as categories of thought which makes an association between lower forms and higher forms, further exploring the relationship between the two.[256] The grammar of the Valentinians was especially important for our work—it was with the Valentinians that image often refers to form while likeness has to do with the substance.[257] Irenaeus will also use image (εἰκών—*imago*) as a term that denotes the form (§4.3.2.3). However, Irenaeus' soteriological-anthropology, soteriology, theology, and biblical account of the cosmogony will require him to use his grammar of imaging with a different emphasis. As

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[254] Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 22. Fantino views the image as a state for the 'Gnostics' of the second century—as the research above has shown, this is true. The soteriological emphasis upon the *pneumatic* person (or the divine spark for Saturninus) divorces soteriology from ethics. The human person is saved by their own divine essence, if that essence is indeed within them.

[255] Though I mention the possibility of borrowing, the discontinuity between Irenaeus and his opponents far outweighs the possible continuity. For this reason, and for the sake of the aim of the paper, I have chosen to expound the continuity. The foundational frameworks of their cosmogeny, anthropology, soteriology, and thus theology is substantively different from one another—they are in opposition. It will follow that their notions of the *imago Dei* also have substantive differences. This will be made clear as we unpack Irenaeus' view in the next section.

[256] Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 79.

[257] Ibid., 81.

we will observe, the Irenaean grammar of imaging uses *imago* to emphasize the importance of a concrete form-substance object with reference to the subject being imaged. Irenaeus however does not use the term 'likeness' with reference to substance. Second, the Saturnian use of image and likeness in reference to the *lucida imago* does not explicitly distinguish between form and substance. This notion parallels Irenaeus in some ways. Marry Donovan Says this about the matter, "In the Irenaean schema, the image of God in the person is in the flesh. This sense of image corresponds to form, and form inheres only in matter."[258] However, the careful reader should also recognize that this notion only held to the manifest presence of the *lucida imago*, not to the human person. Thus, it has little impact upon the *imago Dei* and anthropological considerations. The discontinuity outweighs the continuity when we consider more than the narrow notion of the reference to *lucida imago*. Third, image and likeness are explicitly distinguished from one another in the Valentinian system as presented by Irenaeus. Irenaeus will also, at times, make an explicit distinction between image and likeness—though throughout *AH* and *Dem*, image and likeness are generally used as synonymous terms with reference to the *imago Dei*. There is some continuity here between Irenaeus and the Valentinians. I will speak more to this below.

Let us now synthesize a few considerations worth noting about the image and likeness distinction found in both the Valentinians and Irenaeus.

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[258] Donovan, *Alive to the Glory of God*, 294. She goes on to further say this, "both the Gnostics and the later Alexandrian Fathers hold that the image is in the spiritual part of the human being. Irenaeus rejects this possibility explicitly. Consequently, the image of God in the human being must exist in matter, that is, in our very flesh."

Irenaeus and his opponents both distinguish, at times, between εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις. Though the common-sense reading of Gen. 1:26 views εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις as co-referential and interchangeable (a hendiadys), the terms at some point in church history become divorced from one another. Fantino, in his book *L'homme image de Dieu*, presents a concise history of thought on the development of the doctrine of the *imago Dei*.[259] The distinction between εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις occurs at numerous points throughout the development of the doctrine predating Irenaeus.[260] However, the nearest authors to Irenaeus in this regard are his opponents.[261] While numerous authors between the early Hellenistic period and the early Apologists develop perspectives on the *imago Dei*, the most likely background sources for Irenaeus' position appears to be the biblical canon, his opponents, and an awareness of some of the foundational philosophical concepts of Middle-Platonism.[262]

Irenaeus generally utilizes εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις as inseparable terms in his schema of the *imago Dei*. However, when Irenaeus does distinguish between εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις (with respect to the *imago Dei*) it appears to be formulated in direct contradistinction to the perspectives of his opponents. For this reason, Osborn proposes that Irenaeus is "taking the 'gnostic' position in order to destroy it," and from my own studies, I am

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[259] Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 4-44.

[260] Ibid.

[261] Ibid., 44. Cf. Thesis §3.1-3.3.

[262] Certainly, the early fathers use εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις as distinct terms, but not in reference to the *imago Dei*. See Fantino *L'homme image de Dieu*, 21-40. Irenaeus is the first known church father to make this distinction with respect to the *imago Dei*. It is possible that, at the time of Irenaeus, other authors also made the distinction, but in regard to the referent of the *imago Dei* this would be purely conjecture. There are no existing writings that would support this claim. The most likely claim to make is based on those whom we know Irenaeus engaged with—which here is the Valentinians.

tempted to agree on this point.[263] With regard to the distinction between εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις in Irenaeus, we see the greatest likelihood of borrowing from the Ptolemaic-Valentinian usage.

A second point of continuity where Irenaeus may have borrowed from his opponents is the sense with which εἰκών was used in the Valentinians. Image was used at times with reference to form. Irenaeus also uses the term in this way (§4.3.2.3). The discontinuity between Irenaeus and the Ptolemaic-Valentinians on this point concerns the division between form and substance (which the Valentinians hold and Irenaeus rejects). This second point is far less certain. His understanding of εἰκών, with reference to form-substance, may additionally stem from another background source.

A third point of observed continuity, where Irenaeus may have borrowed from his opponents, is the typologically associative use of εἰκών in the Ptolemaic-Valentinians (*AH* 1.5.1). Irenaeus also uses εἰκών (*imago*) with respect to the imitation of the ontological *imago Dei* (the incarnate son of God). This sense is only observed twice in Irenaeus (*AH* 5.9.3, 5.12.4b).[264] However, this point of continuity may not denote 'borrowing.' It is also possible that Irenaeus may have obtained this use of εἰκών from another source. This point is far less certain than the first point concerning the division between image and likeness.

There were additional areas where Irenaeus' usage of εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις overlap with his opponents (e.g. the *lucida imago* or various points concerning the grammar of imaging). However, none of these other similarities between Irenaeus and his opponents,

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[263] Osborn, 213.

[264] See thesis §4.3.2.3.

with respect to the *imago Dei*, were narrow enough to appear as borrowed concepts. The three points above—and even then, only the first point with some certainty—are possible areas where Irenaeus may have borrowed from his opponents.

With the points of continuity listed, I now turn to point out a possible negative influence upon Irenaeus. The Valentinians, Marcosians, and Saturninans present the physical sense perceptible world as unredeemable. Their soteriology resolves the issue by cutting off the human person from his physicality and restoring that person to the higher spiritual realm. In other words, there is a vast gulf between body and soul in these positions. Irenaeus on the other hand views the human person to be a "unity and composition of [three] separate parts" which are brought together into a close proximity to one another.[265] They are so near to one another that Briggman has proposed that Irenaeus may be appropriating Stoic mixture theory.[266] It has already been mentioned above that Irenaeus presents a non-Platonic anthropology. I believe that Irenaeus, in part, develops his anthropology in contradistinction to his opponents and the underlying dualistic Middle-Platonism that undergird their position.[267]

Further, discontinuity between Irenaeus and his opponents could be expounded *ad infinitum*, but for the sake of this thesis, this one point of discontinuity will suffice. Other

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[265] Forster, 310, 311.

[266] Briggman, *God and Christ in Irenaeus*, 146. It does seem that Briggman overstates Irenaeus' possible utilization of the Stoic's mixture theory. He is right to note that there are similarities, but it is just as possible that he writes without knowing of Nemesius' works and comes to his conclusion in a response to his opponents' radical dualistic anthropology. It suffices to say that Irenaeus emphasizes the unity of the human person's spirit and mind without having to overstate the possibility of his use of mixture theory. It should be received on the spectrum of plausibility, but Briggman's argument does not convince me of the associations between Irenaeus and the Stoics on this point.

[267] It is not merely with respect to Irenaeus' opponents that his position is formed. It is also possible that he receives some of his anthropology from the work of (or in dialogue with) Justin Martyr. Additionally, his interpretation of the scriptures and the apostolic teachings of Polycarp take precedence in his formation.

points of discontinuity between Irenaeus and his opponents pertaining to the *imago Dei* will be intuitively available to the reader in chapter 4 of this thesis.

Now that Irenaeus's opponents understanding of the *imago Dei* has been explored to some degree, we may turn our attention to the possible contemporary Christian sources for Irenaeus' view of the *imago Dei*.

3.   POSSIBLE CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIAN SOURCES PERTAINING TO THE IMAGO DEI IN IRENAEUS

3.1.   An Introduction to Irenaeus' Contemporary Christian Influences

In the chapter above, I explored a few points of continuity and discontinuity between Irenaeus and his opponents with regard to the *imago Dei*. I also discussed the possibility that Irenaeus' emphasis on physicality may be rooted in response to his opponent's anthropology (stemming from their soteriology and observable within their cosmogeny). The observations noted in the above section solely emphasized the possible negative formation of Irenaeus—primarily concerning the development of Irenaeus' thought in response to his opponents. However, it is possible that other positive influencers, or 'orthodox' conversation partners, may also have had an impact on his understanding of the *imago Dei*.[268] In this section, I intend to explore possible orthodox conversation partners in order to observe whether or not any other contemporaries of Irenaeus had a similar schema of the *imago Dei*.

The difficulty here, as we will observe below, is that many of the authors who may have influenced Irenaeus either do not mention the *imago Dei* in their surviving writings, or they do not develop the doctrine of the *imago Dei*. Additionally, Irenaeus does not explicitly attribute his understanding of the *imago Dei* to any authors. Instead,

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[268] There is no doubt that other contemporary Christian authors influenced Irenaeus. The primary question is whether contemporary Christian authors influenced his articulation of the *imago Dei*.

Irenaeus appears to present his view as an authoritative interpretation of the biblical texts in response to his opponents.[269]

As to the non-canonical Christian authors who are generally accepted to be positively formative for Irenaeus, see the following list: Hermas,[270] Ignatius,[271] Papias,[272] Polycarp,[273] Theophilus,[274] and Justin.[275] In the following section I will address these authors in the order presented. I will attempt explore and represent the extent to which each of the authors should be considered as possible sources or conversation partners for Irenaeus. This will be done with the intended aim of narrowing the background of Irenaeus' use of the *imago Dei*.

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[269] This may be a supportive observation to the notion that Irenaeus is, in some sense, a biblical theologian (contra Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement*, 28). This consideration is not made in dismissal of previous comments made concerning Irenaeus and biblical theology in the introduction to Irenaeus. Rather, I make this comment to clarify Irenaeus' apparent primary source material (i.e., the apostles, some notion of canon concerning the NT, and a fixed canon concerning the OT). While the source critical method may be of some help for discerning Irenaeus' hermeneutics on the *imago Dei*, his primary source is the apostolic teaching and the biblical account.

[270] *Herm.* 26 is possibly cited in *AH* 4.20.2. Cf. Hitchcock, 20. This is a less discussed reference.

[271] Hitchcock notes that Irenaeus may have been acquainted with the Syriac versions of three of Ignatius' epistles. Hitchcock notes that there is a reference in *AH* 5.28.4 which is very similar to *Ig. Rom.* 4. 1. The other allusions he notes are less plausible. See Hitchcock, 23. Because of the weaker associations with other writings by Ignatius, only his epistle to the Romans will be taken into account.

[272] *AH* 5.33.3. This is likely the same Papias of Hierapolis mentioned in Eusebius of Caesarea.

[273] *AH* 3.3.4, 5.33.3. *Fragments from the Lost Writings of Irenaeus* 2, 3, and 4.

[274] Irenaeus does not directly cite Theophilus, however there are a number of parallels between the works of these two writers. Lashier points out that both authors began in roughly the same area, they ended up quite far from one another, thereby removing any geographical evidence that might link the two authors (Lashier, 26). However, the parallels between the two writers are so strong that numerous authors have made the connection (For example Lashier mentions Robinson, Loofs, Wingren, and Bacq). Lashier points out two primary parallels between Theophilus and Irenaeus: 1) the use of the phrase "hands of God" (*AH* 2.28.7, 5.5.1, 5.28.4. [Lashier notes *AH* 4.20.1 as well]); and 2) the identification of Σοφια with the Holy Spirit (*AH* 1.22.1, 3.8.3). See Lashier, 28.

[275] Irenaeus quotes Justin twice in his polemics against Marcion, however, the work he cites is a work that is now lost to us. *AH* 4.6.2 and 5.27.2.

First, I will address the possible connection between Irenaeus and Hermas (written before ca. 175) concerning the *imago Dei*.[276] Though there is a quote in *AH* 4.20.2, which was likely borrowed from Hermas, there are no references to the *imago Dei* or subsequent topics in *The Shepherd of Hermas*.[277] Therefore, there is no need to further explore connections between Hermas and Irenaeus in this thesis.

Second, I will address the possible connection between Ignatius (martyred ca. 98-138) and Irenaeus concerning the *imago Dei*.[278] The clearest and most plausible reference to Ignatius in *Adversus Haereses* concerns the phrasing of a line similar to *The Epistle of Ignatius to the Romans*.[279] However, there do not seem to be any other direct quotations from Ignatius' work. I will primarily consider *Ig. Rom.* because it would be unwise to presume that Irenaeus had access to all of Ignatius' epistles by the evidence of one allusion.

Though Ignatius references the *imago Dei* in *Ig. Mag*. 5, *Ig. Smyr.* 9, *Ig. Anti.* 2, and *Ig. Phil*. 13 there is no reference to the *imago Dei* in *Ig. Rom*. Some associations between Irenaeus and Ignatius could be made with respect to the other epistles, but they

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[276] Dating *The Shepherd of Hermas* is a difficult task. It is possible that the document is composite. Certain sections may be earlier, likely the 1st century, while other sections may be dated to the 2nd century. See discussion and pertinent resources in the following resource. Holmes, 445-447.

[277] By "subsequent topics" I mean to include pertinent information concerning an anthropology that may resemble Irenaeus' anthropology.

[278] See the following resources and pertinent references therein concerning the date of Ignatius' martyrdom. Holmes, 170.

[279] *AH* 5.28.4. "As a certain man of ours said, when he was condemned to the wild beasts because of his testimony with respect to God: "I am the wheat of Christ, and am ground by the teeth of the wild beasts, that I may be found the pure bread of God." Cf. *Ig. Rom.* 4.1. "I am the wheat of God, and am ground by the teeth of the wild beasts, that I may be found the pure bread of God."

would be both uncertain and unnecessary.[280] If there was reason to believe that Irenaeus

had access to *Ig. Mag.* and *Ig. Anti.* then we could explore whether or not Irenaeus

received his association between Christ and the image from Ignatius. But this seems

unnecessary because the two authors utilize different language, and both appear to focus

on their interpretation and use of the biblical text.

A stronger argument for the connection between the *imago Dei* and Christ in both

Ignatius and Irenaeus would be to point out their common interpretation of Colossians

1:14-21.[281] What may be gleaned from Ig. *Mag.* 5 and *Ig. Anti.* 2 is that some connection

between the *imago Dei* and Christ exists in the post-canonical discussions prior to

Irenaeus. This should not necessarily be surprising given the connection between Christ

and the *imago Dei* in the Pauline epistles which were widely attested at the time of the

apostolic fathers (Cf. Rom. 8:29; 1 Cor. 15:49; 2 Cor. 3:18, 4:4; Col. 1:15-17, 3:10).

Third, I will address the possible influence of Papias (ca. 70-ca.155/160) on

Irenaeus concerning the *imago Dei*.[282] While Papias of Hierapolis was a widely read and

quoted author, only fragments of his five-volume work (*Expositions of the Sayings of the*

Lord) exist. It is not impossible that there may be some reference to the *imago Dei* in the

complete five-volume work concerning the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth but within the

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[280] In regard to the points of continuity, they would be few since Ignatius does not expand the essence of the *imago Dei* but rather uses it generally. He utilizes it in reference to Christian ethics (*Ig. Smyr.* 9, and *Ig. Phil.* 13. [as in the *Lex Talionis* of Gen. 1:26 and in the ethical emphasis of Js. 3:9) or in a possible connection to Christ (*Ig. Mag.* 5, and *Ig. Anti.* 2. [as in Col. 1:15-17; 3:10, 2 Cor. 4:4, etc.). The association between the *imago Dei* and Christ would be the primary point of contact between Ignatius and Irenaeus—but on this matter, it is more likely that both authors had access to Colossians. These sources above on Ignatius' view of the *imago Dei* contradict what Osborn says in a footnote in the following source. Osborn, *Irenaeus of Lyons*, 211.

[281] For Irenaeus' use of Col. 1:14-1:21 see the following: *AH* 1.4.1, 2.22.3, 3.16.2, 4.20.1, 5.2.1, 5.13.4. For Ignatius' use of Col. 1:14-1:21 see the following: *Ig. Mag.* 5, and *Ig. Anti.* 2.

[282] Holmes, 722.

surviving fragments there is no reference to the *imago Dei* or to sayings associated with the *imago Dei*. Because of this, nothing can be said concerning the *imago Dei* or associated topics in Papias.

Fourth, I will address the possible influence of Polycarp (ca. 69–ca. 155) on Irenaeus concerning the *imago Dei*. As mentioned in the introduction, Irenaeus marks Polycarp as a primary influence on his theology in *Adversus Haereses* and possibly in a letter to Florinus that comes to us through Eusebius.[283] Furthermore Irenaeus directly affirms Polycarp's epistle to the Philippians. There are, however, no references to the *imago Dei* or subsequent topics. While many connections may be made concerning Polycarp's surviving work and Irenaeus, the *imago Dei* and similar topics are not included.

Fifth, I will address the possible influence of Theophilus (later 2nd century) on Irenaeus concerning the *imago Dei*. Theophilus makes direct reference to the *imago Dei* a few times in his surviving work *Theophilus to Autolycus*. In *Autol* 2.11 Theophilus recounts the creation narrative of Gen. 1:1-2:3 which he expounds in the following sections. When he gets to the section concerning man (*Autol* 2.18) he proposes that the

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[283] The indirect influence of Polycarp may be observed in the high praise Irenaeus gives him. See *AH* 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 5.33.4. As for the letter to Florinus see the following quote. "For when I was a boy, I saw thee in lower Asia with Polycarp, moving in splendor in the royal court and endeavoring to gain his approbation…I am able to describe the very place in which the blessed Polycarp sat as he discoursed, and his goings out and his comings in, and the manner of his life, and his physical appearance, and his discourses to the people, and the accounts which he gave of his intercourse with John and with the others who had seen the Lord. And as he remembered their words, and what he heard from them concerning the Lord, and concerning his miracles and his teaching, having received them from eyewitnesses of the 'Word of life,' Polycarp related all things in harmony with the Scriptures. These things being told to me by the mercy of God, I listened to them attentively, noting them down, not on paper, but in my heart. And continually, through God's grace, I recall them faithfully…" Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica,* 5.20.5-7.

imago Dei illustrates the inherited dignity of man. This general observation does not benefit our understanding of Irenaeus' schema of the *imago Dei*.

There is one other another reference to the *imago Dei* in *Autol*. 2.36. Here Theophilus quotes an extensive poem from "the Sibyl" who was a "prophetess among the Greeks." She says that man is made to be the "God formed image, ruler over all."[284] Though Theophilus utilizes this poem, he does not explicitly expound it concerning the *imago Dei*. Again, this reference does not benefit our understanding of Irenaeus' schema of the *imago Dei*.

The remaining image references throughout Theophilus' works generally have to do with physical idols. Theophilus will not benefit our discussion for the following three reasons: 1) his references to the *imago Dei* are undeveloped; 2) there is minimal overlap between Irenaeus and Theophilus with regard to the *imago Dei*; 3) Irenaeus views Theophilus as an opponent after Justin's death.[285] We now turn to the next, and last, author in this discussion.

Sixth, I will address the possible influence of Justin Martyr (ca. 100-ca. 165) on Irenaeus concerning the *imago Dei*. Numerous points of Irenaeus' theology appear to develop original positions observed in Justin's works.[286] There are three primary references to Justin Martyr in Irenaeus' work that are unanimously received by patristic scholars. First, Irenaeus mentions one of Justin's lost works, possibly titled *Against*

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[284] *Autol* 2. 36.

[285] *AH* 1.28.1.

[286] Lashier, 22.

Marcion.[287] Second, there is another allusion to Justin's work in *Adversus Haereses* concerning Satan.[288] And third, a comment concerning Justin and Theophilus.[289]

It is commonly accepted by Patristic scholars that Irenaeus was familiar with more than only *Against Marcion*; numerous other likely connections between Justin and Irenaeus have been proposed in the last 50 years of scholarship.[290] Additionally, those who have worked with *Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching* have noted similar features in *Dialogue with Trypho* and the *First Apology*.[291] Further, it is quite likely that the two authors met in person in Rome during Irenaeus' extended visit.[292] There is very little reason to doubt the dependence of Irenaeus upon Justin on a number of topics.

Some examples of Irenaeus' development of Justinian positions are as follows. First, Irenaeus utilizes a highly systematized notion of recapitulation (ἀνακεφαλαίωσις) in his economy of salvation, similar notions are observed to a lesser degree in Justin's

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[287] For the quotation concerning Justin's lost work *Against Marcion* see *AH* 4.6.2.

[288] *AH* 5.26.2 (which, based on the presentation of Satan in *AH* 5.21.2 may very well be taken from *Dial.* 103).

[289] For the comment concerning Justin and Theophilus see *AH* 1.28.1.

[290] In the following resource, see citations for Grant, Osborn, Minns, and Behr. Michael Slusser, "How Much Did Irenaeus Learn from Justin?" Studia Patristica 40 (2006), 516. Also observe the similarities between *Dial.* 5 and *AH* 2. 34. 4 proposed by Steenberg (Steenberg, *Of God and Man*, 40) or see the proposed connection between *The Fragment on the Resurrection* 8. and *AH* 5.6.1 as proposed by Semisch (Charles Semisch, *Justin Martyr: His Life, Writings, and Opinions*, Trans. J. E. Ryland [Edinburgh: Thomas Clark, 1843], 1:168).

[291] See all references in prior footnote.

[292] This, in conjunction with Irenaeus' engagement with Justin's writings, would help to explain the frequent use and expansion of Justinian ideas—even concerning the development of Justin's development of a "heresiology." Ibid., 519-520. Cf. Lashier, 22. Also, on Heresiology see the following. Alain Le Boulluec, *La Notion d'hérésie dans la literature greque IIᵉ-IIIᵉ siècles* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1985), 36-91. As seen in John Behr, *Irenaeus of Lyons*, 38.

work.[293] Second, both authors have similar arguments and terminology in defense of the physical resurrection but Irenaeus' work in *AH* is more extensive.[294] Third, both authors utilize a similar refutation of Marcion and Valentinian systems of thought which share a number of points.[295] The question remains whether or not the field of the *imago Dei* is included in the growing list of noted fields of dependence. Before diving into the discussion on Justin and the *imago Dei* we will turn to briefly present Justin's anthropology from which we may observe some additional parallels with Irenaeus.

3.2. A Further Exploration of Justin Martyr

3.2.1. Justin Martyr: A Brief Assessment of his Anthropology and Philosophy.

Justin's anthropology could quite easily take up the whole space allotted in this thesis. To avoid taking more space than necessary I will merely summarize Osborn's

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[293] Adolf Von Harnack, *History of Dogma*. Vol. 2. Trans. Neil Buchanan (New York, NY: Russel & Russel, 1958), 305. It is not too surprising that Irenaeus and Justin use the same term ἀνακεφαλαίωσις. Cf. Wingren, 79-90. But the development of the term within each author's economy of salvation shows further development in Irenaeus.

[294] Harvey, 29.

[295] Rev. A. D. Livingstone, "Irenaeus and Gnosticism" (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 1934), 139. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/10092

comments on Justin's anthropology.[296] Some of the concepts mentioned may help us to clarify his use of the *imago Dei*.

Osborn makes five primary observations about Justin's anthropology. First, Justin's anthropology has a great concern for natural moral concepts.[297] His use of φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι stems from the stoics and concerns the innate morality which seems to be in all of mankind by nature. This aspect of his anthropology is tied to his notion that all people have received their rationality from the true λόγος (i.e., Christ) to one degree or another.

Second, the doctrine of the spermatic λόγος is unique to Justin in his presentation and appears to have an apologetic aim.[298] His view is that pagans have access to a "copy, seed, or part of the λόγος," whereas Christians "have access to the whole λόγος."[299] The Christian receives a superior access to divine truth through personal knowledge of Christ and participation in his salvation. So, while all of humanity has an inborn λόγος, this general knowledge is meant to draw the elect to the divine λόγος. This natural λόγος concerns man's freedom of will and thirst for knowledge.

Third, Justin presents mankind's tripart division in two different ways: 1) in *2 Apol*. 10.1 the presentation consists of body, λόγος, and soul in reference to the incarnation; 2) in *Dial*. the presentation consists of body, Spirit, and soul in reference to

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[296] The content may be observed in the following work. Osborn, *Justin Martyr*, 139-153. I have chosen to utilize Osborn for his nuanced approach, his concise presentation, and his careful scholarship concerning the history of research in this field.

[297] Ibid., 140.

[298] Ibid. For the apologetic aspect of his engagement see Ibid., 145.

[299] Ibid.,143. This is very similar to Irenaeus understanding of image bearing in regard to the regenerate and unregenerate.

the continued existence of man.[300] The second division is more likely the anthropological

division, whereas the first is primarily oriented towards moral behavior in light of the

fount of morality.[301] In the anthropological tripart division, Justin presents the soul and

the body as mortal, while the spirit is the animating life of the soul which brings about

motion. The body is dependent upon the soul, and the soul is dependent upon the spirit.[302]

This presents the tripart division in a hierarchy of reliance which removes the possibility

of Stoic mixture theory.[303] The three parts remain distinct from one another in the human

person and are divorceable from one another at death. The same position may be

observed in the *Fragments on the Resurrection*.[304] As it pertains to Irenaeus, the same

anthropological position is observable in *AH* 2.19.6, 5.6.1.

Fourth, Justin notes that man is at the center of God's created cosmos.[305] While

Osborn notes that Stoic anthropocentrism may be an influence on the apologists in this

regard, it should also be noted that Justin Martyr cites and alludes to the creation account

of Gen. 1-2 frequently. Since same position may be in Gen. 1-2 it is unnecessary to

assume the presence of Stoic philosophy on this point.[306] It is because of humanities high

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[300] Ibid., 145.

[301] Ibid., 139, 145.

[302] *Dial*. 6.

[303] Osborn does not explicitly state this, however he does note that they are not three parts "blended in quantitative mixture." Osborn, *Justin Martyr*, 146.

[304] Ibid., 147. cf. *De Resurrectione* 8,10.

[305] Ibid., 148.

[306] Ibid.

position in the created order that we are called to imitate God. Likeness to God in moral

character for Justin is the "true end of man."[307]

Fifth, man is unique because of his "possession of free will."[308] Osborn presents

this fifth point with five subpoints.[309] First, Justin proposes that divine judgement

requires the notion of human culpability and subsequently human free will. Second,

man's ability to make general decisions regarding the course of life requires free will.[310]

Third, since angels appear to have free will, it is likely that mankind also receives a

freedom of the will. Fourth, while fate requires all people to be either all good or all bad

under the economy of God's justice, free will makes sense of the judgement of God.

Fifth, Justin argues that fate requires an arbitrary sense of morality, whereas the freedom

of the will may allow a moral normative in the divine source.

There is significant overlap between Justin and Irenaeus with regard to two

primary points here. First, the tripart anthropological division with the inclusion of the

Holy Spirit is also observed in Irenaeus' anthropology (*AH* 2.19.6, 5.6.1). This overlap

will be further clarified in chapter four of this thesis because Irenaeus proposes his

soteriological-anthropology with reference to the *imago Dei*. Second, Irenaeus makes

similar arguments concerning an insistence of the freedom of will in man with regards to

divine judgement (though he does not discuss the nature of fate). For Irenaeus, the

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[307] Ibid. cf. *Dial* 124.1.

[308] Osborn, *Justin Martyr*, 149.

[309] Ibid., 149-152.

[310] Image bearing and human freedom are intertwined in Irenaeus' theology of the *imago Dei*.

freedom of the will is additionally intertwined with his notion of the *similitudo Dei* (§4.3.2.3).

I now turn my attention to a brief introduction on Justin and his philosophical influences. Discussions on this matter are quite scattered by the eclectic nature of Justin's approach to philosophy as a Christian apologist.[311] Scholars have identified themes and references to Platonism (Plato), Middle-Platonism (esp. Albinus and Plutarch), and Stoicism (especially Heraclitys and Musonius Rufus).[312] Justin highly esteems Plato in so far as he reflects what Justin perceives to be an alignment with biblical or apostolic teaching.[313] Justin openly rejects some aspects of each system but vehemently opposes the Cynics, the Epicureans, and the Pythagoreans.[314]

In regard to Justin's view of the Stoic materialism and fate, we have made some comments in the section on anthropology—overall, he rejects these propositions. Because of his rejection of Stoic materialism, it is unlikely that his view of the λόγος stems from them.

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[311] Craig D. Allert, Revelation, Truth, Canon and Interpretation: Studies in Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho (PhD thesis, University of Nottingham, 2001), 6. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/11370/1/391541.pdf.

[312] L. W. Barnard, *Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought* (New York, NY: University Press, 1967), 30-31.

[313] This is also the case in the form of Justin's metaphysics, but for Justin the higher and lower forms have been reinterpreted through an understanding of God as above and distinct from his creation. Allert also convincingly argues that the same is true of his epistemology: he has a Christian epistemology (wherein a personal God through revelation makes himself sufficiently known) which uses the form of Platonic epistemology (wherein the distinction between the being itself and the knowledge of the being itself is maintained). Allert, 45-58. For some examples see the following. 1 *Apol* 44, 59, 60.

[314] Barnard, 32.

The noted eclecticism in Justin's work makes the disentangling process nearly impossible at times.[315] He uses the philosophies of others to dismantle attacks on Christianity. He ultimately rejects the comprehensive philosophical systems that he utilizes and promotes Christianity as the true philosophy.[316] This is quite similar to Irenaeus' pragmatic and eclectic use of philosophy in promotion of the apostolic teachings.[317]

3.2.2.   Justin's Use of Image and Likeness: Idols and the *imago Dei*

We may now turn to Justin's use of 'image' and 'likeness.' There are two general categories to discuss: image language with reference to idolatry; and image language regarding the *imago Dei*. These categories will be treated in the order presented. In this section I will also discuss Justin's use of μορφή because of the terms importance in understanding the grammar of imaging in general.[318]

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[315] Ibid., 29. Cf. Osborn, *Justin Martyr*, 153.

[316] *Dial* 8.1.

[317] This may be observed in Irenaeus argument against transmigration of human souls (as William Schoedel recognized) and in Irenaeus' debatably partial use of Stoic mixture theory as Anthony Briggman argues. See Briggman, *God and Christ in Irenaeus,* 146-162. However, it is again important to recognize that Irenaeus is not primarily a philosopher, but an apologist living during the period wherein Middle-Platonism was pervasive. Because of this he will naturally be eclectic, but similarly to Justin, Irenaeus' view is that Christianity is the true philosophy by which all other philosophies should be checked. The commonly accepted writings of the Jews, the apostles, alongside the apostolic theology are the foundations through which Irenaeus crafts the rule of faith. This is not to say that he is always consistent in his use of various philosophies, nor to say that the philosophies which he utilizes are implicit within the teachings of the bible.

[318] Something could also be said on Justin's use of σχῆμα throughout his work (esp. in *1 Apol.* 55), however, this term is less important to our work because of its general absence in Irenaeus' sections on the *imago Dei*.

Justin's image language, with reference to idolatry, is fairly straight forward. I will start with *The First Apology*, 9. In this chapter Justin points out the folly of idol worship by noting the disjunction between the form (μορφή) of an idol and the form (μορφή) of God. He says this:[319]

> "And neither do we honor, with many sacrifices and garlands of flowers, the things being formed and placed in temples and called gods; since we know that these are without souls, and dead, and do not have the form of God (for we do not consider God to have form, which some say is fashioned to his honor), but have the names and shapes of those evil demons which have appeared…and often from dishonorable vessels, by simply changing the form, and making an image of the shape they make what they name gods."[320]

In this text, Justin utilizes μορφή, rather than εἰκών, to argue that formed objects (idols) are incapable of portraying the form of God because God has no form. The referent here concerns the invisible Father. This comment concerning the form of God will be important later when we discuss *1 Apol.* 63.

In *1 Apol.* 55 Justin uses εἰκών to refer to an image of an emperor which is erected after their death. This is the normal usage concerning form wherein the greater subject is imaged in a lesser material likeness. The same usage concerning an object created in the image of another and set up for worship is found in *1 Apol.* 62, 64; *Dial.* 65, 69, 94, and *Fragments on the Resurrection* 6.[321] The grammar of imaging is

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[319] All translations of Justin's work (excluding *Fragments on the Resurrection*) are my own from the Greek text presented by the following source. Miroslav Marcovich, ed., *Iustini Martyris Apologiae Pro Christianis,* Patristische Texte Und Studien 38 (Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter & Co. 1994).

[320] Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ θυσίαις πολλαῖς καὶ πλοκαῖς ἀνθῶν τιμῶμεν, οὓς ἄνθρωποι μορφώσαντες καὶ ἐν ναοῖς* ἱδρύσαντες θεοὺς προσωνόμασαν, ἐπεὶ ἄψυχα καὶ νεκρὰ ταῦτα* γινώσκομεν καὶ θεοῦ μορφὴν μὴ ἔχοντα* (οὐ γὰρ τοιαύτην ἡγούμεθα τὸν θεὸν ἔχειν τὴν μορφήν, ἥν φασί τινες εἰς τιμὴν μεμιμῆσθαι), ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνων τῶν φανέντων κακῶν δαιμόνων καὶ ὀνόματα καὶ σχήματα ἔχειν… Καὶ ἐξ ἀτίμων πολλάκις σκευῶν διὰ τέχνης τὸ σχῆμα μόνον ἀλλάξαντες καὶ μορφοποιήσαντες θεοὺς ἐπονομάζουσιν.

[321] *Dial.* 94 uses both εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις.

consistent throughout and offers nothing to benefit the discussion on Irenaeus.[322] What is

worth noting is Justin's additional use of the technical term μορφή to refer to the

formlessness of God the father as mentioned above.

We now turn to consider the texts used by Justin in regard to the *imago Dei*. The

first text to consider is *1 Apol.* 63. Here we observe that Justin maintains his position on

the formlessness of God and states that the visible manifest presence of God—throughout

the theophanies of the Jewish Scriptures—were the manifest appearances of Christ

himself.[323]

> "…But these words were written as proof, that Jesus the Christ is the Son of God
> and Apostle, being of old the logos, and appearing sometimes in the appearance
> of fire, and sometimes in the image (εἰκών) of angels; but now, having become a
> man through the will of God for the human race, he endured all the sufferings that
> the demons instigated the foolish Jews to inflict upon Him…For those who assert
> that the Son is the Father, are proved neither to be able to understand the Father,
> nor to know that the Father of the whole cosmos has a Son; who—being the logos
> and the first born—is also God. And before, he appeared in the form (μορφή) of
> fire and in the image (εἰκών) of an angel to Moses and to the other prophets; but
> now in the times of your rule, as we have said before, become Man by a virgin,
> according to the will of the Father, for the salvation of those who believe on him,
> he endured both to be mistreated and to suffer, that by dying and rising again he
> might conquer death…"[324]

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[322] Also, it should be noted here that Justin quotes Matthew 22:17-21 in *1 Apol.* 17 and says, "Εἴπατέ μοι, τίνος εἰκόνα τὸ νόμισμα ἔχει." Here εἰκών is used with the sense of imprinted likeness.

[323] Justin's emphasis on a high Christology throughout is central to proving that Jesus's role in God's economy of salvation. See the following work to observe a presentation of Justin's Christology and method of proving Christ. Jeremy Andrew Hudson, "The use of the Jewish Scriptures by Early Christian Greek Apologists 140-190 CE: Justin Martyr, Tatian and Theophilus of Antioch" (PhD diss., Cambridge, 2018), 48-52, https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.38571

[324] Ἀλλ' εἰς ἀπόδειξιν γεγόνασιν οἵδε οἱ λόγοι*, ὅτι υἱὸς θεοῦ καὶ ἀπόστολος Ἰησοῦς ὁ Χριστός ἐστι, πρότερον λόγος ὤν, καὶ ἐν ἰδέᾳ πυρὸς ποτὲ φανείς, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰκόνι ἀσωμάτων, νῦν δὲ* διὰ θελήματος θεοῦ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου γένους ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος ὑπέμεινε καὶ παθεῖν ὅσα αὐτὸν ἐνήργησαν οἱ δαίμονες διατεθῆναι* ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνοήτων Ἰουδαίων… Οἱ γὰρ τὸν υἱὸν πατέρα φάσκοντες εἶναι* ἐλέγχονται μήτε τὸν πατέρα ἐπιστάμενοι* μήθ' ὅτι ἐστὶν υἱὸς τῷ πατρὶ τῶν ὅλων γινώσκοντες· ὃς λόγος καὶ πρωτότοκος* ὢν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ θεὸς ὑπάρχει. Καὶ πρότερον διὰ τῆς τοῦ πυρὸς μορφῆς καὶ εἰκόνος ἀσωμάτου τῷ Μωϋσεῖ καὶ τοῖς ἑτέροις προφήταις ἐφάνη· νῦν δ' ἐν χρόνοις τῆς ὑμετέρας ἀρχῆς*,ὡς προείπομεν*, διὰ παρθένου ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς βουλὴν ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας τῶν

In this text we observe Justin's consistency in holding to the formlessness of God, the manifest presence of Christ in the OT theophanies, and the deity of Christ. Further, and more importantly aligned with our aim, we observe how Justin uses εἰκών. In this usage, the image strictly concerns the form of sense-perceptible appearance. The use of εἰκών is here only used to refer to Christ when he was the non-corporeal λόγος. He put on the appearance (εἰκών) of angels or the appearance (εἰκών) of fire before becoming incarnate as a man. In this text we may implicitly observe that Justin views Christ as becoming fully man in the incarnation.[325] The manifest appearances during Christ's pre-incarnate state were physically transitory in so far as the image of the manifestation was temporary. However, after the incarnation the image of Christ and the substance of Christ were permanently altered. In the incarnation, the image and the substance were united in portraying the physical being of Christ (though they were incapable of portraying the deity of Christ). This is again, implicit rather than explicit. In this text there is not enough evidence to claim a likeness to Irenaeus' perspective that Christ is the ultimate *imago Dei* after which we were created. But there is enough evidence here to claim that the use of image refers to the apparent visible form of Christ.[326] This sense is also evident in Irenaeus' work when image is used as a standalone term (thesis §4.3.2.3).

We now turn to Justin's *Dialogue with Trypho* 62 for a more explicit reference to the *imago Dei.* Here (*Dial*. 55-63) Justin is arguing that the theophanies which occurred

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πιστευόντων αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξουθενηθῆναι καὶ παθεῖν ὑπέμεινεν, ἵνα ἀποθανὼν καὶ ἀναστὰς νικήσῃ* τὸν θάνατον.

[325] νῦν δὲ* διὰ θελήματος θεοῦ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου γένους ἄνθρωπος.

[326] It is unclear whether or not Justin makes a distinction between form and substance in his use of εἰκών.

in the Jewish Scriptures were not the appearance of God the father, but rather of the pre-incarnate λόγος who is Christ. He does this by arguing that the God who appeared to Moses was not the Father, but rather the Christ.[327] He then turns to support the claim by considering Jacob's vision of God (*Dial*. 58 [cf. Gen 35:9-10]), the burning bush (*Dial*. 60 [cf. Exod. 3:1-4:17]), and then to our text at hand, which concerns the creation account and the use of the plural ποιήσωμεν as a proof for the existence of the pre-incarnate Christ, contrary to the Jewish interpretations of the passage at the time (*Dial*. 62 [cf. Gen. 1:26, 27-28]). In *Dial.* 62 Justin presents an exact quote of the LXX version of Gen. 1:26-28 saying this:

> "And this, oh my friends, the logos of God, was also said through Moses—revealing to us him who was explained—that God speaks concerning the creation of man with the very same way in these words: 'Let us make man after our image and likeness. And let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the heaven, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over all the creeping things that creep on the earth. And God created man: after the image of God he created him; male and female he created them. And God blessed them, and said, increase and multiply, and fill the earth, and have power over it."

In the text above, Justin does not aim to unpack the meaning of the *imago Dei* for his goal is to defend the existence of the pre-incarnate Christ. Very little may be taken from this citation outside of an awareness that Justin Martyr knew of this biblical text and was willing to cite the whole section in order to present Christ as a preincarnate being, present at the beginning of all things.

Now, before turning to the last reference I must present a nuanced claim concerning the source I will be using. Only three of the works attributed to Justin Martyr found in the Codex Parisinus Graecus 450 (dated to 1364) are generally claimed to be

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[327] *Dial*. 55-56.

authentic. However, one of the texts has been debated as possibly authentic. This text is

known as *Fragments on the Resurrection*, or also as *De Resurrectione*.[328] Following

Adolf Von Harnack, many scholars discredit this work, arguing that it belongs to the

spurious works of Justin (alongside many others in Codex Parisinus Graecus 450).[329]

However, Prigent makes a compelling argument for the authenticity of *Fragments on the*

Resurrection in his work *Justin et l'Ancien Testament*. And, contrary to Slusser's

claims,[330] Prigent finds some modern support within modern Justinian scholarship.[331]

Two of the primary modern authors who support Prigent's work are Osborn and

Skarsaune though there may be others that I am unaware of at this time.[332]

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[328] Osborn, *Justin Martyr*, 13.

[329] Adolph V. Harnack, *Geschichte der Altchristlichen Literatur bis Eusebius.* Die Überlieferung und der Bestand (Leipzig, Germany: J. C. Hinrichs Verlag, 1958), 1:145-150. Other authors who supported Harnack are as follows: W. Bousset, G. Archembault, A. Peuch, F. R. Montgomery, W. Delius, and M. Slusser. Goodenough does not engage with the topic enough to be added to this list though he generally agrees with the general argument following Harnack. See the following resource. Erwin R. Goodenough, *The Theology of Justin Martyr: An Investigation into the Conceptions of Early Christian Literature and its Hellenistic and Judaistic Influences* (Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1968), 78-79.

[330] Slusser dismisses *Fragments on the Resurrection* in his introduction to Justin Martyr without engaging with the scholarship on the matter. See the following work. Michael Slusser, "Justin Scholarship: Trends and Trajectories," in *Justin Martyr and His Worlds*, ed. Sara Parvis and Paul Foster (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2007), 15. Although Slusser—in his division between first trend of Justinian scholarship (being more general and exploratory) and second trend of Justinian scholarship (being more concrete and precise)—recognized that Skarsaune was a compelling scholar whose work fits under the second and more reliable trend of Justinian scholarship, he does not take into consideration the arguments at play in the defense of *De Resurrectione*, nor skarsaune's support of Prigent.

[331] Pierre Prigent, *Justin et l'Ancien Testament; l'argumentation Scripturaire du traité de Justin contre toutes les hérésies comme source principale du dialogue avec Tryphon et de la première Apologie*. Études Bibliques (Paris: 1964). Other authors who support this claim are as follows: C. Semisch, J. C. Th. Von Otto, Th. Zahn, Fr. Loofs. Also see Eric Osborn and Oskar Skarsaune for modern authors in support of *De Resurrectione*. Semisch is especially convincing in his comparison of *De Resurrectione* 8 and Irenaeus' *AH* 5.6.1. where he sees an almost exact quotation to argue for early authorship and then he makes comparisons between *De Resurrectione* and *Dial.* to show unique similarities in phrasing and particular terms (Charles Semisch, *Justin Martyr: His Life, Writings, and Opinions*, trans. by J. E. Ryland [Edinburgh: Thomas Clark, 1843], 166-182).

[332] This is especially true of Osborn who says that "Prigent's case for the authenticity of the fragments [is] entirely convincing," while Skarsaune merely notes the strength of Prigent's argument and presents an author for a counter argument in the footnote. See the following sources. Eric Francis Osborn, *Justin Martyr*, Beiträge Zur Historischen Theologie 47 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1973), 13, 146 n. It should be

Since it is outside of the aim of this thesis to make an argument for or against the authenticity of *De Resurrectione* I will merely comment on *De Resurrectione*—if it is the case that this work is certainly spurious (or so thoroughly redacted that it is uncertain what belongs to Justin and what belongs to the redactor) then this section should be disregarded; however, it if is the case that this work is later accepted as authentic, more credence should be given to this section of my thesis. Either way, the arguments for direct parallels between *Adversus Haereses* and *De Resurrectione* in Semisch and Prigent have gone to show that it is exceedingly likely that Irenaeus drew from this text.[333]

Before turning to the next text, some comments should be made concerning the aim of this text. The author is primarily writing this short treatise against those who would reject the physical resurrection of the sense-perceptible flesh. These opponents of the faith more narrowly view the flesh as the very "cause of our sins" and thus, they abuse their own flesh.[334] These opponents believe that if the physical resurrection of the flesh would occur, then we would be cyclically reintroduced to the infirmities of mankind (as such they disregard the apparent physical resurrection of Christ).[335] Because of their negative view of the physicality of man, these opponents propose that the resurrection

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noted that Osborn is very cautious when using *De Resurrectione*, he does not say that Justin is the author nor speculate who the author is throughout his work (ibid., 75 and 146). Oskar Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy: A Study in Justin Martyr's Proof-Text Tradition: Text-Type, Provenance, Theological Profile*, Supplements to Novum Testamentum 54 (The Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1987), 9.

[333] Though it is also possible that it was written after *Adversus Haereses* and possibly utilizes Irenaeus. Or that it was written by Justin and redacted in light of Irenaeus' work. Though these options appear less likely, even those that dismiss *De Resurrectione* as authentic recognize that it likely belongs to the late 1st or 2nd century.

[334] *De Res.* 2.

[335] Ibid.

occurs only within a spiritual ontology—existing only in incorporeal substance.[336] The

author of *De Resurrectione* states, in contradistinction to his opponents, that the

physicality of God's creation is not in disharmony with the will of God. The author

argues that human sense-perception is divinely approved in the creation account, in the

order of the form and substance of God's creation, and in the economy of the created

world itself. Sin was not brought about because of our physicality—for the soul takes

equal responsibility in any act of sin.[337] Interestingly the author does not attempt to locate

the source of sin itself in response to his opponents, rather argues against their claims

concerning the flesh in another fashion[338] and moves to affirm the physicality of mankind

within the full economy of God's creation of the cosmos and redemption of his creatures.

Now we may turn to the next text. *De Resurrectione* 7 (or 9 if using *Justin*

Martyris ἀπόδειξις *Resurrectionis Carnis*)[339] presents a strong affirmation of the

physicality of God's creation—even in light of the heavenly economy. The author refutes

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[336] Ibid.

[337] Ibid., 8.

[338] The flow of the argument covers a number of topics in support of his position on the importance of the human body, these may be portrayed as follows: the ability of God to resurrect the body without reintroducing infirmary (*De Res.* 2, 4); the role of physicality in procreation and God's willingness to discontinue procreation in the age to come (Ibid., 3); the support of the philosophers on a physical resurrection (esp. Plato, the Epicureans, the Stoics [Ibid*.,* 6]); the importance of God's affirmation of his creation (Ibid., 7); the body and soul being equal parts and taking equal responsibility in the whole human person and their sin (Ibid., 8); the reaffirmation of the physical resurrection of Jesus as the first among many (Ibid., 9-10).

[339] Because the analysis of this text has been so scattered throughout the history of scholarship (esp. following Harnack) there is no consensus on the division of the text. I will be following Rev. Dods translation and section division for the rest of this paper.

those who would discredit the importance of a physical resurrection by diminishing or demonizing the value of the physical world.[340] The author says this:

> "For does not the word say, "Let us make man in our image (εἰκών—*imago*), and after our likeness (ὁμοίωσις—*similitudo*)?" What kind of man? Manifestly he means fleshly (σαρκικός—*carneum*) man. For the word says, "And God took dust of the earth, and made man." It is evident, therefore, that man made in the image of God was of flesh (σάρξ—*carnes*). Is it not, then, absurd to say, that the flesh made by God in his own image is contemptible, and worth nothing? But that the flesh is with God a precious possession is manifest, first from its being formed by Him, if at least the image is valuable to the former and artist; and besides, its value can be gathered from the creation of the rest of the world. For that on account of which the rest is made, is the most precious of all to the maker."[341]

In effort to argue against those who "think meanly of the flesh," the author reminds the audience of the importance of the creation account.[342] Here he unites the initial creation account of Gen. 1:1-2:3 to the creation account of Gen. 2:4-25. This cuts against the grain of the interpreters who attempted to separate these creation accounts in effort to reconcile their philosophical presuppositions and the biblical account— especially the presupposition concerning the greater nature of the spirit and the lesser (or possibly evil) nature of the physical world. The separation of these two sections of the creation account (Gen. 1:1-2:3 and 2:4-2:25) is most clearly observable in Philo, the Orphites, and the Valentinians—though others exist as has been discussed.[343]

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[340] "But following our order, we must now speak with respect to those who think meanly of the flesh, and say that it is not worthy of the resurrection nor of the heavenly economy, because, first, its substance is earth; and besides, because it is full of all wickedness, so that it forces the soul to sin along with it…" Ibid., 7.

[341] I am utilizing Rev. M. Dods' translation here because of a lack of access to the Greek text. I was able to check the translation against a blurred online copy of the following resource: Joannes Ernestus Grabius, *Spicilegium SS. Patrum ut et Hæreticorum Seculi Poſt Christum Natum* I. II. & III*: Seculi II,* (London: E Theatro Sheldoniano, 1699) 2:186-187.

[342] *De Res.* 7.

[343] On the Valentinian reading see the section on Irenaeus' opponents above. On Philo, see Appendix A. For more on the matter review Holsinger-Friesen, 76-134. Cf. Presley, 212-213.

The author locates the person who received the *imago Dei* as the physical Adam. He images God in his whole being (as a bi-part union [*De Res.* 8). Because of the value of the body in relation to the *imago Dei*, and in relation to God's delight of his creation, flesh should not be depreciated. Here, contrary to many later patristic authors (esp. following Origen and other Alexandrian fathers) the *imago Dei* is located within the sphere of the human person's whole ontology. The author does not specify the nature of the *imago Dei,* but interestingly he does not divorce the image from our physical form and substance.

This sense of image bearing is an exact parallel to Irenaeus—though it must be admitted that it is not quite as developed here as it is in Irenaeus. If the text is authentic and belongs to Justin, then here we find a plausible foundation, a common context of thought, and/or a possible conversation partner for the development of Irenaeus' view on the *imago Dei*.

There is one more text to consider. The author of *De Resurrectione* points out the bi-part unity of the human person in a brief comment against his opponents. The anthropology presented in this text does not allow the soul to be called "man" apart from the body, and likewise, the body may not be called "man" apart from the soul. It is only in the union of body and soul wherein we observe the form and being of a creature and call them a human person. He says this:

> "For what is man but the reasonable animal composed of body and soul? Is the soul by itself man? No; but the soul of man. Would the body be called man? No, but it is called the body of man. If, then, neither of these is by itself man, but that which is made up of the two together is called man, and God has called *man* to

life and resurrection, he has called not a part, but the whole, which is the soul and the body."[344]

This text would be misconstrued if it were interpreted as an application of Stoic Mixture Theory, for the parts maintain their distinct spheres within the anthropology. Nor can it be taken as an application of Platonic Dualism, for the parts are only separable as a result of sin. Both parts are equally affirmed as being 'human' in union. This same claim is found in Irenaeus' anthropology. The strong associations between this anthropological view and Irenaeus' view should be taken into consideration—possibly even in support of Prigent and Semisch who believed that Irenaeus used *De Resurrectione*. Again, if this text is, in later scholarship, found to be authentic, then we should take Justin as a vital conversation partner to Irenaeus in regard to Irenaeus' views on anthropology and the nature of physicality as it relates to the *imago Dei*.

3.3. A Summary of the Findings

We may now conclude this section with a general summary. Of all the surviving works of these pertinent authors belonging to the 1st and 2nd centuries, only Justin Martyr has a view of the *imago Dei* which may have the same emphasis upon the physicality of the human person as formed after the image of Christ. However, this observation concerning the similarity between 'Justin' and Irenaeus has more to do with their anthropology—and more narrowly, how their anthropology requires a particular interpretation of the *imago Dei*. Further, this emphasis is only found in a work that has

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[344] *De Res.* 8.

been frequently attributed to the spurious works of pseudo-Justin. If *Fragments on the Resurrection* are found to be authentic, then we ought to observe Justin as a fellow conversation partner or source for Irenaeus' articulation of the *imago Dei*. If *Fragments on the Resurrection* is spurious, then Irenaeus stands alone as the earliest surviving orthodox author to present a doctrine of the *imago Dei* which emphasizes the union of man's respective parts (body, soul, spirit) to be equal parts in the imaging process of the whole man. It is possible that Irenaeus had other conversation partners with respect to the *imago Dei*, but scholarship on this matter is limited by the current manuscripts available to us. With this section concluded, we may now turn to expound Irenaeus' position on the *imago Dei.*

4.   IRENAEUS' POSITION ON THE *IMAGO DEI*

With the pertinent information concerning Irenaeus' life, works, opponents, and contemporary sources presented, we may now turn to Irenaeus' position on the *imago Dei*. There will be three primary sub-sections within this section: first, an analysis of texts concerning the *imago Dei* within *Against Heresies*; second, an analysis of texts concerning the *imago Dei* within *Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching*; and third, a summary and categorization of the findings in light of other academic positions on the matter. This third section will include two additional headings: 1) Christ as the ontological *imago Dei*; and 2) the *imago Dei* in Irenaeus' economy of salvation.

The analysis of these texts will follow the same format and method of the previous analysis of Irenaeus' opponents and possible contemporary Christian influences. A text from *AH* or *Dem* will be introduced, the text will be presented, and then the relevance of the text will be expounded. In the following sections special attention will be granted to where Irenaeus may be either borrowing from his opponents or responding to his opponents to gain some clarity on the extent of his use of his opponents in the development of his views.

A degree of disciplined selectivity will be applied within this section. There are sections in *AH* where Irenaeus refutes his opponents with direct reference to the *imago Dei* but does not necessarily expound his own perspective in the process—since this has received some treatment above, a few of these texts will not be treated in the following

section.[345] Further, there are also texts where our specific terms (*similitudo*, *imago*, εἰκών, ὁμοίωσις, ὁμοιότης, and ὁμοίωμα) are used but applied to completely different topics, these texts will not be included in the primary texts of this section.[346] The secondary passages may be referenced as supportive texts where the grammar of imaging aligns, but this will occur infrequently and will primarily show up in the footnotes.

It should be additionally noted that the names for the Son of God are used interchangeably in both *AH* and *Dem*. They should be taken as interchangeable in the reading of his works as well as in the reading of my presentation of his works. The interchangeability of these terms may be an intentional rhetorical attack to the over analysis and division of the referents of the divine names in the Ptolemaic-Valentinian perspective.

4.1.   The *imago Dei* in *Against Heresies*

<u>*AH* 2.7.1-2.8.3.</u>

The first pertinent section is *AH* 2.7.1-2.8.2. These chapters are situated in book II wherein Irenaeus—having presented the thoughts of his opponents in book I—now intends to directly respond to their ideas on the *Pleroma* as it exists above God.[347] These sections on the *imago Dei* must be read in light of the background information presented

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[345] See the following sections for examples. *AH* 2.6.3, 2.7.1, 4.20.1, 5.15.4, 5.28.4.

[346] Some examples are as follows: *AH* 2.17.3, 3.6.5, 3.12.13, 3.21.10, 4.20.10-11, 4.36.7.

[347] *AH* 2. Pref. Cf. Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 82.

above on Irenaeus' opponents because Irenaeus' aim here is polemic.[348] Irenaeus has two

primary stated intentions throughout *AH* 2.7-8. They are as follows: first, he aims to

undermine the notion that the individual forms within the world are images of the

Pleroma, *Enthymesis*, or *Bythus* (*AH* 2.7.1-7); and second, that the created things are not

a shadow of those above (2.8.1-3). These two sections will receive some analysis below.

There is one further note of importance before moving forward. It should be

recalled that, for the Valentinians, there is often a distinction (within their anthropological

use) between image and likeness—image reflects the material element (ὑλικός), while the

likeness reflects the ensouled element (ψυχικός). The section below does not only address

the Ptolemaic-Valentinian anthropological division, but also presents a refutation of their

understanding of the grammar of imaging. While the Ptolemaic-Valentinian

anthropological distinction is of value in understanding Irenaeus' refutation here, the

additional benefit of this section is that his refutation of their grammar of imaging

clarifies Irenaeus' own position on the grammar of imaging.

In *AH* 2.7.1-8. Irenaeus begins by noting that if *Soter* created likenesses and

images (*similitudines et imagines*) of the *Pleroma* through *Enthymesis* (cf. 1.4.1-1.5.6),

then his attempt to honor the *Pleroma* was a failure. Irenaeus states that *Soter* only

succeeded in showing his own vainglory.[349] For if *Soter* wanted to honor eternal beings

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[348] It should be mentioned that in this section Irenaeus treatment of his opponents may be reductionistic here due to his rhetorical method. As Minns notes "among Irenaeus' favorite rhetorical tools is the dilemma: he tries to force his opponents to a position where they must accept either of two equally unacceptable alternatives…when, in fact, other possibilities may exist." Though this section contains some of that (esp. *AH* 2.7.7), on the whole Irenaeus "did consider the accurate reporting of the views of his opponents, or exposure of their absurdity, as he called it, to be one of his most effective weapons against them" (again Minns). See Minns for a treatment of the issue. Minns, *Irenaeus*, 35.

[349] *AH* 2.7.1.

by creating an image of them, then he should have made images that are eternal rather than fading and finite. "For what honor can those things which are temporal confer on such as are eternal and endure forever? Or those which pass away on such as remains? Or those which are corruptible on such as are incorruptible?"[350] If *Soter* did create these things and the image is dissimilar, then *Soter* is merely a "poor workman."[351] The central assumption in Irenaeus' critique here is that only eternal forms may serve to honor eternal beings. If a being or object lacks a form with appropriate likeness to the being which it images, then as the images fade, so too does the honor the image served to produce.

Irenaeus' position differs from his opponents on the nature of the association between God and the creation in the grammar of imaging. The Ptolemaic-Valentinians believed that symbolic association between the higher realms and the lower realms was sufficient. Even if that image were to fade. Irenaeus critiques their view because of the immense dissimilarity of forms between the *Pleroma* and the objects of the lower realm.[352] In this argument, Irenaeus agrees with his opponents on a distinction between some higher realm and the creation, but he disagrees with their conclusions.[353] From Irenaeus' perspective, the same critique could not be leveled at the Apostolic Christian perspective, because—as we will observe later—Christ is the image of God. Mankind is only created *in* that image and *after* his/their likeness.

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[350] *Quis enim honor est aeternorum eorum quae semper sunt e aquae sunt temporalia, eorum quae stant ea quae praetereunt, incorruptibilium corruptibilia?*

[351] *AH* 2.7.2.

[352] *AH* 2.7.2. Also see the following resource for a similar reading of this section concerning form. Donovan, *One Right Reading?*, 133.

[353] Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 82, 86.

Irenaeus continues his critique of his opponents view by questioning how the thirty *Aeons* of the *Pleroma* (each of which are associated with concepts or objects by symbolic association) could possibly be represented by the immense diversity found in the world.[354] Irenaeus argues that the Ptolemaic-Valentinian perspective fails to explain where these forms originate from because they are mere symbolic representatives and thus fail to present any concrete source for the origin of forms.[355] Given the immense disparateness between the object (material cosmos) and the subject (the *Pleroma*) Irenaeus rejects the position that things below could be imaged by the *Aeons* of the Ptolemaic-Valentinian system. This may be observed in the following quote from *AH* 2.7.6-7:

> "But, again, how can these things [below] be images of those [above], since they
> are really contrary to them, and can in no respect have sympathy with them? For
> those things which are contrary to each other may indeed be destructive of those
> to which they are contrary, but can by no means be their images—as, for instance,
> water and fire; or, again, light and darkness, and other such things, can never be
> the images of one another. In like manner, neither can those things which are
> corruptible and earthly, and of a compound (*composita*) nature, and transitory, be
> the images of those which, according to these men, are spiritual; unless these very
> things themselves be allowed to be compound, limited in space, and of a definite
> shape, and thus no longer spiritual, and diffused, and spreading into vast extent,
> and incomprehensible. For they must of necessity be possessed of a definite
> figure, and confined within certain limits, that they may be true images; and then
> it is decided that they are not spiritual. If, however, these men maintain that they
> are spiritual, and diffused, and incomprehensible (*effusa et incomprehensibilia*),
> how can those things which are possessed of figure, and confined within certain
> limits, be the images of such as are destitute of figure and incomprehensible? If,
> again, they affirm that neither according to configuration nor formation, but
> according to number and the order of production, those things [above] are the

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[354] *AH* 2.7.3. Further, he questions how these beings who are equal in power, nature, and practice could be presented by a creation that is at war with itself—if there is good and evil within the creation then there must be evil too in the *Aeons* (*AH* 2.7.3-4). If his opponents propose that evil arose from *Enthymesis* then they determine that she is the cause of evil (*AH* 2.7.4).

[355] The symbolic nature of the association between the lower realm and the *Pleroma* is generally specified according to numbers, letters, orders of production, or formation as seen in the work above and in our current section (*AH* 2.7.7).

images [of these below], then, in the first place, these things [below] ought not to be spoken of as images and likenesses of those Aeons that are above. For how can the things which have neither the fashion nor shape of those [above] be their images…"[356]

Irenaeus does not explicitly propose here how he thinks the Christian should view the nature of forms in relationship to the spiritual realm. However, implicit in his argument is the idea that a spirit may become composite in order to become an image for other composite beings.[357] Symbolic association is not sufficient for Irenaeus' grammar of imaging. For Irenaeus, the spiritual ontology may not be imaged by material forms unless that purely spiritual being puts on a form that serves to make it sense perceptibly available to the composite creature.

Involved in his position are two suppositions: 1) regarding the nature of spirit, and 2) regarding the grammar of imaging. First, for Irenaeus, spirit is *effusa et incomprehensibilia* (*AH* 2.6.6-7), "spirit should be regarded as infinite" and boundless in nature.[358] Because of the nature of spirit, it is not possible that it could be imaged unless it condescends and puts on form limitation. Second, Irenaeus does not accept the Ptolemaic-Valentinian position regarding the grammar of imaging. For the Ptolemaic-Valentinians a higher realm may be imaged by the lower realm symbolically and abstractly; mere association suffices for their grammar of imaging. However, it appears that Irenaeus believes that the subject of an image requires a definite form, without form

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[356] *AH* 2.7.6-7.

[357] Both Fantino and Donovan recognize that Irenaeus' understanding of the nature of imaging is central to this section. See Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 87. Cf. Donovan 133.

[358] Briggman, *Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 101. Briggman's points are beneficial even if it may be overstated that Irenaeus borrows from Stoics on this point.

the subject could not possibly be imaged by composite beings. There must be metaphysical similarity between subject and object.

These two suppositions help to make sense of his critiques of the Ptolemaic-Valentinians in this section. The Ptolemaic-Valentinians, according to Irenaeus, seem to think that metaphysically distancing their cosmological structure (*Bythus*→*Pleroma*→*Sophia*→ *Enthymesis*→*Demiurge*→the created world) will deal with the issues that arise when attempting to explain how a spiritual being or essence can make itself known. Yet Irenaeus views their attempt as philosophically insufficient. As we will see later, Irenaeus believes that the biblical solution to the problem involves Christ—a spiritual being—who becomes a mediator in the incarnation by putting on form and thereby becoming the *imago Dei*. For the Ptolemaic-Valentinians, the *Aeons* are the subject of imaging, the cosmos is the object of imaging, and the link between the two is symbolic association to be observed by man. However, for Irenaeus God the Father is the subject of the image, Christ becomes both partial subject (in relation to the Father and in his own nature as deity) and object (in his incarnation as the true *imago Dei*), the link between the two is mediated by Christ's bi-part ontology (being both God and composite man).

In *AH* 2.8.1-3. Irenaeus' argument continues but shifts to address another possible response that the Ptolemaic-Valentinians might give in defense of their position. Irenaeus says this:

> "If, again, they declare that these things [below] are a shadow of those [above], as some of them are bold enough to maintain, so that in this respect they are images, then it will be necessary for them to allow that those things which are above are possessed of bodies. For those bodies which are above do cast a shadow, but spiritual substances do not, since they can in no degree darken others. If, however, we also grant them this point (though it is, in fact, an impossibility), that there is a

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shadow belonging to those essences which are spiritual and lucent, into which they declare their Mother descended; yet, since those things [which are above] are eternal, and that shadow which is cast by them endures forever, [it follows that] these things [below] are also not transitory, but endure along with those which cast their shadow over them. If, on the other hand, these things [below] are transitory, it is a necessary consequence that those [above] also, of which these are the shadow, pass away; while, if they endure, their shadow likewise endures."[359]

Again, Irenaeus has a rigid concept of imaging that does not allow for any symbolic likenesses between the realm of the *Aeons* and the sense perceptible cosmos. The spiritual realm does not cast shadows onto the sense perceptible cosmos because they have no form. Because of his position on the nature of imaging and spirit, Irenaeus also takes issue with the term *umbra* (shadow). He does not see how a spiritual substance could obscure or darken something else (*quandoquidem nulli obscurare possunt*).[360] These concerns of his continue into 2.8.2-3 as he to argues against his opponents' position.

What we learn from *AH* 2.7.1-2.8.3 is that Irenaeus views the Valentinian perspective on imaging as untenable for three primary reasons. Subsequently we also learn three things about Irenaeus' position. First, Irenaeus disagrees that it is possible for spiritual beings to image themselves symbolically since abstract concepts fail to define the fashion or shape of the aeons (*neque habitum neque figuram*).[361] Form is essential to the grammar of imaging for composite creatures. This first point is one that falls under Irenaeus' presuppositions concerning the grammar of imaging and is one that is not

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[359] *AH* 2.8.1.

[360] *AH* 2.8.1.

[361] *AH* 2.7.7.

wholly accepted in later patristic views on the *imago Dei*.[362] Second, only an image

which is like God in its nature (eternality, incorruptibility, and spiritual ontology) and

character (being in alignment with the moral good of God) may serve as an image of

God. Similitude is essential to imaging. Third, because of the nature of spirit and of

mankind, a spiritual thing or being must put on form in order to become an image to

composite creatures—it must condescend and become sense perceptible to make the

things of God known. God himself must put on form to make his image known.

AH 2.19.6.

In this obscure and difficult text, Irenaeus aims to undermine the metaphysics and

soteriology of the Ptolemaic-Valentinian view. It should be remembered here that, in the

Ptolemaic-Valentinian cosmogeny, the *Demiurge* was formed by *Enthymesis* after the

image of those angels who saved her from the vacuous darkness outside of the *Pleroma*.

Mankind is made in the same metaphysical composition after *Demiurge*, but some of

those who were made received the spiritual soul from *Enthymesis* as a seed for salvation.

The argument that Irenaeus uses to undermine his opponents position contains helpful

information on his view of the nature of a soul that fits well with his emphasis upon the

importance of form. In the following quote, Irenaeus will make the claim that the soul of

a person (be that *Demiurge* or human) will take on the form of that being's bodily form.

In *AH* 2.19.6 Irenaeus says this:

> "…If, then, he (*Demiurge*) obtains form in mere earthly and animal men, he can
> no longer be said to be after the likeness of angels whom they call lights, but
> [after the likeness] of those men who are here below. For he will not possess in
> that case the likeness and appearance of angels, but of those souls in whom also
> he receives shape; just as water when poured into a vessel takes the form of that

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[362] Especially Origen and those who follow his position. See *Commentarii in Jo*, 20.22., *Homiliae in Jer*.
2.1., *Fragmenta in Jer*. 14., *Contra Celsum*, 6.63.

vessel, and if on any occasion it happens to congeal in it, it will acquire the form of the vessel in which it has thus been frozen, since souls themselves possess the figure of the body [in which they dwell] (*quando ipsae animae corporis habeant figuram*); for they themselves have been adapted to the vessel [in which they exist], as I have said before. If, then, that seed [referred to] is here solidified and formed into a definite shape, it will possess the figure of a man, and not the form of the angels. How is it possible, therefore, that that seed should be after images of the angels, seeing it has obtained a form after the likeness of men? Why, again, since it was of a spiritual nature, had it any need of descending into flesh? For what is carnal stands in need of that which is spiritual, if indeed it is to be saved, that in it may be sanctified and cleared from all impurity, and that what is mortal may be swallowed up by immortality; but that which is spiritual has no need whatever of those things which are here below. For it is not we who benefit it, but it that improves us."[363]

Again, we see the importance of form to Irenaeus.[364] For Irenaeus, the soul is to the body as water is to a vessel—the soul takes on the form of the body (cf. *AH* 2.33.4). In *AH* 2.7.1-2.8.3 we observed that spirit is boundless and infinite, but here Irenaeus presents his anthropological understanding of the soul (*anima*) as bound to form. It is because God determined that mankind would be composite that the soul (the breath of God) becomes one with the form of the body.[365] In *AH* 5.7.1 Irenaeus states that souls are incorporeal and eternal, they stem from the breath of life that God gave Adam. So though the soul has a form after the image of the body it inhabited, the substance is incorporeal and eternal. The question remains then, in what way does the soul have a form? The initial perplexity seems to arise from two points: 1) Irenaeus is commonly known for his wholistic anthropological view, 2) Irenaeus does not seem to distinguish between form and substance. Irenaeus' schema does however seem to reconcile the initial confusion of

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[363] *AH* 2.19.6.

[364] Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 88.

[365] Note that this is not comparable to Stoic Mixture Theory because soul and body remain distinct from one another even though they take on the same form and are intended to be two parts of the whole. Contra. See Briggman, *God and Christ in Irenaeus,* 146-162.

the issue. His considerations on the soul having a form (being molded by the body) and being incorporeal primarily intend to answer what component of the man will be resurrected.[366] Since the soul is eternal and contains its own sort of form, the resurrection will only apply to the body. But the soul is not superior to the body, nor is the body superior to the soul; the two are intended to be equal parts to the human person as a composite being. For Irenaeus, the soul may be incorporeal and bound to some sort of spiritual form in the intermediary state before the resurrection without undermining the equal importance of the other components of man.

Fantino here argues that the Latin *similitudo* likely stems from ὁμοιότης. He argues this because the referent does not concern a process of becoming like something else but instead concerns the static anthropological model that Irenaeus holds to.[367] Irenaeus sees form as central to human person in both body and soul. While it is true that the soul and body in Irenaeus anthropology are equal in value to the human person, there is also an asymmetrical relationship between the two. The soul is like the body in form but not in nature.[368] The body is not like the soul for the two are distinct components of the human person.[369]

The implications of this text will become clearer as the we push further through Irenaeus' work and get a better understanding of the contours of Irenaeus' view of the *imago Dei*. What will be observed is that Christ, like man, becomes composite—his body

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[366] Steenberg, *Of God and Man*, 39.

[367] Ibid.

[368] Also see *AH* 2.33.4. for more on the nature of the soul in relation to the body. His perspective on the soul may be influenced by Justin Martyr (*Dial*. 5)

[369] Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 88.

becomes a part of his ontology. In the incarnation Christ becomes the very form of his

body. The primary takeaway from this text for now concerns the importance of form to

Irenaeus, even for the soul of man.

AH 3.11.8.

Here we have another text that primarily adds to the discussion on Irenaeus'

grammar of imaging. The context of *AH* 3.11.8 does not primarily concern the *imago Dei*

itself, but rather the way in which one concrete form (the faces of the cherubim) may

'image' an event (the dispensation of the Son of God). The following text may be

particularly confusing to the modern reader. In this section Irenaeus uses a historically

situated defense of the four gospels found in the current biblical canon.[370] He does so by

noting the following: "there are four zones of the world in which we live," there are "four

principal winds," because the Church is scattered throughout the world "it is fitting that

we should have four pillars."[371] But Irenaeus goes further and says this:

> "For the cherubim, too, were four-faced, and their faces were images of the
> dispensation of the Son of God. For, [as the Scripture] says, "The first living
> creature was like a lion," symbolizing his effectual working, his leadership, and
> royal power; the second [living creature] was like a calf, signifying [His]
> sacrificial and sacerdotal order; but "the third had, as it were, the face as of a
> man,"—an evident description of his advent as a human being; "the fourth was
> like a flying eagle," pointing out the gift of the Spirit hovering with his wings
> over the Church. And therefore, the Gospels are in accord with these things,
> among which Christ Jesus is seated."[372]

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[370] Further, Irenaeus argues that the four gospels are the center of the biblical canon. These four gospels
serve as the centrifugal point whereby the harmony of the whole canon may be observed. Bushur argues
that the four gospels to Irenaeus are the fount of his "rule of truth." See Bushur, 193, 194, 205, etc.

[371] *AH* 3.11.8.

[372] Ibid.

The text is at first glance quite difficult. In part, this is due to the non-intuitive gap in Irenaeus' logic when read by modern readers. Additionally, at first glance Irenaeus seems to be doing the same sort of dangerous eisegetical work that his opponents sometimes utilize. There is, however, a vast difference between Irenaeus' interpretation here and the interpretive methodology of his opponents. His opponents put forth biblical texts in support of their philosophical presuppositions. Whereas Irenaeus here is establishing a defense for the four gospels as the "center around which the prophetic scriptures and apostolic epistles revolve…not merely in a rhetorical attempt to justify the limitation of the authentic canon…but to testify to the truth of the catholic character of the Bible."[373] Regardless, the benefit of this text for our discussion is clear. Even when Irenaeus seems to make symbolic associations between two concepts, his use of image language requires at least half of the equation to include concrete forms. The images associated with the four faces each denote something by their very form. Irenaeus is not prone to abstraction in his use of image language (possibly in reaction to his opponents abuse of image language) and continues rely on form as an essential component of imaging. This said, there is a figurative association between the forms of the cherubim and the historical dispensations of Christ within the text.[374]

While form is vital for his image language, we here observe that image language does not consistently have to denote one concrete form to another but can denote a relation between one concrete form (a face) and a concept (a dispensation). This however

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[373] Bushur, 177-178.

[374] It should be noted that Irenaeus occasional employs a this-for-that interpretation, but that overall, a metaphorical use of terms within his rhetoric is uncharacteristic in his writing. See Steenberg, "Children in Paradise," 8-9.

is not the case when it comes to Irenaeus' view of the *imago Dei*. It seems that Irenaeus only reacts against his opponent's use of image language when the subject is said to image something of a spiritual ontology.

AH 3.17.3.

The context of *AH* 3.17.1-4 concerns an argument against the Ptolemaic-Valentinian position that Jesus (an ordinary human) received the divine indwelling of *Savior* (the *Aeon*) at his baptism. Irenaeus instead argues that the best reading of the biblical account of Christ's baptism views the descending figure as the Holy Spirit (Matt. 3:13-17, Mk. 1:9-11, Lk. 3:21-22, and Jn. 1:32-34). In this argument Irenaeus then describes the actions of the Spirit as a seemingly personal extension of the one true God. This leads us to *AH* 3.17.3—here the Holy Spirit is portrayed as the "dew of God" who serves to do three primary things. First, the Holy Spirit will "keep the believer from judgement."[375] Second, he will "keep the believer from unfruitfulness."[376] Third, "he functions as an advocate for the believer."[377] For the purpose of this paper, the reference has been added here because Irenaeus also mentions the role of the Holy Spirit in relation to the image of the Father and the Son.

> "…we have need of the dew of God, that we be not consumed by fire, nor be rendered unfruitful, and that where we have an accuser, there we may have also an Advocate, the Lord, commending to the Holy Spirit his own man, who had fallen among thieves, whom he himself compassionated, and bound up his wounds, giving two royal denaria; so that we, receiving by the Spirit, the image

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[375] Briggman, *Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit*, 84.

[376] Ibid.

[377] Ibid.

and superscription of the Father and the Son, might cause the denarium entrusted to us to be fruitful, counting out the increase [thereof] to the Lord."[378]

What is interesting about this text for our purposes is that the Holy Spirit is noted to have been the mode through which we receive the stamped image of the Father and Son. This text does not necessarily state that the image has been lost, nor does it state when the Spirit superimposes this image upon a person. But it is clear here that the Spirit is the one who brings about that image of God upon the human person. Further, here it seems that the image is not an end to itself, but rather is wound up in this notion of being fruitful with what we have received. Later texts will determine the extent to which Irenaeus is consistent with the Spirit's role in superimposing the image of the Father and the Son on the human person.

AH 3.18.1-2.

Here Irenaeus' argument against his opponents continues (as above in the context of *AH* 3.17.3). He promotes a high Christology in response to his opponents by "adducing proofs from the Scriptures."[379] In this section we will observe that Irenaeus puts forward the necessity of the works of Christ in response to the fallen nature of those under Adam.[380] Within the section the soteriological considerations of Irenaeus' position become intertwined with the *imago Dei*. Irenaeus says this in *AH* 3.18.1-2:

> "As it has been clearly demonstrated that the Word, who existed in the beginning with God, by whom all things were made, who was also always present with mankind, was in these last days, according to the time appointed by the Father, united to his own workmanship, inasmuch as he became a man liable to suffering,

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[378] *AH* 3.17.3.

[379] *AH* 3.*pref.*

[380] It should be noted here that the "fall" in Irenaeus is distinct from the traditional conception of the fall. Steenberg defends the notion of a 'fall,' but qualifies this fall by key limiting factors. See his work in the following resource. Steenberg, *Irenaeus on Creation*, 167-169.

[it follows] that every objection is set aside of those who say, "If our Lord was born at that time, Christ had therefore no previous existence." For I have shown that the Son of God did not then begin to exist, being with the Father from the beginning; but when he became incarnate, and was made man, he commenced afresh the long line of human beings, and furnished us, in a brief, comprehensive manner, with salvation; so that what we had lost in Adam (*ut quod perdideramus in Adam*)—namely, to be according to the image and likeness of God (*id est secundum imaginem et similitudinem esse Dei*: τουτέστι το κατ᾽ εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν εἶναι Θεοῦ)—that we might recover in Christ Jesus (*hoc in Christo Iesu reciperemus*: τοῦτο ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἀπολαύσωμεν). For as it was not possible that the man who had once for all been conquered, and who had been destroyed through disobedience, could reform himself, and obtain the prize of victory; and as it was also impossible that he could attain to salvation who had fallen under the power of sin,—the Son effected both these things, being the Word of God, descending from the Father, becoming incarnate, stooping low, even to death, and consummating the arranged plan of our salvation, upon whom [Paul], exhorting us unhesitatingly to believe, again says, "Who shall ascend into heaven? that is, to bring down Christ; or who shall descend into the deep? that is, to liberate Christ again from the dead." Then he continues, "If thou shall confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thine heart that God hath raised Him from the dead, thou shall be saved." And he renders the reason why the Son of God did these things, saying, "For to this end Christ both lived, and died, and revived, that he might rule over the living and the dead…."[381]

This text may be comprehensible within its continued defense of a Christian soteriology. However, as it pertains to our discussion on the *imago Dei* within the whole scope of Irenaeus' *Against Heresies*, it is slightly more difficult to understand. Two primary considerations may be brought to the surface. First, it almost appears as if Irenaeus is saying that the *imago Dei* was lost in Adam. Some authors have hastily deduced that this text shows that Irenaeus believed that the image and likeness was lost at the fall.[382] But that reading does not carefully take into account the phrasing of this particular text or the whole of Irenaeus' position (as we will continue to see in sections

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[381] *AH* 3.18.1-2.

[382] Esp. Holsinger-Friesen, 162. Also see the following author who has a different take on the matter. Bushur, 124 fn. 181.

below). Irenaeus does not say that we lost the *imago Dei*, but rather that we lost our ability to live in accordance (*secundum*: κατ') with the image and likeness of God. It is the capacity for life that has been lost by those who are under Adam and have fallen under the power of sin. In other words, a likeness to God in moral character and virtue (as it could have pertained to salvation under Adam) is absent in the person who is not united to the works of Christ.[383] But that same unregenerate person (as a creature of God) still retains the image of Christ's incarnate form.[384] Second, this text serves to clarify *AH* 3.17. 3. It helps the reader to determine *when* the Holy Spirit superimposes the ability to image of the Father and the Son (*AH* 3.17.3) on the human person as it relates to new life. Further, it helps the reader to determine *who* receives this ability to image God as it relates to new life. It is only those who have received the salvation purchased for us in Christ are able to live in accordance with the *imago Dei*.[385]

I must put here a note of some importance which will serve as a primer to a later discussion concerning the proposed distinction between image and likeness in Irenaeus' schema. At some times image and likeness are used synonymously for the *imago Dei* (e.g. *Dem* 22, 32-33, *AH* 5.1.1, 5.16.1-2); at other times the two terms are used together to denote some general likeness between man and Christ, often having to do with growth towards the moral nature of God, incorruptibility, or rationality (e.g., *Dem* 32, *AH* 3.18.1, 4.38.3-4, 5.1.3, 5.8.1, 5.10.1, 5.16.1); at other times there is a stark distinction between image and likeness. When there is a stark distinction between image and likeness, image

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[383] Osborn, *Irenaeus of Lyons*, 224-225, 246. Cf. Collver, 27.

[384] Osborn, *Irenaeus of Lyons*, 224-225.

[385] Briggman, *Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit*, 85.

will have something to do with has to do with form-substance (e.g., *Dem* 11) while likeness may either have to do with rationality/freedom of will (e.g., *Dem* 11, *AH* 4.4.3, 4.37.4) or the incorruptibility of the flesh received in Christ's works (e.g. *AH* 3.38.3, 5.6.1). In this text image and likeness are used co-referentially in a soteriological section which shows that the capacity for likeness to Christ through salvation is regained in salvation. It is not the term ὁμοίωσις/ *similitudinem* which brings about this meaning, but the terms according with image and likeness together.

AH 3.20.2.

In this section (*AH* 3.20.1-4), Irenaeus aims to correct the Ptolemaic-Valentinian soteriology in two strokes. First Irenaeus portrays the divine character of God as one who is patient, kind, merciful, and competent to save even his enemies—this is stated in contradistinction to his opponent's soteriology. Second, Irenaeus portrays the man who rejects this saving grace as ungrateful. God's disposition of love towards us in presenting the gift of salvation to us is meant to establish in man a "state of gratitude to the Lord in having obtained from him the gift of incorruptibility.[386] This view, though commonplace in historical Christian theology, is in direct conflict with the metaphysical determinism of the Ptolemaic-Valentinian soteriology. In this section Irenaeus looks forward to the time wherein the redeemed will become like Christ in incorruptibility. It is in this context that Irenaeus situates the condescension of Christ into the "likeness of sinful flesh" so that he could cause man to be redeemed "into his own likeness." Consider the fuller text below:

> "…And therefore, Paul declares, "For God hath concluded all in unbelief, that he may have mercy upon all;" not saying this in reference to spiritual Aeons, but to man, who had been disobedient to God, and being cast off from immortality, then obtained mercy, receiving through the Son of God that adoption which is

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[386] *AH* 3.20.2.

[accomplished] by Himself. For he who holds, without pride and boasting, the true glory (opinion) regarding created things and the Creator, who is the Almighty God of all, and who has granted existence to all; [such an one,] continuing in his love and subjection, and giving of thanks, shall also receive from Him the greater glory of promotion, looking forward to the time when he shall become like Him who died for him, for he, too, "was made in the likeness of sinful flesh," to condemn sin, and to cast it, as now a condemned thing, away beyond the flesh, but that he might call man forth into his own likeness (ὁμοίωσιν), assigning him as [His own] imitator to God, and imposing on him his Father's law, in order that he may see God, and granting him power to receive the Father; [being] the Word of God who dwelt in man, and became the Son of man, that he might accustom man to receive God, and God to dwell in man, according to the good pleasure of the Father."[387]

This text, along with *AH* 4.2.7, show that Christ put on the likeness of sinful flesh without succumbing to the sin of the flesh. Those who have received Christ may now receive likeness to him. What is the sense denoted here? The context concerns the "greater glory of promotion" when man shall "become like Him who died for him."[388] This sense appears to contain both the notion of a redeemed will and incorruptibility of the restored body with the term ὁμοίωσιν.[389] This looks forward to the eschatological likeness made available in full redemption, but also in the imitation of God and submission of his law in the present age. This sort of likeness is restored to man in union with Christ and pertains to the *imago Dei* as it did in *AH* 3.18.2. The restored ability to imitate Christ, which was lost in Adam, is restored in the work of Christ, and will be perfected in the coming age.

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[387] *AH* 3.20.2b.

[388] *AH* 3.20.2.

[389] This text does not seem to narrowly fit into the categories that Fantino and Osborn both hold to. Likeness here does not merely occur with reference to restoration of will *or* the incorruptibility of the resurrected body, but both of these considerations within Irenaeus' economy of salvation, with the additional notion of *imitatio Christi* and submission to the moral obligations of God's law. The narrow categorization of likeness in Fantino and Donovan are seemingly too reductionistic on this point with regards to this text. See Donovan, *One Right Reading?*, 134.

This text shows how the term 'ὁμοίωσιν' may be used with reference to the *imago Dei* in Irenaeus' economy of salvation. It simultaneously refers to eschatological perfection, the trajectory of growth in *imitatio Christi*, and an exhortation to obedience in the present age. This work of sanctification is bound, not only to the work of Christ, but through the work of the Holy Spirit in the lives of the redeemed. Because of the restorative work of Christ and the Spirit, it seems that some authors are correct in stating that this text may serve as additional support for the ὁμοίωσιν being used with some association to free will. However, it should be noted that the direct context pertains to the growth of man after the very likeness of God by means of imitation.

AH 3.22.1.

This text goes on to present the nature of Christ's reception of the physical substance of man. Irenaeus takes note of the Christological development of the incarnation here in contradistinction to his opponents. The Ptolemaic-Valentinians and Marcosians both believed that Christ gained nothing from his physical birth and retained his purely spiritual ontology—thereby removing all analogical connection between Christ and Adam. Irenaeus proposes instead that Christ truly became man—he became bound and limited by becoming composite, "recapitulating in himself in his own handiwork."[390] In this recapitulation Christ makes the image of God known because he serves as the ontological *imago Dei* in the incarnation. Now, this is not to say that Christ in Irenaeus' schema was created for the purpose of making God known—Irenaeus views Christ as one who predates creation and co-created the cosmos with God the father as one of God's

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[390] *AH* 3.22.1. cf. 4.pref.4. Also see the following for brief comments on this section. Nielsen, 13.

own hands.[391] It is Christ's lack of original creation that serves as a point of difference between Christ and mankind in regard to the *imago Dei*. Irenaeus says this:

> "Those, therefore, who allege that he took nothing from the Virgin do greatly err, [since,] in order that they may cast away the inheritance of the flesh, they also reject the analogy [between him and Adam]. For if the one [who sprang] from the earth (Adam) had indeed formation and substance from both the hand and workmanship of God, but the other not from the hand and workmanship of God, then he (Jesus) who was made after the image and likeness of the former did not, in that case, preserve the analogy of man, and he (Jesus) must seem an inconsistent piece of work, not having wherewith he may show his wisdom. But this is to say, that he also appeared putatively as men when he was not man, and that he was made man while taking nothing from man. For if he (Jesus) did not receive the substance of flesh from a human being, he neither was made man nor the Son of man; and if he was not made what we were, he did no great thing in what he suffered and endured. But everyone will allow that we are [composed of] a body taken from the earth, and a soul receiving spirit from God. This, therefore, the Word of God was made, recapitulating in himself his own handiwork; and on this account does he confess himself the Son of man…"[392]

Interestingly, this text is infrequently noted in Osborn, Briggman, Steenberg, and even Wingren concerning the *imago Dei*. The text is important because of the way in which Irenaeus determines to show the distinction between Christ (as the *imago Dei*) and man (as created after the image of Christ). He uses the *imago Dei* as an on-ramp to the topic at hand. Christ was not 'made' in the image of God but rather he recapitulated himself into the form which made imaging possible. Again, in Irenaeus, form is a prerequisite for imaging as it relates to composite persons. In this way the analogy

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[391] The "hands of God" will be discussed in a later text. For Irenaeus' Christ and the Holy Spirit were co-creators with God as his hands. They are both deity and are equal to God. His view should not be anachronistically confused with the more developed trinitarianism of post-Nicea, but rather should be taken as its own system (not fully *sui Generis* but rooted in the interpretation of the canon and apostolic sources). For more on this topic review Briggman, *God and Christ in Irenaeus*. As well as Presley, "Irenaeus and the Exegetical Roots of Trinitarian Theology." in *Irenaeus: Life, Scripture, Legacy*, 165-172.

[392] *AH* 3.21.1.

between Christ and man has discontinuity—man was made, but Christ recapitulated himself and remained eternally preexistent.[393]

As numerous authors have noted, Irenaeus uses the *imago Dei* as a conduit for the purpose of communicating an apostolic soteriology to his audience.[394] This text is a prime example of this. Irenaeus uses the *imago Dei* as a point of reference for a greater system of thought which is correlated to Christ's recapitulation (*AH* 3.23.1, 5.12.4, 5.20.1, 5.21.2, etc.) so that he might discuss the nature of man, the nature of God, and the nature of salvation and divine self-revelation. The Irenaean schema of the *imago Dei*, within his economy of salvation, places Jesus Christ as the central mediator of all things by which God and his story of redemption becomes known and enacted to and for man.

For our discussion, the primary point of importance in this text is this: the incarnation and inheritance of the flesh is vital for the analogy of man to be maintained in Christ who was the *imago Dei*. For Irenaeus, Christ had to inherit flesh, form, and his own workmanship (*plasma*), so that he could preserve the analogy of man as the *imago Dei*.

AH 3.23.1-2.

Again, as above in *AH* 3.22.1, we have a soteriological section which uses the *imago Dei* in conjunction with a portrayal of Christ's recapitulative act. Irenaeus pulls from Rom. 5:12-21 and 1 Cor. 15:20-49 in his presentation of Christ as the new Adam. Christ, as the recapitulated head of humanity, is then in a position fitting to redeem

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[393] Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 165-166.

[394] Some examples of authors who have noted this are as follows: Fantino, Osborn, Wingren, Donovan, Steenberg.

humanity. Just as in Adam all of humanity fell and suffered captivity, so in Christ death is abolished and salvation is offered. The text is as follows:

> "It was necessary, therefore, that the Lord, coming to the lost sheep, and making recapitulation of so comprehensive a dispensation, and seeking after his own handiwork (*plasma*: πλάσμα), should save that very man who had been created after his image and likeness (imaginem et similitudinem: κατά εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν), that is, Adam, filling up the times of his condemnation, which had been incurred through disobedience—[times] "which the father had placed in his own power." This was necessary too, inasmuch as the whole economy of salvation regarding man came to pass according to the good pleasure of the father, in order that God might not be conquered, nor his wisdom lessened, [in the estimation of his creatures]…But inasmuch as God is invincible and long-suffering, he did indeed show himself to be long-suffering in the matter of the correction of man and the probation of all, as I have already observed; and by means of the second man did he bind the strong man, and spoiled his goods, and abolished death, vivifying that man who had been in a state of death[395]…but this is Adam, if the truth should be told, the first formed man, of whom the scripture says that the Lord said, "let us make man after our own image and likeness;" and we are all from him: and as we are from him, therefore we have all inherited his title…"[396]

This text helps to clarify how the role of Adam (as head of all humanity) fits into God's economy of salvation. In Adam we received both a formation after the image and likeness of God through natural generation (cf. Gen. 5:3) as well as the death and captivity which mankind received under his title. Christ, not allowing his people to remain under Adam, saw it necessary to save "that very man who had been created after his image and likeness."[397] Here, the *imago Dei* seems to serve as a sufficient reason for God's salvation of Adam, the redemption of the position that Adam originally held, and subsequently the redemption of all under the Grace of the recapitulated head of humanity.

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[395] Note here the use of Luke 11:14-23 or Matthew 12:22-32.

[396] *AH* 3.23.1-2.

[397] *AH* 3.23.1.

The central reason for Christ's condescension to his people primarily stems from his own

character, but the secondary reason concerns the nature of his people as his own

handiwork (*plasma*).[398] Here, Irenaeus presents the Lord as the *imago Dei* after whose

image mankind was made. Further he uses the notion of the *imago Dei* as a necessary

component for understanding why God would condescend to redeem his people.

AH 4.17.6.

In this text we will observe that Irenaeus uses image language to denote a

figurative likeness between one subject and an object using the metaphor of a painting.

Irenaeus says this:

> "…just as a king, if he himself paints a likeness of his Son, is right in calling this
> likeness his own (*suum*), for both these reasons, because it is [the likeness] of his
> Son, and because it is his own production; so also does the father confess the
> name of Jesus Christ, which is throughout the world glorified in the Church, to be
> his own, both because it is that of his Son (concerning the likeness), and because
> he who thus describes it gave him for the salvation of men…"[399]

In this text Irenaeus uses *imaginem*/εἰκόνα to show that the form of a king's Son

is actually properly represented in a painting of that Son. He then focuses on the king's

relationship to the image of the Son. Fantino categorizes this section as "image as

representation of figure" ("image comme representation figurée").[400] The painting, within

the context of Irenaeus' work, serves as an image of the Son who is an image of the

Father—rather than a narrow image of the figure itself ("image comme figure").[401] This

tricky bit of text illustrates the way in which the form of Christ (post-incarnation) relates

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[398] Steenberg, *Irenaeus on Creation*, 136.

[399] *AH* 4.17.6.

[400] Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 94.

[401] Ibid., 95.

to the father. The incarnate Christ is like the Father because he the Son of that Father. Even when Christ makes the *imago Dei* known in the incarnation, the form he takes is representative of that father by the embodiment of Christ's actions. The character of God is made known to a greater degree by the incarnation of God in bodily form. Irenaeus could not be saying here that the ontology of Christ's composite being is the image of God metaphysically (for that would require the view that God is not purely spirit), rather Irenaeus seems to say that there is a general likeness between the image of Christ in his form and who God is in his character.[402]

AH 4.19.1.

Marry Anne Donovan notes that this section is a part of Irenaeus' argument against his opponents concerning the eucharist. Generally, *AH* 4.17-19a concerns the "eucharist as fulfillment of the figurative sacrifices of the OT."[403] In *AH* 4.17-18.4 Irenaeus expounds the notion that the eucharist is a representation of the sacrifice of Christ as a fulfillment of the OT Levitical practice of sacrificing for reconciliation and atonement.[404] This sacrifice was not done for the sake of God himself, but for the benefit of his people, since God requires nothing from men. In *AH* 4.18.4 Irenaeus turns to consider the heretics. Many of Irenaeus' opponents partook in the Lord's Supper but did so with respect to the higher spiritual realities above those of the God of the Christians and Christ himself. Irenaeus points out the inconsistency of this with the practice of the

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[402] If someone argued that Irenaeus was here saying that the metaphysical characteristic of God was being made known in the incarnation, then they would have to view this text as a complete one-off in Irenaeus' schema of the metaphysical characteristics of God as spirit (esp. contra *AH* 2.7.1-2.8.3).

[403] Donovan, *One Right Reading?*, 109.

[404] Cf. Ibid., 110.

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Lord's Supper in *AH* 4.18.4. For Irenaeus, the very form-substance of the bread receives the Word of God to become the eucharist (*AH* 4.18.5, 5.2.3); therefore, we who receive the eucharist also receive the spiritual blessings of Christ himself. The earthly form of the bread receives the λόγος, not something above the λόγος which the λόγος may signify (e.g. the *Pleroma*). This is the context in which Irenaeus goes on to state how the heavenly things are represented in the earthly things of this world (*AH* 4.19.1). Irenaeus presents his position in contradistinction to his opponents who believe that heavenly things image the higher spiritual truths of the *Pleroma*. In *AH* 4.19.1 Irenaeus says this:

> "Now the gifts, oblations, and all the sacrifices, did the people receive in a figure, as was shown to Moses in the mount, from one and the same God, whose name is now glorified in the Church among all nations. But it is congruous that those earthly things, indeed, which are spread all around us, should be types of the celestial, being [both], however, created by the same God (*sed terrena quidem, quae sunt erga nos disposita, congruit typos esse eorum quae sunt caelestia, ab eodem tamen Deo facta*). For in no other way could he assimilate an image of spiritual things [to suit our comprehension] (*nec enim alter poterat assimilare spiritalium imaginem*). But to allege that those things which are super-celestial and spiritual, and as far as we are concerned, invisible and ineffable, are in their turn the types of celestial things and of another *Pleroma*, and to say that God is the image of another Father, is to play the part both of wanders from the truth, and of absolutely foolish and stupid persons. For as I have repeatedly shown, such persons will find it necessary to be continually finding out types of types, and images of images, and will never be able to fix their minds on one and the true God. For their imaginations range beyond God, they having in their hearts surpassed the Master himself, being indeed in idea elated and exalted above him, but in reality turning away from the true God."[405]

The relevance of this text concerning the grammar of imaging is this: earthly things can be types of the spiritual things. Now this text may be interpreted in one of two ways. Option one, it is possible that Irenaeus is saying that any and every object in some way images God because its formation emanates from God. Option two, Irenaeus may be

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[405] *AH* 4.19.1.

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saying more narrowly that earthly things with reference to the gifts, oblations, and sacrifices noted within the OT are perceived to be the images of the present dispensation of Christ. The second option is contextually stronger considering the narrow aim Irenaeus has in the schema of his argument against his opponents noted above (cf. *AH* 4.32.2).[406]

Included in this second option are three implicit points to Irenaeus' grammar of imaging. First, Irenaeus' use of imaging language has a built-in direction for imaging. The subject is imaged by the object. Second, there seems to be a 'greater to lesser' direction included in Irenaeus' image language. The subject of the image is often greater in one sense or another than the image of that object. The Levitical sacrifices of the OT were the pictures and figures (lesser objects) of things to come (the greater subject). In this way the earthly things are the types of the celestial. This may also apply to Jesus Christ as the image of the Father, but that is more difficult to discern within Irenaeus' writings.[407] Third, imaging comes to a full stop at God. Since God the Father is "incomprehensible in greatness," he is incapable of being the image of anything beyond himself.[408] Fourth, spiritual things must take place in the sense-perceptible realm to be known by mankind. This fourth point has to do with Irenaeus' position on man as composite creatures (*AH* 2.7.1-8, 2.17.2, cf. 2.19.6). The spiritual events of God's

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[406] This is further supported by Fantino's work. Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 96.

[407] Note, by the use of 'greater' I do not intend to propose a value claim with reference to Christ. Irenaeus primary stance on the ontological *imago Dei* is that Jesus Christ, the Word of God, is the *imago Dei*. But simultaneously, Irenaeus in no way alludes to the notion that Jesus is lesser (value judgement) than God. Only that in his incarnation he became composite and is no longer purely a spirit, metaphysically speaking. In this sense, he put on limitations associated with the composite body, and in this sense even with the ontological *imago Dei* Jesus in some ways becomes 'less' than the Father. The act of condescension magnifies his glory, but the Word of God seemingly becomes tied to the resurrected body and his very ontology receives a genuine change.

[408] *AH* 4.19.1.

unfolding covenant redemption become situated in the sense perceptible realm and are observed in the concrete events set out for Israel in the Torah. "For in no other way could he assimilate an image of spiritual things [to suit our comprehension]."[409] The "gifts, oblations and all the sacrifices" serve as concrete images of spiritual realities which are fulfilled in Christ and made known in the true Church.

These four takeaways have to do with Irenaeus' grammar of imaging, and thus have been observed in other texts as well. However, this text serves as an overt and central datapoint for these notions.

AH 4.33.4.

In this text we have a brief allusion to the superiority of those who have begun to be like God. Irenaeus says this concerning the likeness of God and the image after which mankind was made:

> "But who else is superior to, and more eminent than, that man who was made after the likeness of God (*Melior autem eo homine qui secundum similitudinem dei factus*: κρείσσων δὲ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν θεοῦ γεγονότος καὶ ἐξοχώτερος) except the Son of God, after whose likeness man was made (*ad cujus similitudinem factus est homo Dei*: οὗ καθ᾽ὁμοίωσιν γέγονεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος). And for this reason, he did in these last days exhibit the similitude; [for] the Son of God was made man, assuming the ancient production [of his hands] into his own nature, as I have shown in the immediately preceding book."[410]

Irenaeus uses likeness (*similitudinem*: ὁμοίωσιν) with regard to man in the same way noted above in *AH* 3.18.1-2. Irenaeus uses ὁμοίωσιν in reference to some similarity denoted between man and the ontological *imago Dei*. The categories of similarity are not mentioned here but will be partially expressed in other sections below. Some categories

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[409] *AH* 4.19.1.

[410] *AH* 4.33.4.

of likeness included are as follows: capacity for imitation of the incarnate Word's moral actions (e.g. *AH* 5.10.1-2), mankind's freedom of will (e.g. *AH* 4.37.4), immortality (e.g. *AH* 4.38.3b-4), and the triune representation in the soteriological-anthropology of man (e.g. *AH* 5.6.1), the form of man with reference to the form of the incarnate Word of God (e.g. *AH* 5.6.1b).

From the distinctions noted thus far between image and likeness, one might expect Irenaeus to say, "except the Son of God, after whose image man was created." But the term used in the Latin is *similitudinem*. And the Greek term observed in Theodoret's fragment is ὁμοίωσιν.[411] Fantino notes, the original Greek is either ὁμοίωσις or εἰκών.[412] But he then states that the original text was probably εἰκών, in alignment with the general use of εἰκών in *AH,* without giving any reference to Theodoret's fragment.[413] Generally, as we will see later, it is the form of Christ after whom we have been made (with use of εἰκών).

The way I see it, there are three possibilities. 1) Theodoret's fragment is incorrect and uses the improper term and the proper term is εἰκών. 2) Theodoret's fragment is correct, and the term is ὁμοίωσιν. 3) Theodoret's fragment is incorrect and any pertinent imaging term may have equal footing for the text.

Since option one is the most consistent with Irenaeus' general use of εἰκών within the schema of the *imago Dei* as it relates to Christ and man, this option should remain plausible. However, since we do not have the original text, and there is a danger in

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[411] Rousseau, Vol. IV, pt. 2, 811.

[412] Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 112.

[413] Rousseau, Vol. IV, pt. 2, 811.

assuming that Irenaeus had every one of his terms neatly fitted within a consistent systematic framework, option two is also plausible.[414] Option three does not take into account the range of uses of Irenaeus' image terms and should be dismissed.[415]

If option one is correct then the text should be read as follows: the man who has become like God is superior to all, with exception to Christ, after whose form we were created. If option two is correct then the text should be read as follows: the man who has become like God is superior to all, with exception to Christ, after whose likeness to God we were created.

When the two positions are placed side by side, it must be noted that either can work in Irenaeus' general schema of imaging. The first option places emphasis on the form we have received through Christ post-incarnation. The second option places emphasis on the imitation of Christ who is our moral and ethical leader in all things.

Since both options are supported within Irenaeus' framework, then option two may be the better option, for it is the most textually supported. However, if option one is correct, there is no reason to dismiss the notion that the term *imago* here has to do with formation and imitation since Irenaeus elsewhere uses *imago* with reference to imitation (*AH* 3.20.2, 5.9.3). If this is correct, then in this text Irenaeus proposes that mankind was not just made after the pattern of his form, but also with allusion to categorical likenesses that man has with the *imago Dei*.

AH 4.37.4-5.

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[414] It is commonly recognized within numerous sources that Irenaeus' does not use *imago* and *similitudo* with absolute consistency throughout *AH* and *Dem*.

[415] In support of this dismissal, see Fantino's appendix 1. Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 183-186. For additional terms see ibid., 218.

In this excerpt, Irenaeus uses "likeness" with notions of free will. This text takes place amidst the greater context of Irenaeus' description of the "law of liberty" (*AH* 4.37-39) which concerns "human choice" as a response to divine invitation.[416] From Irenaeus' point of view, free will must exist to some degree if God is to remain good amidst his divine justice.[417] This section is written as a doctrinal counterproposal that undermines his opponent's metaphysical soteriology. For review here, the Ptolemaic-Valentinians (and subgroups) held that that some are created good and were preordained for salvation by their received nature (being in essence πνευματικός) while others are animal, only partially free of will and only saved through good works (ψυχικός), while the *hylics* (ὑλικός) were preordained for destruction.[418] In *Against Hereses*, Irenaeus proposes that the freedom of the will is available for all mankind. Irenaeus says this:

> "But because man is possessed of free will from the beginning, and God is possessed of free will, in whose likeness man was created, advice is always given to him to keep fast to the good, which thing is done by means of obedience to God. And not merely in works, but also in faith, has God preserved the will of man free and under his own control…"[419]

The likeness between man and God here concerns the ability to choose to obey or disobey God in works and in faith. In this sense, all humanity is made in the likeness of God (contra. the Ptolemaic-Valentinian position). Previously, *similitudo* has been used with reference to the growth in the ability to imitate the virtues and morality of Christ

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[416] Donovan, *One Right Reading?*, 131.

[417] Ibid.

[418] For further review, see the section concerning the Valentinian cosmogeny and eschatology above.

[419] *AH* 4.37.4b-5a.

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(esp. *AH* 3.18.1-2, 3.20.2).[420] This is the first text where the *similitudo* between man and God narrowly concerns the freedom of the will. Further, in this text the likeness between man and God is not liable to develop (as is the case in growing in Christ-likeness). Free will here is the ability to determine for oneself to move towards either obedience or disobedience in moral actions.[421]

Fantino supposes that *similitudo* here is a translation of ὁμοιότης because of the reference to free will. Here this may be correct because of the nuanced sense of similarity as it aligns with his research of the terms ὁμοιότης and ὁμοίωσις.[422] The freedom of man's will is mentioned noted several times in Irenaeus' works (e.g. *AH* 3.20.2, 4.4.3, 4.37.5, 5.29.1) but is very infrequently used with reference to *similitudinem Dei* (*AH* 4.37.4, *Dem* 11).[423]

AH 4.37.7b.

This section serves as a hinge upon which the conversation turns from moral free will as a justification for divine judgement (*AH* 4.37.1-7a) to a discussion on the maturation of the human person (*AH* 4.37.7b-4.38.4). Here, Irenaeus nuances his discussion on free will by explaining why humanity was not created perfect from the

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[420] *AH* 3.20.2 may also include the notion of free will.

[421] Now, this section should not be read as if Irenaeus believes that mankind has libertarian free will—he understands the effects of the fall to alter our disposition towards God. We are in some sense free, but in another sense (under Adam) we are bound to be enemies of God outside of his own work of redemption. So, we are free to choose obedience or disobedience, but never unto salvation. We are free to put faith in God, but the faith serves only as a conduit through which our adoption is accepted. Because mankind under Adam forfeit life, the weight of salvation rests on the work of God himself. Irenaeus notion of free will works in conjunction with his notion of the fall—*AH* 4.37.1-7 must be read in light of *AH* 3.18.7.

[422] See his argument. Fantino, 115. Also see Donovan who agrees with Fantino on this point. Donovan, *One Right Reading?*, 134.

[423] The radical infrequence with which *similitudinem Dei* is used with reference to the freedom of the will makes me believe the categories presented by Donovan (*One Right Reading?*, 134) to be insufficient

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beginning, thereby developing his schema of the "perfectible humanity."[424] Mankind was

not created perfect from the beginning but was rather preordained to move towards

development and perfection under the nourishment of God in Christ. God allowed Adam

and Eve to fall by their own free decisions, God then wove man's apostasy into his

purpose of salvation and maturation of humanity.[425] Irenaeus says this:

> "The Lord has therefore endured all these things on our behalf, in order that we,
> having been instructed by means of them all, may be in all respects circumspect
> for the time to come, and that, having been rationally taught to love God, we may
> continue in his perfect love: for God has displayed long-suffering in the case of
> man's apostasy; while man has been instructed by means of it, as also the prophet
> says, "your own apostasy shall heal you;" God thus determining all things
> beforehand for the bringing of man to perfection, for his edification, and for the
> revelation of his dispensations, that goodness may both be made apparent, and
> righteousness perfected, and that the Church may be fashioned after the image of
> his Son (*et Ecclesia ad figuram imaginis Filii ejus coaptetur*) and that man may
> finally be brought to maturity at some future time, becoming ripe through such
> privileges to see and comprehend God."[426]

What makes this text unique is how Irenaeus fits the maturation of the whole

Church into his schema of perfection. It is not just individuals who move towards

maturation in Christ, but the corporate body of all who are redeemed in him. Of course,

given Irenaeus' reading of 1 Cor. 12:12-31, this idea is to be expected. Image here (likely

εἰκών)[427] does not seem to concern the form (e.g., substance and form united as in *AH*

4.17.6, 5.26.1, 5.28.2, 5.29.2) of the corporate body so much as the relationship between

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[424] Perfection here does not have to do with ontological goodness, but rather with moral comprehension and development of Godly knowledge. In this sense, Adam and Eve were imperfect—not because of their mutability but because of their lack of understanding, or infancy, concerning the morality of God. See the following resource for a helpful treatment on the matter. Donovan, *One Right Reading?*, 132-133.

[425] Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 141.

[426] *AH* 4.37.7b.

[427] Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 98. Cf. Rousseau, Vol. IV, pt. 2, 943.

Christ and his Church in the movement towards maturation. This use of εἰκών is similar to the general association made between the cherubim's faces and the dispensation of Christ in *AH* 3.11.8.[428]

The takeaway of this text is that the Church is being made into the image of Christ in a figurative manner. *Imago* here does not directly correspond to 'form' (as it often does in *AH*) but pertains rather to a figurative association between subject (Christ) and object (corporate body of the Church) in the process of maturation.[429]

AH 4.38.3b.

The context of this section may be observed in the introduction to *AH* 4.37.7. In this text Irenaeus tells of God's creation of the world *ex nihilo*. God alone is uncreated and infinite—his people will forever remain created and finite beings. However, those who are redeemed receive growth and "after a long period of existence begin to reflect the glory of the uncreated one."[430] God's redeemed people never become uncreated in their ontology, but they do begin to "receive a faculty of the uncreated" in God's gracious "bestowal of eternal existence upon them."[431] Irenaeus says this concerning our growth towards God in this regard:

> "…but being in subjection to God is continuance in immortality, and immortality is the glory of the uncreated one. By this arrangement, therefore, and these

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[428] Fantino comes to the same conclusion concerning the use of εἰκών in this text. Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 99.

[429] It should be noted that Minns misses the mark on his analysis of this text. He takes the text a step further than Irenaeus and goes on to say that the Church becomes the new Adam in likeness with Christ—however, this does not appropriately consider Christ's relationship to Adam as distinct from our relationship to Christ. We have been adopted into the new headship of Christ, but in Irenaeus' schema we do not become a new Adam ourselves. See Minns, *Irenaeus*, 127.

[430] *AH* 4.38.3a.

[431] Ibid.

harmonies, and a sequence of this nature, man, a created and organized being, is rendered after the image and likeness of the uncreated God—the Father, planning everything well and giving his commands, the Son carrying these into execution and performing the work of creating, and the Spirit nourishing and increasing [what is made], but man making progress day by day, and ascending towards the perfect, that is approximating to the uncreated one…"[432]

Here the image and likeness both have to do with the eschatological telos of man in relation to the perfection of the uncreated God. We were created for movement towards God in the growth offered up by the Father, Son, and Spirit.[433] The context of the section would suggest that image and likeness refer primarily to a finite creature's reception of immortality in submission to God. Irenaeus' use of *imago* and *similitudo* again show that the terms can be utilized as a categorical conduit suited to explain maturation towards the perfection of God. The image and likeness here aren't ontological and static, but teleological and dynamic in movement towards the true subject being imaged: God.

AH 4.38.4b.

The context again is the same as above concerning the development of God's people to perfection. In this text Irenaeus speaks to God's economy of salvation with reference to the fallen world. God allowed Adam and Eve to fall (thereby maintaining their free will). God then determined to integrate man's sin into his plan of salvation. The eschatological result of his salvation post fall is a perfected man who knows both good

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[432] *AH* 4.38.3b.

[433] Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 137.

and evil but now determines to do good.[434] Within this context, Irenaeus says the following:

> "…For after his great kindness he graciously conferred good [upon us], and made men like to himself, [that is] in their own power; while at the same time by his prescience he knew the infirmity of human beings, and the consequences which would flow from it; but through [his] love and [his] power, he shall overcome the substance of created nature. For it was necessary, at first, that nature should be exhibited; then, after that, that what was mortal should be conquered and swallowed up by immortality, and the corruptible by incorruptibility, and that man should be made after the image and likeness of God, having received the knowledge of good and evil."[435]

Here Irenaeus uses both terms (*imago* and *similitudo*) to show that the image and likeness can be used with reference to mankind's knowledge of good and evil. Here image and likeness are used to denote a general likeness to God concerning a narrow field of interest. In *AH* 4.38.7b we observed that *imago* and *similitudo* were used with reference to man's reception of the faculty of immortality in submission to God. But here, the clause concerning image and likeness is more directly linked to the knowledge of good and evil—though it follows similar considerations on incorruptibility. Indeed, in this sense, man was not made after the *imago Dei* from the beginning—only through the fall was the knowledge of evil gained.[436] According to Irenaeus, this sense of likeness to God was attained by the fall of man.

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[434] Fantino proposes a similar reading of this text. "Le risqué était que l'homme choisisse le mal au lieu d'opter pour le bien. C'est ce qu'il a fait. Mais Dieu qui savait cela par avance a intégré le péché de l'homme dans Son dessein afin de conserver sa liberté à l'homme. Dieu aurait pu créer un homme non libre qu'il aurait mené à la perfection sans probléme, mais il voulait que l'homme fût libre dans Son évolution. Le péché a des conséquences fondamentales sur cette progression, mais Dieu l'a permis, car il voulait que l'homme progressat librement." Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 138.

[435] *AH* 4.38.4.

[436] In the following section (*AH* 4.39.1-4) Irenaeus ties his notion of free will into the topic concerning knowledge of good and evil. Since mankind gained the knowledge of good and evil, their free will is tested in the process of learning to obey God and keep his commandments.

Irenaeus does not promote the fall in this section, nor does he laud the way in which this likeness to God had been attained. Rather, his reading of Gen. 3:22 requires him to note the reality that man attained a general likeness to God in the fall when mankind came to know good and evil. Irenaeus here attempts to take into account the reality of mankind's dilemma with regards to the fall and our responsibility as moral free agents. This category concerning a general likeness to God may not necessarily have to do with the *imago Dei* per se in the original source material because of his use of Gen. 2:23. While the available material uses *imago* and *similitudo* (with reference to εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις), the LXX says ἰδοὺ Ἀδὰμ γέγονεν ὡς εἷς ἐξ ἡμῶν. Mankind's growth in the knowledge of good and evil was a central component of maturation. But that does not necessarily mean that it is also a part of the Irenaean schema of the *imago Dei*. Since this is the only text that seems to use an attribute gained by the fall with association to the image and likeness of God, this text may need to be considered as *sui generis* in the category of general likeness to God.

If the text is authentically part of Irenaeus' schema of the *imago Dei,* then the trait (knowledge of good and evil) must also be taken in light of the previous clause concerning the restoration of man. God had knowledge of good and evil. Man attains the likeness to God in this respect in the fall. But this likeness is the downfall of man until the will of man is restored to a state of free obedience through the work of the Son and the Spirit.[437] It is in the redemption of man that the likeness to God concerning the knowledge of good and evil becomes a beneficial quality. The redeemed man, who will become incorruptible and immortal, will also chose to use his knowledge of good and

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[437] *AH* 4.39.1. (cf. 3.18.1, 5.6.1b, *Dem* 5).

evil in the obedience of God.[438] Since man has attained a likeness to God with respect to the knowledge of good and evil, we are called to use our free will to obey him, lest we seek corruption and receive the appropriate punishment of those who have refused to be subject to God.[439]

AH 5.1.1.

In this section Irenaeus presents the central role that λόγος (Christ) takes as a mediator between mankind and God. His mediatory role required a genuine incarnation and full reception of human flesh. In the incarnation, God's eternal λόγος (being pure spirit) condescended to become a composite being (spirit/flesh). This act of condescension served as a special revelation which made the greater spiritual realities of God known to man. In *AH* 5.1.1 Irenaeus says this:

> "For in no other way could we have learned the things of God, unless our master, existing as the Word, had become man. For no other being had the power of revealing to us the things of the Father, except his own proper Word. For what other person "knew the mind of the Lord," or who else "has become his counsellor?" Again, we could have learned in no other way than by seeing our teacher, and hearing his voice with our own ears, that, having become imitators of his works as well as doers of his words, we may have communion with him, receiving increase from the perfect one, and from him who is prior to all creation. We—who were but lately created by the only best and good being, by him also who has the gift of immortality, having been formed after his likeness (*in eam quae est ad eum similitudinem facti*); and predestined, according to the foreknowledge of the Father, that we, who had as yet no existence, might come into being, and made the first-fruits of creation—have received, in the times known beforehand, [the blessings of salvation] according to the ministration of the Word, who is perfect in all things, as the mighty Word, and very man, who, redeeming us by his own blood in a manner consonant to reason, gave himself as a redemption for those who had been led into captivity. And since the apostasy tyrannized over us unjustly, and, though we were by nature the property of the omnipotent God, alienated us contrary to nature, rendering us its own disciples, the Word of God, powerful in all things, and not defective with regard to his own

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[438] *AH* 4.39.1.

[439] This sentence is intended to synthesize Irenaeus' teachings in *AH* 4.39.1-4.

justice, did righteously turn against that apostasy, and redeem from it his own property, not by violent means, as the [apostasy] had obtained dominion over us at the beginning, when it insatiably snatched away what was not its own, but by means of persuasion, as became a God of counsel, who does not use violent means to obtain what hedesires; so that neither should justice be infringed upon, nor the ancient handiwork of God go to destruction. Since the Lord thus has redeemed us through his own blood, giving his soul for our souls, and his flesh for our flesh, and has also poured out the Spirit of the Father for the union and communion of God and man, imparting indeed God to men by means of the Spirit, and, on the other hand, attaching man to God by his own incarnation, and bestowing upon us at his coming immortality durably and truly, by means of communion with God—all the doctrines of the heretics fall to ruin."[440]

In this text, Christ's centrality as a mediator between man and God is further established (building on *AH* 2.7.1-2.8.3, 2.7.1-8, 2.17.2, 3.22.1, 3.23.1-2) and Irenaeus seems to move closer to his position on the ontological *imago Dei* (as we will see more clearly in later texts). Here, however, Irenaeus' primary use of *similitudo* concerns a general resemblance between man and God with regard to immortality.

Irenaeus' stance on the immortality of the soul is nuanced and puzzling. Early in *Adversus Haereses* he proposes that the soul has a "natural immortality (*AH* 2.34.3).[441] He believes that the soul is the breath of God which man received in the beginning (*AH* 5.7.1 c.f. Gen. 2:7) and the breath of God is immortal. But immortality, in soteriological passages, becomes entangled with his notion of life. One can have an eternal soul and not live eternal life.[442] What is important to Irenaeus is that one simultaneously does not deny the eternality of the breath of God (since it is of God and God is eternal) while also recognizing that participation in God's economy of salvation results in an incorrupt

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[440] *AH* 5.1.1.

[441] Osborn, *Irenaeus of Lyons*, 222.

[442] Ibid. cf. Steenberg, *Of God and Man*, 38.

eternality. Because eternality can either refer to the natural immortality of the soul or to the quality of participation in Christ, it can cause difficulty in interpretation.

The text at hand recognizes that there is a likeness between man and God concerning eternality. But which of the two senses does Irenaeus refer to here? Does the text concern the natural immortality of the soul? Or does the text concern the quality of participation in Christ? The second sense seems to fit the context the most clearly. The text, in saying "We—who were but lately created by the best and good being…having been formed after his likeness, and predestined…," seems to refer primarily to those who are in Christ. The likeness here is not ontological, but rather something that will be grown into as we commune with God. The term *similitudo* is again used with a teleological aspect as we have observed above.

AH 5.1.3.

This text generally shares the same context of *AH* 5.1.1. However, this text is particularly tailored as a response to the Ebionites in their rejection of the incarnation. Irenaeus critiques the Ebionites' rejection of Christ's dual nature and argues that they remain in Adam and have not yet been brought under the reconciliation of Christ. It is in this polemic context that Irenaeus rearticulates the necessity of the incarnation and uses the *imago Dei* with reference to Christ as the new Adam. *AH* 5.1.3b says this:

> "…therefore do these men (the Ebionites) reject the commixture of the heavenly wine, and wish it to be water of the world only, not receiving God so as to have union with him, but they remain in that Adam who had been conquered and was expelled from paradise: not considering that, as at the beginning of our formation in Adam, that breath of life which proceeded from God, having been united to what had been fashioned, animated the man, and manifested him as a being endowed with reason; so also, in the end, the Word of the Father and the Spirit of God, having become united with the ancient substance of Adam's formation, rendered man living and perfect, receptive of the perfect Father, in order that as in the natural Adam we were all dead, so in the spiritual we may all be made alive.

For never at any time did Adam escape the hands[443] of God, to whom the Father speaking said "let us make man in our image, after our likeness." And for this reason, in the last times,[444] not by the will of the flesh, nor by the will of man, but by the good pleasure of the Father, his hands formed a living man, in order that Adam might be created after the image and likeness of God."[445]

In this text Irenaeus uses the Adam-Christ typology with reference to the *imago Dei*. When the Word of God put on human flesh, Adam was recapitulated in Christ, so that we may be under the new spiritual Adam instead of the natural Adam. In Irenaeus' schema it is because the Word of God became incarnate that God was able to perfect the human person. By joining the "Word of the Father and the Spirit of God" to the form of Adam we are brought to life.

Here, within the context of the Adam-Christ typology, Adam is represented as being created after the image and likeness of God again in Christs' incarnation. As we shall see later, Christ was not made in the *imago Dei* as Adam was—instead, Christ is the truer image of God in all respects.[446] Though the context mentions that man is fashioned by the triune presence of God (the Father and the hands of God), it does not specify the sense with which man is made after the image and likeness of God. The benefit of this text concerns the formation of man after the image and likeness of ontological *imago Dei*,

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[443] For Irenaeus, the "hands of God" refers to the Holy Spirit and the Word of God, both of whom participated in God's act of creation.

[444] *Fine* here has to do with the time inaugurated by Christ's incarnation into the flesh (as it always does in Irenaeus' work). See Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 66.

[445] *AH* 5.1.3.

[446] It is interesting that, at this point, Irenaeus has been slow to establish the boundaries of the ontological *imago Dei*. He has yet to clearly claim that Christ is the image of God directly. It seems quite likely that his thoughts on the matter developed as he responded to his opponents throughout the progression of writing *Adversus Haereses*. Further, the concrete and pithy statements concerning the *imago Dei* found in *On the Apostolic Preaching* seem to support the consensus that *dem* was written either after *AH* or during his writing of vol. 5 of *AH*. For further support on this notion see the following work. Behr, *On the Apostolic Preaching*, 3.

but it does not add any specific 'likeness' observable between man and the *imago Dei* himself.

<u>*AH* 5.6.1.</u>

Previously, Irenaeus argued that the "incarnation makes resurrection possible for human beings" (*AH* 5.1.1-5.5.2), but here (*AH* 5.6.1-5.8.3) Irenaeus begins to expound his "interpretation of Pauline texts on the resurrection of the flesh."[447] In Irenaeus' anthropological schema, the flesh, the spirit, and the soul are not in opposition but are each vital cooperative components of the whole human person. Neither the flesh, nor the spirit, nor the soul alone serves as the primary component of the human person because the human person is, by design, a composite creature. Further, the Spirit is not a component that mankind immediately has access to. The Holy Spirit must be received by man as a gift through Christ. The text directly concerns "the reception of the Holy Spirit by believers."[448]

This section at hand is a foundational text for Irenaeus' anthropology as it functions within his soteriological framework. One particular finding will be invaluable for our discussion. In the following text we will observe that here Irenaeus makes a stark distinction between the image of God (pertaining to the form of man) and likeness to God (pertaining to the formation of man into a likeness of God through the work of the spirit). It should be recalled here that his opponents make a sharp distinction between image and likeness as well.[449] *AH* 5.6.1a says this:

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[447] Donovan, *One Right Reading?,* 146.

[448] Briggman, *Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit*, 174.

[449] See the sections concerning Irenaeus' opponents above. Cf. Wingren, 16.

"Now God shall be glorified in his handiwork (*Glirificabitur autem Deus in suo plasmate*), fitting it so as to be conformable to, and modeled after, his own Son. For the hands of the Father, that is, by the Son and the Holy Spirit, man, and not merely a part of man, was made in the likeness of God (*fit homo secundum similitudinem Dei*). Now the soul and the spirit are certainly a part of the man, but certainly not the man; for the perfect man consists in the comingling (*commixito*) and the union (*adunitio*) of the soul receiving the Spirit of the Father, and the admixture of that fleshly nature which was molded after the image of God (*et admixtae ei carni quae est plasmata secundum imaginem Dei*)."[450]

In this text Irenaeus first uses *similitudo* to denote mankind's general likeness to God in all of his components, having been modeled after the Son of God. However, this likeness is not limited to the body, soul, or spirit, but rather encompasses all three components of the whole person. This text is interesting because it is one of the only places where *similitudo* has to do with the component parts of Irenaeus' soteriological-anthropology as they relate to the triune Godhead. The three components correspond to the Triune God in the following way: the Son is the image of the formation, the Spirit is the third component of the restored person, and the Father is the one who gave the breath of life that brought about the soul of man. *Similitudo* here is a link between man and God in Irenaeus' soteriological-anthropology.

Here, image again has to do with a concrete form, the very *plasma* of a human person, whereas likeness concerns the anthropological similarity between man and the triune God after the model of the Son (cf. *AH* 5.1.3). Irenaeus' stark division between image and likeness here may be borrowed from his opponents, but the use of the division is presented in contradistinction to his opponents. For this reason, Osborn says this: "image and likeness must be held together. Where Irenaeus distinguishes between the two…he is taking the 'Gnostic' position in order to destroy it." Irenaeus utilizes the

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[450] *AH* 5.6.1a.

division between image and likeness here to present an orthodox economy of salvation. Further, for Irenaeus, it is the whole person who is saved—his anthropology and soteriology are not divorced from one another but rather knit together with Christ as the mediating bridge between the two.

Later, in *AH* 5.6.1b Irenaeus says this with reference to the human person made in the image of God:

> "…for if anyone takes away the substance of the flesh, that is the handiwork [of God] (*id est plasmatis*), and understand that which is purely spiritual, such then would not be a spiritual man, but would be the spirit of a man, or the Spirit of God. But when the spirit here is blended with the soul is united to [God's] handiwork, the man is rendered spiritual and perfect because of the outpouring of the Spirit, and this is he who was made in the image and likeness of God. But if the Spirit be wanting to the soul, he who is such is indeed of an animal nature, and being left carnal, shall be an imperfect being, possessing indeed the image [of God] in his formation (*in plasmate*), but not receiving the likeness (*similitudinem*) through the Spirit and this is this being imperfect. Thus also, if anyone takes away the image and set aside the handiwork (*si quis tollat imaginem et spernat plasma*), he cannot then understand this as being a man, but as either being some part of a man, as I have already said, or something other than a man. For that flesh which has been molded is not a perfect man in itself, but in the body of a man, and a part of a man. Neither is the soul itself, considered apart by itself, the man; but is the soul of a man, and part of a man. Neither is the spirit a man, for it is called the spirit, and not a man; but in the commingling and union of all these constitutes the perfect man…"

In this text we again observe that it is only the person who receives the Spirit of God into their soul and body who is considered to be in the *imago* and *similitudo* of God. Again, *imago* is used with reference to the form and substance of a human person. In Irenaeus' view, all people are made after the 'image' of God in their form, but that is not to say that all people have a likeness to God in character or nature. In this text, likeness to God comes through the joining of God's Holy Spirit to man. We observe here that mankind lost the ability to live their lives in accordance with the *imago Dei*—this usage aligns with what was observed in *AH* 3.18.1-2. The image and likeness to God is not lost,

but the ability to live in accordance with that image and likeness has been lost. The Holy Spirit serves to restore us to the capacity to live in accordance with the *imago Dei*. This text utilizes the concept of the *imago Dei* in order to reveal the need for the Spirit of God in Irenaeus economy of salvation. The Spirit serves to apply the work of Christ to the human person, restoring their ability to obey the moral law of the father (*AH* 5.9.3) and preparing them for incorruptibility (*AH* 5.8.1b). That is not to say that the Holy Spirit is the likeness of God ontologically, but rather that the Holy Spirit restores our ability to live in accordance with the *imago Dei*.[451]

<u>*AH* 5.8.1b.</u>

This section is a continuation of Irenaeus' application of Pauline texts concerning the resurrection of the flesh (*AH* 5.6.1-5.8.3).[452] In this section Irenaeus explores the role of the Holy Spirit in bringing man to perfection. For Irenaeus, the presence of the Holy Spirit in a person's being simultaneously enables that person to become like God in character through enabling proper obedience while also preparing that person for incorruption.[453] This incorruption is the inheritance of those who "have been sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise."[454] In this section Irenaeus says this concerning the *imago Dei:*

> "…If therefore, at the present time, being earnest we cry, "Abba, Father," what shall it be, when on rising again, we behold him face to face; when all the members shall burst out into a continuous hymn of triumph, glorifying him who raised them from dead, and gave the gift of eternal life? For if the earnest, gathering man unto itself, does even now cause him to cry, "Abba, Father," what

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[451] Contra. Orbe, *Anthropologia De San Ireneo*, 89.

[452] Donovan, *One Right Reading?*, 146.

[453] *AH* 5.7.2, 5.8.1.

[454] *AH* 5.8.1 (cf. Eph. 1:3).

shall the complete grace of the Spirit effect, which shall be given to men by God? It will render us like unto Him and accomplish the will of the Father (*similes no sei efficiet et perficiet volutatem Patris*); for it shall make man after the image and likeness of God (*efficiet enim hominem secundum imaginem et similitudinem Dei*)."[455]

In this text, the likeness between man and God in the resurrected body is not a general or moral likeness per se; rather it narrowly concerns incorruptibility in the resurrected state. Both *imago* and *similitudo* are used in reference to the incorruptibility of the resurrected body as it images the incorruptible Christ.

AH 5.9.3.

In this section Irenaeus argues against a Valentinian interpretation of 1 Cor. 15:50 where Paul says that "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God."[456] The Ptolemaic-Valentinians (along with other groups that reject the resurrection of the body) used this text as a support to their hyper-dualistic elevation of the spiritual world over and against that of the physical creation.[457] In rejection of their interpretation, Irenaeus reestablishes his soteriologically oriented tripart anthropology (redeemed people consisting of flesh, soul, and the Spirit of God) in order to argue that those who do not have the Spirit of God are "mere flesh and blood."[458] This text falls under the larger

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[455] *AH* 5.8.1.b

[456] *AH* 5.9.1.

[457] Elaine Pagels, *The Gnostic Paul: Gnostic Exegesis of the Pauline Letters* (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1975), 85.

[458] Ibid.

umbrella of the argument for the resurrection of the flesh found in *AH* 5.9.1-5.14.4.[459] It

is in this context that Irenaeus the following concerning 1 Cor. 15:49:

> "The flesh, therefore, when destitute of the Spirit of God, is dead, not having life, and cannot possess the kingdom of God: [it is as] irrational blood, like water poured out upon the ground. And therefore he says, "As is the earthy, such are they that are earthy." But where the Spirit of the Father is, there is a living man; [there is] the rational blood preserved by God for the avenging [of those that shed it]; [there is] the flesh possessed by the Spirit, forgetful indeed of what belongs to it, and adopting the quality of the Spirit, being made conformable to the Word of God. And on this account, he (the apostle) declares, "As we have borne the image of him who is of the earth, we shall also bear the image of Him who is from heaven." What, therefore, is the earthly? That which was fashioned. And what is the heavenly? The Spirit. As therefore he says, when we were destitute of the celestial Spirit, we walked in former times in the oldness of the flesh, not obeying God; so now let us, receiving the Spirit, walk in newness of life, obeying God. Inasmuch, therefore, as without the Spirit of God we cannot be saved, the apostle exhorts us through faith and chaste conversation to preserve the Spirit of God, lest, having become non-participators of the Divine Spirit, we lose the kingdom of heaven; and he exclaims, that flesh in itself, and blood, cannot possess the kingdom God."[460]

While Irenaeus' use and interpretation of 1 Cor. 15:49 may need to be critically

assessed from an exegetical standpoint, his interpretation of this text within his polemic

aims are clear for our purposes. We bear the image (*imago*) of that which is earthly in our

plasma (the form and substance of our flesh). However, we who are in Christ also bear

the image of the Spirit of God. It is for this reason that we should enact that life which we

have received by a lived obedience to God.

Here Irenaeus initially uses *imago* in reference to form (as it frequently is). He

additionally uses *imago* with reference to "obeying God" and walking in the "newness of

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[459] Donovan, *One Right Reading?*, 148. This argument continues for the next three sections from *Adversus Haereses* that will be discussed below.

[460] *AH* 5.9.3.

life." and This use of *imago* is somewhat unique for Irenaeus and seems to concern the

moral imitation of God by walking in the life of the Spirit of God.

AH 5.10.1b-2a.

In this text, Irenaeus continues his argument concerning the resurrection of the

flesh in opposition to his opponents' view of 1 Cor. 15:50.[461] He uses the imagery of the

olive branch found in Rom. 11:17-24 to illustrate the transformation of God's people as

partakers in the kingdom of God. In this section, the transformative process includes the

notion that a redeemed human is enabled to look to the Spirit rather than being enslaved

to the passions of the flesh. The flesh is not likened to the body, but to the characteristics

of sin. This text is primarily polemic, Irenaeus aims to correct the 'gnostic' view of 1

Cor. 15:50 and attempts to offer a biblical definition of the flesh by utilizing Rom. 11:17-

24. In Irenaeus' presentation, the person who refuses to be grafted onto the good olive

tree lives according to the flesh, not the Spirit. It is in this context that Irenaeus says this

concerning the image and likeness of God:

> "…and again, those persons who are not bringing forth the fruits of righteousness,
> and are, as it were, covered over and lost among brambles, if they use diligence,
> and receive the Word of God as a graft, arrive at the pristine nature of man (*in
> pristinam veniunt hominus naturam*)—that which was created after the image and
> likeness of God (*eam quae secundum imaginem et similitudinem facta est Dei*).
> But as the engrafted wild olive does not certainly loose the substance of its wood,
> but changes the quality of its fruit, and receives another name, being now not a
> wild olive, but a fruit bearing olive, and is called so; so also, when man is grafted
> in by faith and receives the Spirit of God, he certainly does not lose the substance
> of the flesh, but changes the quality of the fruit of his works, and receives another
> name, showing that he has become changed for the better, being now not [mere]
> flesh and blood, but a spiritual man, and is called such…"[462]

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[461] Donovan, *One Right Reading?*, 149.

[462] *AH* 5.10.1b-2a.

Here, being brought into the image and likeness of God has to do with a restoration of the "pristine nature of man" (*in pristinam veniunt hominis naturam*). The question is what is this pristine nature? The sense denoted here seems to refer to the former nature of man prior to the corruption of sin and death.[463] In other words, Adam and Eve prior to the fall. In the post-fall world, it is the person who has received the Word of God who takes on the nature of the pre-fall Adam. The redeemed individuals who have regained this pristine nature then begin to obey the Spirit rather than the flesh as an outward expression of an inward reality.

Since the context of the overarching argument concerns the resurrection of the flesh, it is initially unclear whether Irenaeus proposes that this pristine nature may be fully obtained now, or only to degrees prior to the resurrection. The difficulty of this matter is reconciled by considering Irenaeus' use of perfection language and his stance on the original state of Adam. As it pertains to perfection, Irenaeus, in *AH* 5.6.1, claims that those who are perfect have the Spirit of God in them—contextually however, this text does not denote the sense of moral perfection, but rather a perfect salvation. *AH* 5.8.1 says that the redeemed in the present age receive "a certain portion of his Spirit, tending towards perfection, and preparing us for incorruption." It seems most likely that the former nature of man is regained in the sense that the redeemed are capable of obedience and are shepherded towards incorruption. *AH* 3.18.1 may be a helpful background for understanding what is regained in the pristine state. The assessment *AH* 3.18.1 above found that the ability to live in accordance with the *imago Dei* was lost in the fall. This

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[463] Osborn states that this text alludes to the natural man who is the "image," but he fails to observe that both terms are used here. Additionally, the natural man in Osborn denotes the form substance unity, and therefore does not make sense of this text here. See Osborn, *Irenaeus of Lyons*, 212.

ability concerned man's ability to obey or disobey the Father. While it would be anachronistic to imply that Augustine of Hippo's fourfold state is present in Irenaeus' economy of salvation, the same notion of the first three states seems present to some degree. If I am correct in reading *AH* 3.18.1 as a background text for 5.10.1b-2a, then to regain the pristine state of man is not to regain a state of absolute perfection, but rather to be restored to a state of potential obedience (a nascent *posse non peccare*).

One additional clarification should be made within Irenaeus' schema of the *imago Dei*. This pristine nature of man is not the image and likeness of God. Rather, it is the person who is in this pristine nature who aligns most with the *imago Dei*. In other words, the pristine nature of man is not the ontological substance of the *imago Dei* but is rather used in reference to the pre-fall state of Adam who was made in the image and likeness of the *imago Dei*.

AH 5.11.2b.

This text serves a strikingly similar function to *AH* 5.10.1-2. It does not describe the ontological *imago Dei*, but rather uses image language to continue the argument against his opponents view of 1 Cor. 15:50. The context of *AH* 5.11.2 is near enough to *AH* 5.10.1-2 that nothing more needs to be said as an introduction to the text. In *AH* 5.11.2 Irenaeus says this:

> "…Therefore, when did we bear the image of him who is of the earth? Doubtless it was when those actions spoken of as "works of the flesh" used to be wrought in us. And then, again when do we bear the image of the heavenly? Doubtless when he says, "you have been washed," believing in the name of the Lord, and receiving his Spirit. Now we have washed away, not the substance of our body, nor the image of our formation, but the former vain conversation. In these members, therefore, in which we were going to destruction by working the works

of corruption, in these very members are we made alive by working the works of the Spirit."[464]

Again, Irenaeus clarifies 1 Cor. 15:35-49 in contradistinction to his opponents. It is not when the formation of a person is reduced to a mere spiritual ontology that the person images the heavenly. Rather, in our bodies, we bear the heavenly image when we believe in the Lord, receive the Spirit of God, and live in alignment with the works of the Spirit.

AH 5.12.4b.

In this text, Irenaeus utilizes Col. 3:1-11 and especially v.10 which says "and have put on the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge after the image of its creator." Col. 3.10 is used with reference to those who have received the Spirit of God, and therefore only those who have receive his Spirit may be considered to have been renewed after the knowledge of God.[465] Irenaeus uses this text in contradistinction to the 'gnostic' reading of the text.[466] This passage shares a general context with the texts above insofar as it concerns the continued argument for the resurrection of the body and the rejection of the false interpretation of 1 Cor. 15:50. In this context Irenaeus says this:

> "…and for this reason he (Paul) goes on to say, "and put on the new man, that which is renewed in knowledge, after the image of him who created him." In this, therefore, that he says, "which is renewed in knowledge," he demonstrates that he, the same man who was in ignorance in times past, that is, in ignorance of God, is renewed by that knowledge which has respect to him. For the knowledge of God renews man. And when he says, "after the image of the creator," he sets forth the

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[464] *AH* 5.11.2.

[465] Ibid., 149.

[466] Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 104.

recapitulation of the same man who was at the beginning made after the likeness of God."[467]

For Irenaeus' opponents, knowledge of the true God was the indication of a metaphysically redeemable substance within that person (i.e. the *pneumatics* [πνευματικός]). Irenaeus agrees that knowledge of God is required for salvation, but he adjusts the source of that knowledge.[468] A proper knowledge of God is received from Christ through the Spirit of God.[469] This knowledge serves the purpose of renewing man after the image of Christ, restoring us to the same capacity of Adam who was "at the beginning made after the likeness of God."[470] Knowledge of God, as received through the word of Christ and the work of the Spirit of God, serves to restore us after the image of Christ who is the *imago Dei*.

This text presents two aspects of the *imago Dei*. First, our restoration in knowledge occurs "after the image of him who created him." This, as we will observe in the next section (*AH* 5.16.1-2), is to be understood as being renewed in knowledge after the image of the Word of God (Christ) who formed man. Second, there is a soteriological aspect to growth after that image. It is difficult to tell here just what sense is of growth is used. Is it primarily moral growth and adherence to the Spirit of God? Or is it primarily concerning the acceptance of the Spirit of God into the person's anthropology thereby making that person more like Christ? It seems quite likely that both are in mind, given previous texts within the overarching argument (*AH* 5.9.1-5.14.4). In the immediate

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[467] *AH* 5.12.4b.

[468] Ibid.

[469] Ibid.

[470] *AH* 5.12.4.b.

context, both the importance of the role of the Spirit in our salvation (e.g., *AH* 5.11.2) and

the moral fruit shown by adherence to the Spirit (e.g., *AH* 5.10.1-2) may be observed with

reference to being renewed after the image of God.

<u>*AH* 5.16.1b-2.</u>

This text, as we will observe, is invaluable to the discussion on Irenaeus' view of

the *imago Dei*.[471] *AH* 5.16.1-2 is immediately situated in a section which considers the

story wherein Jesus heals the man who was born blind (John 9:1-34, *AH* 5.15.1-

5.16.2).[472] This story is taken by Irenaeus as one of three events which "serve to capsulize

the story of salvation" within his presentation of the nature of the Father and the Creator

(*AH* 5.15.1-5.20.2).[473] Irenaeus' reflection upon this story is later incorporated into his

position on the importance of form-substance unity in the body of man (*AH* 5.14.4). This

subsequently leads to a section on the nature of Christ's revelation of himself to

composite creatures through the incarnation (*AH* 5.16.1-2). Here, Irenaeus interprets the

imago Dei of Gen. 1:26 intertextually through his reading of Jn. 1:14, and Col. 3:15-20. It

is in this context that Irenaeus says this:

> "…And in this way was the hand of God plainly shown forth, by which Adam
> was fashioned, and we too have been formed; and since there is one and the same
> Father, whose voice from the beginning even to the end is present with his
> handiwork (*plasmati*), and the substance from which we were formed is plainly
> declared through the gospel, we should therefore not seek after another Father
> besides him, nor [look for] another substance from which we have been formed,
> besides what was mentioned beforehand, and shown forth by the Lord; nor
> another hand of God besides that which, from the beginning even to the end,
> forms us and prepares us for life, and is present with his handiwork, and perfects

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[471] Additionally, this text is invaluable for understanding his soteriology and anthropology. It is referenced in nearly every primary assessment of Irenaeus' thought in these areas (cf. bibliography for a list of sources reviewed).

[472] Donovan, *One Right Reading?*, 154.

[473] Ibid.

it after the image and likeness of God (*et perficit illud secundum imaginem et similitudinem Dei*). And then, again, this Word was manifested when the Word of God was made man, assimilating himself to man, and man unto himself, so that by means of his resemblance to the Son, man might become precious to the father. For in times long past, it was said that man was created after the image of God, but it was not [actually] shown for the Word was as yet invisible, after whose image man was created. Wherefore also he did easily lose the likeness (*in praeteritis enim temporibus, dicebatur quidem imaginem Dei factum esse hominem, non autem ostendebatur: adhuc enim invisibile erat Verbum, cujus secundum imaginem homo factus fuerat; propter hoc autem et similitudinem facile amisit*). When, however, the Word of God became flesh, he confirmed both these: for he both showed forth the image truly, since he became himself what was his image (*et imaginem enim ostendit veram, ipse hoc fiens quod erat imago ejus*) and he reestablished the likeness after a sure manner, by assimilating man to the invisible father through the means of the visible Word (*et similitudinem firmans restituit, consimilem faciens hominem invisibili Patri per visibile verbum*)."[474]

There are four primary observations to be made in this text. The first concerns a division between image and likeness in *AH* 5.16.2. The second concerns an additional proof for the notion that Irenaeus' grammar of imaging requires a form-substance unity to make spiritual things known to the composite creature. The third concerns the teleological aspect of the image and likeness of God. The fourth concerns the ontological *imago Dei* who is Christ. These will be addressed below in the order presented here.

First, we will discuss the division between image and likeness in *AH* 5.16.2. Image here is used with direct reference to the composite form of the incarnate Christ. It is when Christ became man that the image of God was made known. This is because the λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ was invisible prior to the incarnation. Here, *imago* again has to do with form substance unity. Likeness in *AH* 5.16.2 however concerns the reestablishment of man's ability to live in righteousness.[475] We must recall what has been said above

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[474] *AH* 5.16.1b-2.

[475] It may be due to this text that some scholars reduced Irenaeus' use of likeness to the loss of original righteousness. For one example, see the following resource. David Cairns, *The Image of God in Man* (New

concerning mankind's loss of likeness to God. Irenaeus in *AH* 3.18.1 said that Adam lost

the ability to live in accordance with the image and likeness of God. Within the

soteriological usage of the *imago Dei*, God's work of restoration in Christ and through

the Spirit is required to restore us unto life (*AH* 3.18.1. cf. 3.17.3). Elsewhere Irenaeus

says that mankind "lost the true rationality…and opposed the righteousness of God" (*AH*

4.4.3). In this sense does Christ "re-establish the similitude after a sure manner, by

assimilating man to the invisible Father through means of the visible Word."[476]

     There is some debate in modern scholarship over what the 'likeness' is that is

regained in Christ. Fantino proposes that the likeness which was lost was the presence of

the Holy Spirit.[477] Behr proposes that the likeness which was lost was the "strength of the

breath of life, which would have kept Adam immortal, and his natural and childlike

mind."[478] Behr does not here take into account *AH* 3.18.1-2 (cf. 5.6.1b, 5.10.1b-2a)

wherein Irenaeus shows that the image and likeness are not lost, but rather our ability to

live according to that image and likeness were muted by absence of the Spirit. In this

regard Fantino is closer to the mark since the Holy Spirit is required to enable man to be

restored to the pristine nature in which Adam was originally formed in the image and

likeness of God (*AH* 5.10.1-2). *AH* 3.18.1-2 serves as the primary interpretive

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York, NY: Philosophical Library, 1953), 20. However, this reductionistic presentation fails to capture the nuance of the use of *similitudo* here as well as the various usages throughout the Irenaean schema (§4.3.2.3).

[476] *AH* 5.16.2b.

[477] Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement*, 115.

[478] Ibid.

background to understanding what Christ regains for man in *AH* 5.16.2 because it is the clearest text with reference to the loss of mankind's likeness to God.

Second, we may again observe the general consistency of Irenaeus' grammar of imaging. The form-substance appearance of the spiritual world was required to make God known to man more fully. The *imago Dei* was unknown until the λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ became incarnate and put on visibility. Here we might recall one of Irenaeus' critiques leveled against his opponents in *AH* 2.7.6-7—symbolic or conceptual images do not function to image God or to make him known because Irenaeus' grammar of imaging requires composite creatures to engage with concrete images.

Third, we may again observe the teleological component of Irenaeus' notion of the *imago Dei*. Christ, being present with his handiwork (*plasmati*), has committed to perfect his handiwork after the image and likeness of God. While this certainly has to do with his reestablishment of man's ability to live in righteousness through the work of the Holy Spirit, it also concerns the perfect ordering of mankind in the resurrection (cf. *AH* 4.38.3-4, 5.1.1). Further, as *AH* 5.16.2 points out, the image and likeness of God is Christ. Therefore, though not stated explicitly, the referent may concern some growth towards a likeness to Christ now, and perfect growth in likeness to Christ in the resurrection. The teleological aspect of the perfection of God's people is implicit in the framework of Irenaeus' soteriology and has thus been woven into his soteriological usage of the *imago Dei*.[479]

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[479] Matthew Steenberg, "Children in Paradise: Adam and Eve as 'Infants' in Irenaeus of Lyons." *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 12, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 1-22.

Fourth, we may observe the nature of the ontological *imago Dei*. The *imago Dei* wasn't known fully until Christ became incarnate because Christ, in his incarnate form, is the *imago Dei*. This idea that Christ is the *imago Dei* certainly includes the considerations concerning *similitudo*, but also includes the narrow sense of *imago* (since the *imago Dei* was made known when Christ put on form).

The incarnate Christ, as the ontological *imago Dei* in both form and general likeness to God, is the bodily archetype after which Adam and Eve received their forms. The true form of the perfect man is made known in Christ who "became himself what was his image" (*ipse hoc fiens quod erat imago ejus*).[480] Adam and Eve do not seem to function proleptically in relation to Christ's incarnation—rather, even before the incarnation, it is the image of the incarnate Christ after which mankind was formed. This notion is understandably a bit difficult and has been cause for different interpretations.[481] Irenaeus does not explicitly clarify how this functions; however, given his grammar of imaging and the narrow use of *imago* in *Adversus Haereses*, it is difficult to read it any other way. The general logic is as follows: Adam was formed *after* the image of God → since invisible subjects may not be imaged to sense perceptible beings, it is Christ in his incarnate form who is the image of God → Adam was therefore formed after the image of the incarnate Christ prior to Christ's historical incarnation. In this sense the image was

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[480] *AH* 5.16.2.

[481] Antiono Orbe sees this text as functioning eschatologically. Christ reveals what the true *imago Dei* is and what mankind will be in their restored state. But this interpretation it doesn't make sense of the general flow of logic in the text. This is in part because Orbe has two categories in play that emphasize the role of Christ as the *imago Dei* ("personal" and "substantial") but neither take into consideration the general consistency of Irenaeus' use of *imago* within his grammar of imaging (wherein *imago* nearly always means 'form') where Fantino's assessment is more sufficient. See Antonio Orbe, *Theología de San Ireneo: Comentario al libro V del Adversus Haereses*. (Madrid: Biblioteca des Autores Cristianos, 1988), 2:92-98.

not yet shown. For this reason, it may be argued that Irenaeus may have held an early

form of Christological supralapsarianism.[482]

AH 5.21.2a.

In this text, Irenaeus uses the image and likeness of God in man an aspect which

required Christ's salvific works to become perfect. Here, the image and likeness of God

was imperfect in man, and thus required the Lord's recapitulation of himself in creation.

In *AH* 5.21.2 Irenaeus says this:

> "Now the Lord would not have recapitulated in himself that ancient and primary
> enmity against the serpent, fulfilling the promise of the creator, and performing
> his command, if he had come from another Father. But as he is one and the same,
> who formed us at the beginning, and sent his Son at the end, the Lord did perform
> his command, being made of a woman, by both destroying our adversary, and
> perfecting man after the image and likeness of God."[483]

A difficulty in this text is that Irenaeus does not clarify the referent of the image

and likeness here. Does it refer to Christ as the ontological *imago Dei*? Or to the

restoration of man to that former nature of the pristine man? It is unclear. However, the

way in which he utilizes the terms image and likeness for the sake of his argument is

clear. Here Irenaeus uses the coreferential terms as a point of reference by which

perfection is gauged by the work of Christ. This text, for our purpose, is a support of

Irenaeus' application of the *imago Dei* in soteriological contexts. Here the *imago Dei* has

a teleological component with regards to the growth of man through the work of Christ.

AH 5.36.3.

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[482] Presley has a similar perspective though he leans more towards Orbe's view. Presley, 179.

[483] *AH* 5.21.2a.

This is the closing text to Irenaeus' *Adversus Haereses*. It is a concise section wherein Irenaeus "connects his teaching on the kingdom with the argument of *AH* 5… [while also recalling] his major antagonistic themes."[484] The following topics may be observed in this section: the physical resurrection of God's people, the inheritance of the earth following resurrection, the creation's freedom from the bondage of corruption, and a final sentence concerning the economy of salvation and the *imago Dei*. It is in this final sentence of *AH* 5.36.3 that Irenaeus says this:

> "…For there is the one Son, who accomplished his Father's will, and one human race also in which the mysteries of God are wrought, "which the angels desire to look into;" and they are not able to search out the wisdom of God, by means of which his handiwork, confirmed and incorporated with his Son is brought to perfection (*per quam plasma ejus conformatum et concorporatum Filio perficiturm*); that his offspring, the first begotten Word, should descend to the creature, that is, to what had been moulded (*plasma*), and that it should be contained by him; and, on the other hand, the creature should contain the Word (*et facture iterum capiat Verbum*), and ascend to him, passing beyond the angels, and be made after the image and likeness of God (*et fiens secundum imaginem et similitudinem Dei*)."[485]

From this final text in *Adversus Haereses* we can observe how man, in the second fashioning (*secundum plasmationem* [cf. *AH* 5.23.2]) of his nature, receives the Word. The Word then recapitulates that person to himself after his own image. The soteriological and eschatological context of the text makes it appear as if there is some greater extent to which the image and likeness of God are shown in the person who has the indwelling Word. This fits well with Irenaeus' soteriologically focused anthropology wherein the person who has the body, the soul, and the Holy Spirit is made perfect in the *imago Dei* because that person now has the capacity in the Spirit to live according to the

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[484] Donvan, *One Right Reading?*, 168.

[485] *AH* 5.36.3b.

imago Dei who is Christ. This text does not necessarily imply that the image and likeness were lost. Rather, it seems to emphasize that the redeemed man—and to a greater extent the fully restored man after the resurrection—has become more fully aligned to the image and likeness of God. In the nearness and indwelling of the Word, we pass beyond the angels. This fits the schema of the *imago Dei* observed in Irenaeus thus far.

4.2.   The *imago Dei* in *The Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching*

Now, having presented and expounded upon each of the relevant texts concerning the *imago Dei* in *Adversus Haereses*, we may turn our attention to *The Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching* (*Dem*). This work was likely produced after *Adversus Haereses* and serves as a "summary memorandum" (κεφαλιωδής ὑπόμνημα) of Christian teaching.[486] It does not present the teachings in a "system of theological beliefs," but rather Irenaeus recounts "the various deeds of God culminating in the exaltation of his crucified Son."[487] In this work we will observe five primary references to the *imago Dei* (*Dem* 5, 22, 32, 55, & 97). This text, having been written after *Adversus Haereses*, must be read in light of the previous development of Irenaeus' thought on the *imago Dei*. Given the concise nature and aim of the text, we will find that Irenaeus is clearer concerning his use of the *imago Dei*.

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[486] *Dem* 1.

[487] Behr, *On the Apostolic Preaching*, 7.

All quotations from *Dem* will be taken from Behr's translation; at key points I will adjust Behr's translation with reference to the source material found in Rousseau's work.[488]

Dem 5.

This section concerns the origin of all things: God.[489] The divine method of creation was subject to divine ontology; God is Spirit (πνεῦμα) and "verbal" (λογικός), so he created all things by his Word (who is Christ) and adorned all things by the Spirit.[490] The Word of God "establishes, that is, works bodily and confers existence."[491] The Spirit however, "arranges and forms the various powers."[492] It is in this context that Irenaeus says this concerning the likeness of God, "…because above all is the Father, and through all is the Word…while in us all is the spirit who cries "Abba, Father," and forms man to the likeness of God…"[493]

In this section it should be recalled that Irenaeus' use of *similitudo* here mimics the sense found in *AH* 3.20.2. Here, likeness was used with reference to the process of growth established through the work of the Holy Spirit into imitation of Christ. The perfect man is the one who has the Holy Spirit, for without that Spirit he cannot live in accordance with God. This may be the implication present in *Dem* 5 as well.

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[488] A. Rousseau, *Irénée de Lyon: Démonstration de la Prédication Apostolique* (Paris: Cerf, 1995). It should be additionally noted that the Greek and Latin used in this section are Rousseau's proposed translations of the Armenian translation discovered in 1904.

[489] *Dem* 4.

[490] *Dem* 5.

[491] Ibid.

[492] Ibid.

[493] *Dem* 5.

<u>*Dem* 11.</u>

This text concerns the fashioning of man with God's own hands (*hominem autem propiis plasmavit manibus*). It goes on to describe the composition of the first man, being a mixture (συγκράννυμι) of earth (*terra*) and his own power (δύναμις). God then stamps himself (*proprias circumposuit caracteres*) upon his own handiwork (*plasma*) so that his creation may be seen to be like God (θεοειδής). Irenaeus then says this concerning the image and likeness of man to God:

> "…for man was placed upon the earth, fashioned in the image (εἰκών) of God— and that he might be alive, he breathed into his face a breath of life; so that both according to the breath of life (*insufflationem*) and according to the formation (*plasmatus*), man was like (*similis*: ὅμοιος) God. Accordingly, he was free and master of himself, having been made by God in this way, that he should rule over everything upon the earth…"[494]

In this text Irenaeus differentiates between image and likeness. Image seems to primarily concern the form and substance of man. It refers to the body of man even prior to receiving the breath of life. Likeness, on the other hand, refers to the breath of life and the *plasma* of man. Likeness, in Irenaeus' schema, can at times concern the formation of the human person as well as the animating force of the soul which was given by God through his breath—this notion fits well with *AH* 5.6.1 wherein the body, soul, and Holy Spirit are all components of the perfect man made after the likeness of God. This said, these are more general usages of *similitudo* and are not to be considered as his normative use since this anthropological and metaphysical consideration occurs primarily here and in *AH* 5.6.1.

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[494] *Dem* 11.

Now, concerning the dominion of man, the syntax of the section does not seem to imply that the dominion which man receives substantially concerns the likeness man has to God, but rather it seems to stem from the likeness man has to God. If the image and likeness concern 'first things,' then the 'second thing' is mankind's freedom of will which makes dominion possible.[495]

Dem 22.

Dem 22 is a retelling of God's covenant promise with Noah. As Irenaeus works through the covenant event, he additionally portrays the *lex talionis* of Gen. 9:6 which uses the *imago Dei* as the fundamental basis for the value of a human life. However, Irenaeus reads Col. 1:15 into Gen. 9:6 and thus adds additional context concerning Christ and the *imago Dei* in his reiteration of the *lex talionis*. In this text we will observe one of Irenaeus' clearest expressions of the ontological *imago Dei*: namely that Christ is the image of God.

The general consistency with which the terms *imago* and εἰκών are used within Irenaeus' grammar of imaging should be recalled we turn to *Dem* 22. Irenaeus is explicit concerning the nature of imaging for sense perceptible creatures—only concrete images consisting of a form substance unity can image something else. It seems, from this study, that there are only three texts where he uses *imago* in a way that is inconsistent with this view (*AH* 3.11.8, 4.7.2, 4.30.4)—and the text at hand is not one of them.

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[495] C. S. Lewis, "First and Second Things," in *God in the Dock* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2014), 307-311.

Irenaeus says this concerning the *imago Dei*: "for he[496] made man in the image of God, and the image of God is the son, according to whose image man was made; and for this reason he appeared in the last times, to reveal the image like himself (*ut imaginem similem sibi ostenderet*)."[497]

There are two primary observations to pull from this text. First, man is not the *imago Dei*, he is made after the image of the *imago Dei*. Second, the *imago Dei* is Christ himself. These observations have been noted before, but here they are exceptionally clear and concise.

In addition to the two observations stated above, there is a question that this text should cause us to consider. What is the relationship between the preincarnate Christ and the image after which man was made? Or in other words, how is it that man was made after the image of God when that image was not yet incarnate into its form-substance? In *AH* 5.16.1-2 we observed that Christ was the archetypal *imago Dei*. In this sense the *imago Dei* has a "revelatory function" since "the image reveals the archetype of which it is an image."[498] Irenaeus does not go on to explain this point but it seems that even man's form foreshadowed and typified the archetypal man who was yet to come.[499] When the eternal Word of God became incarnate, he made the archetypal form—after which

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[496] Rousseau and Behr both replace the 3rd person with the 1st person to align the text with the LXX.

[497] *Dem* 22.

[498] Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement*, 89.

[499] This notion was additionally held by Tertullian, who also fails to explain how this functions prior to Christ's incarnation, but only affirms that the incarnation had to occur to make the image of God known by the one who was in the form of God. See *Res.* 6. Fantino points out the commonality between Tertullian's writings and Irenaeus on this matter by showing their polemic aim against the 'gnostic' tendencies concerning Christ's relationship to God and man. Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 150-151.

mankind had been originally formed—known to man. For Irenaeus, it was always God's

plan that his Word would become incarnate—in part because it was required to resolve

the mystery of the *imago Dei* and to connect the beginning of all things to the end.[500]

Dem 32b-33b.

    Dem 32-33 occurs within what Behr identifies as a section concerning "the

salvation wrought by the Son of God" (*Dem* 31-42a).[501] *Dem* 31 focuses on the

communion between God and man in the incarnation of Christ. *Dem* 32 continues to

expound on the incarnation by showing how the virgin birth of Christ parallels the

creation of Adam (who was formed of the virgin earth and the wisdom of God). This

leads to *Dem* 33 where Irenaeus comments on the soteriological implications of Christ as

the new Adam. It is in this context that two references to the image and likeness of God

are made. Irenaeus in *Dem* 32b-33b says this:

> "…Thus, the Lord, recapitulating this man, received the same arrangement of
> embodiment as this one, being born from the virgin by the will and wisdom of
> God, that he may also demonstrate the likeness of embodiment to Adam (*ut et
> ipse [eam quae] ad Adam [erat] similitudinem carnationis ostenderet*[502]), and
> might become the man written in the beginning, "according to the image and
> likeness of God" (*et fieret*[503] *[is qui] scriptus [erat] in initio homo secundum
> imaginem et similitudinem Dei*).[504] And just as through a disobedient virgin man
> was struck and, falling, died, so also by means of a virgin, who obeyed the word
> of God, man, being revivified, received life. For the Lord came to seek back the
> lost sheep, and it was man who was lost; and, therefore, he did not become any
> other formation (πλάσμα) but being born from her who was of the race of Adam,

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[500] Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 105.

[501] Behr, *On the Apostolic Preaching*, 60.

[502] *Ostendero*: imperfect, active, subjunctive, 3rd person, sg.

[503] *Fio*: imperfect, active, subjunctive, 3rd person, sg.

[504] Since it is the Lord who is the subject throughout this section, it is unlikely that man in general is meant
here. This is also observed, as we have mentioned previously, in *AH* 3.23.1-2 and 5.1.2. See John Behr, *On
the Apostolic Preaching,* 108.

he maintained the likeness of her formation (*similitudinem plasmationis servavit*). For it was necessary for Adam to be recapitulated in Christ, that "mortality might be swallowed up in immortality…"[505]

In this text, which primarily concerns the role of the incarnation in Irenaeus' economy of salvation, we observe that Jesus receives the same embodiment as his own creation. In this embodiment he puts on the likeness of Adam's substance so that he might show what the ontological *imago Dei* is. Christ parallels Adam in his formation,[506] "connecting the end with the beginning" (*AH* 3.22.2), so that "mortality might be swallowed up in immortality" (*Dem* 33).

It is interesting that Irenaeus writes that Jesus 'becomes' the man after whom Adam was formed, for it leaves a puzzle concerning how man was made after an image that had yet been actually formed. This has been discussed to some degree above in *Dem* 22 but here it must be further addressed. In Irenaeus' schema, Jesus was always the substance of the *imaginem et similitudinem Dei*. Yet, this schema does not explain how Adam was made after this *imago Dei* without the *imago Dei* having yet become the fully formed *imago Dei* (post-incarnation). Irenaeus' grammar of imaging helps to make sense of the notion. In *AH* 2.17.1-2 we observed that Irenaeus almost exclusively understands *imago* to pertain to a concrete subject—in part because the spiritual ontology is invisible to composite creatures. It seems likely that, for Irenaeus, the pre-incarnate Son was the ontological image and likeness of the Father in Spirit, but at the creation of mankind the

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[505] Dem 32b-33b.

[506] It should be noted that it seems Irenaeus' perspective on Adam's formation from virgin earth seems to come from his reading of Gen. 2:4-7. In this creation account, the first thing to be formed from earth was not the vegetation, but man. Man was formed from soil, not yet watered or used to grow anything else. This formation from virgin earth is then paralleled with the formation of the Son from the virgin Mary. Cf. Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 110.

Son was determined to become the composite sense-perceptible *imago Dei* to better make God known to his creation. So, Adam—as a type—was created after the bodily image of this conceptual archetypal person who would come and make the likeness of God fully known.[507]

This text speaks to the ontological *imago Dei* (the Son) while also utilizing the *imago Dei* within Irenaeus' economy of salvation. The *imago Dei* is again observed as a vehicle of thought for expressing the nature of the Son, his relationship to his creation, his relationship to the Father, and his instrumental role in restoring his creation to himself.

Dem 54b-55.

In this text we encounter another teaching on Christ as the ontological *imago Dei*. The context concerns Irenaeus' teaching on the human birth of Jesus Christ (*Dem* 53-66).[508] Genesis 1:26 is utilized by Irenaeus to support his reading of Isaiah 9:6. Irenaeus rightly believes that the messianic prophecy of Isaiah 9 refers to the Son, but he also reads Is. 9:6 into the creation discourse hinted at in Gen. 1:26 when the 1st plural ποιήσωμεν is used (LXX). In Dem 54b-55. Irenaeus says this:

> "…And again the same prophet says, "Unto us a Son is born, and unto us a child is given, and his name is called Wonderful Counselor, Mighty God." And he calls him "Wonderful Counselor," even of the Father, showing by this that the Father works all things together with him, as it has it in the first book of Moses, which is entitled "Genesis," "And God said, let us make man in our image and according to our likeness," for it is clear that here the Father addresses the Son, the Wonderful Counselor of the Father. He is, moreover, also our counselor, giving

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[507] The implications of this discussion on infralapsarianism and supralapsarianism in the early church may need to be considered in another work. It seems that Irenaeus' understanding of the *imago Dei* requires a Christological supralapsarianism wherein it was always God's plan that the Son would become incarnate. However, it is unclear what this implies about the fall in Irenaeus' economy of salvation.

[508] Behr, *On the Apostolic Preaching*, 74-82.

advice, not compelling us as God—also being, he says, "Mighty God"—counseling us to abandon ignorance and receive knowledge, and to depart from error and to come to the truth, and to cast off corruptibility and to grasp incorruptibility."[509]

Since Irenaeus believes that the Son and the Holy Spirit are the "hands of God" (*AH* 5.28.4), he reads them into in the internal discussion of Gen. 1:26 ("let *us* make man in *our* image…"). However, we may also observe here that the Son takes a special role as the image and likeness of God. As we have observed elsewhere, the Holy Spirit has a vital role in applying redemption to the human individual in the restoration of the individual's ability to live according to the image and likeness of God. But the Spirit is not considered to be the image and likeness of God—that role in Irenaeus' schema is reserved for Christ alone.

Dem 97

This last section concerns an exhortation to those who have received salvation from Christ. The redeemed are to turn to him and give thanks to the one who preached the message of salvation concerning "the visible advent of our Lord—that is, his human existence."[510] This salvation is also intertwined with the "wisdom of heaven" which, for Irenaeus, is simultaneously the scriptures, the message of salvation, and possibly the Holy Spirit himself (cf. *AH* 4.20.3). In this section Irenaeus makes a statement concerning the *imago Dei* and the formation of man. He says this:

> "All who keep her (wisdom) are unto life; but they who forsake her will die.[511] Jacob and Israel, he calls the Son of God, who received from the Father dominion over our life, and after receiving it, he brought her (wisdom) down to us, to those

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[509] *Dem* 54b-55.

[510] *Dem* 97.

[511] Cf. Baruch 3:29-4:1.

who are far from her, when he appeared on earth and conversed with men, mixing and blending the Spirit of God the Father with the handiwork of God, that man might be according to the image and likeness of God."[512]

Irenaeus, in these later sections of *Dem,* becomes cryptic as he weaves different themes from the scriptures into his proclamation of the economy of salvation. This section does not seem to concern the initial creation of man, for he says "*quando in terra visus est et cum hominibus conversatus est.*"[513] Rather it concerns the way in which Christ, in his incarnate presence with man, brought the Spirit of God into a greater connection with the formation of man. The association between the *imago Dei* and the presence of the Holy Spirit is not new to Irenaeus schema (e.g. *AH* 4.38.4, 5.6.1, 5.12.4; *Dem* 5). Again, we observe that Irenaeus uses *imago* and *similitudo* as coreferential terms that denote the general sense of restoration after the image of Christ. This usage has been common in Irenaeus as we have seen thus far.

4.3.   A Synthesis of the Findings in Irenaeus

This concludes our analysis of Irenaeus' *Against Heresies* and *Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching.* We may now turn our attention to synthesizing the findings above. Here I will attempt to categorize and clarify the schema that Irenaeus has developed throughout these two works.

What we have observed thus far is that Irenaeus has a cohesive understanding and application of the *imago Dei*. Irenaeus' schema has a basic framework, but his

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[512] *Dem* 97.

[513] *Dem* 97.

application of the schema is richly intricate in cohesion with his soteriological-anthropology, theology, soteriology, and metaphysical positions. Throughout this project I have observed two primary categorical distinctions in Irenaeus' use of image and likeness language with reference to the *imago Dei*. The first category concerns Christ as the ontological *imago Dei*. This first category is *a priori* to understanding nearly every reference concerning the image and likeness of God. The second category concerns the *imago Dei* within Irenaeus' economy of salvation. Under this second category we will observe how Irenaeus used the *imago Dei* as a conduit for numerous soteriological and anthropological points. These two categories will be discussed below in light of current relevant scholarship on Irenaeus.[514]

4.3.1.   Christ: The Ontological *imago Dei*.

Throughout the analysis of pertinent sections from *AH* and *De* we have observed that man is not the *imago Dei* but is rather made after the ontological *imago Dei*.[515] Within the Irenaean schema, the ontological *imago Dei* was used with reference to the following notions: Christ as epistemological mediator (*AH* 4.33.4, 5.12.4b, *Dem* 22); Christ as the salvific mediator (*AH* 3.22.1. 4.33.4, *Dem* 32b), and the incarnate Word as the model after which mankind was fashioned (*AH* 3.23.1-2, 4.33.4, 5.16.1-2, *Dem* 22).

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[514] Esp. Fantino, Orbe, and Osborn, but also Wingren, Donovan, Holsinger-Friesen, Preston, Behr, Cartwright, etc.

[515] Orbe attempts to portray a likeness between Irenaeus and Philo on this point (Orbe, *Anthropologia De San Ireneo*, 107-108). This is unlikely on two points. First, Irenaeus does not identify man as the image of the *imago Dei*, but rather as one created in or after that image. There is an intense dissimilarity between Philo and Irenaeus on the *imago Dei* that makes the one point of quasi-similarity dubious and unnecessary. Second, given the work done by Runia, it is unlikely that Irenaeus uses Philo (Runia, *Philo in Early Christian Literature*, 116-118). See Appendix B for Philo's view of the *imago Dei*. Additionally see the following resource for an Irenaean critique of the λόγος model. Foster, 109.

The next paragraph will attempt to give a concise review of the pertinent texts used in discerning what and who the *imago Dei* is.

Irenaeus, in *AH* 3.22.1, presented Christ as the *imago Dei* who recapitulated himself into the form-substance of his own handiwork (*plasma*) so that the analogy between himself and Adam may be retained in the recapitulation. Irenaeus then uses the notion of the *imago Dei* to explain why it was fitting that Christ would recapitulate himself for the redemption of those made after his image and likeness (*AH* 3.23.1). *AH* 4.33.4 then revealed that Irenaeus believed that man is created with some likeness to the *imago Dei*. However, this ability to live in that likeness to the *imago Dei* was to some degree lost in the fall but regained when the *imago Dei* made the *similitudo* known to man.[516] Christ, as the *imago Dei*, then is both a salvific mediator (restoring the *imitatio Christi* to his people) and an epistemological mediator (in revealing what likeness man has to him as the *imago Dei*).[517] In *AH* 5.16.1-2 (cf. *Dem* 22) Irenaeus presents the incarnate Christ as the true archetypal *imago Dei*. In the incarnation the Word of God "became himself what was his image" ("*et imaginem enim ostendit veram, ipse hoc fiens quod erat imago ejus*").[518] In this act of putting on his own image, he then makes the invisible Word of God known to his people while also making the true Adam known in his recapitulation.[519] Irenaeus, in *Dem* 32-33 showed that Christ, as the *imago Dei*, was

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[516] This will be further explored in the next section. Here the primary emphasis is on the ontological *imago Dei*.

[517] Marc Cortez observed this category in his presentation of Irenaeus' thought. Cortez, 25.

[518] *AH* 5.16.2.

[519] This is what Ysabel de Andia views as the "double visibilite." Ysabel de Andia, *Homo Vivens* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1986), 69. Cf. Cartwright, 248.

the necessary soteriological bridge between man and the Father because it was through Christ that mankind received their formation. Lastly, Irenaeus views the Son as equal to God in his role as the preexistent and eternal wonderful counselor who the Father addresses in the internal discussion of Gen. 1:26 (*Dem* 54b-55). It is only fitting that Christ would serve as the ontological *imago Dei* in his role as divine become incarnate.

Throughout this thesis, the term "*imago Dei*" has been used as a categorical term which includes the notions of both the image and the likeness of God as coreferential terms.[520] This thesis thus far has observed that Irenaeus views Christ as both the image and likeness of God after which mankind was fashioned. This position on the ontological *imago Dei* is accepted by authors such as Fantino,[521] Osborn,[522] Wingren;[523] however, it is rejected by Orbe.[524]

Antonio Orbe believes that the Irenaean schema of the *imago Dei* includes a stark division between image and likeness throughout the entirety of *AH* and *Dem*. In Orbe's reading, the image is represented by the Word of God (in a visible state and invisible state), whereas the likeness is represented by the Holy Spirit.[525] This view stems from his understanding of the role of the hands of God in the formation of man (*AH* 5.6.1. cf.

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[520] There may be a few places where *imago Dei* solely refers to the 'image' aspect, but those should be easily discernable by the context of use.

[521] Fantino*, La Théologie d'Irénée*, 216-218.

[522] Osborn, *Irenaeus of Lyon*, 212.

[523] Wingren, 21.

[524] Orbe, *Anthropologia De San Ireneo*, 89. Anthony Hoekema also follows this notion. Anthony A. Hoekema, *Created in God's Image* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994), 35.

[525] Ibid.

3.18.1-2) and the general association of the Word of God with the image of God (*Dem* 22). However, as we have observed in the readings of *AH* and *Dem* above, the Holy Spirit is never directly stated to be the likeness of God, whereas the Word of God is occasionally presented as both the image and likeness of God (*AH* 3.18.1, 3.21.1, 3.23.1-2. 5.15.1b-2, *Dem* 32-33, 54-55 [esp. cf. *AH* 4.33.4). Orbe's idea that the Holy Spirit is the likeness of God appears to be a conflation of the role of the Holy Spirit in the economy of salvation and the nature of the Holy Spirit in his ontological relation to the Father (*AH* 4.33.4, 4.38.3b, 5.6.1b, 5.8.1b). This conflation is understandable but has led to a misinterpretation of Irenaeus' thought as presented in both *Against Heresies* and *Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching*. It is my hope that the study presented above has served to remedy this false notion.

At several key points within this thesis, we have observed a puzzle concerning the formation of man and the pre-incarnate Word of God (*Dem* 22, 32b-33b, [cf. *AH* 5.16.2]). Antonio Orbe argues in *Teología V.2* that there is a distinction between the substantial image and the personal image.[526] Presley identifies Orbe's distinction as something which is "not located in identity, but in visibility; that is, the invisibility or visibility of the image within the timing of the divine economy."[527] The personal image was the invisible Word of God prior to the incarnation, but the substantial image is that Word of God become incarnate who communicates God through sense perceptible presence and

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[526] Orbe, *Teología V.2*, 92-3. Orbe primarily considers *AH* 5.16.2 in light of Irenaeus' reading of John 1:14.

[527] Presley, 178. Cf. Orbe, *Teología V.2*, 92-3.

speech.[528] Does this presentation fit what we have observed above? Or is there another scheme within the ontological *imago Dei* that better responds to the issue?

Orbe's distinction between personal and substantial image succeeds in recognizing the distinction between the invisible Word of God and the incarnate Christ within the Irenaean economy of salvation. However, his application of this distinction in relation to the creation of Adam fails to explain how man received his form-substance unity from the image of one who was invisible and spiritual in essence. Orbe's format states that man was made after the invisible image of the Word of God in anticipation of the incarnation. However, from what we have observed in Irenaeus' grammar of imaging, man could not have been made after an invisible image. It does not seem to be the case that man was made in anticipation of the incarnate Word of God; but rather, that man was made after the image of archetypal incarnate *imago Dei* which was not yet known. In contradistinction to Orbe, this scheme views the incarnate body of Christ as a-temporal with reference to the creation account. In other words, in using Orbe's distinction, I would argue that Irenaeus saw man as made after the substantial image prior to the incarnation of that image—not merely in anticipation of the incarnation event.[529] The substantial image of the incarnate *imago Dei* was always in the mind of God and served as the model after which the hands of God formed man from the virgin soil (*AH*

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[528] For a more modern representation of Orbe's thought, see Sophie Cartwright. Though she does not cite Orbe (likely because of the growing criticisms leveled at his work) she makes the same application of the division between the pre-incarnate and the post incarnate Christ with respect to the *imago Dei*. Cartwright, *The Image of God in Irenaeus, Marcellus, and Eustathinus*, 175.

[529] This position is additionally supported in Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 104-106, 111-112, 153-156. Cf. Briggman, *God and Christ in Irenaeus*, 189-194.

3.21.10).[530] In this sense, Christ is not only the archetypal man, but also the prototype of man.[531]

My position regarding mankind's formation after the incarnate Word of God is preliminary, as is Orbe's, because Irenaeus does not clarify the relation between the formation of Adam and the invisible Word of God. However, I propose that my position makes better sense of Irenaeus' grammar of imaging, his insistence upon form-substance unity, and his position on the role of the incarnate Son as the model of humanity.[532] In the Irenaean schema, the *imago Dei* plays a central mediatorial role between man and God in anthropology, soteriology, cosmogeny, and epistemology. The *imago Dei* serves as conceptually burdened term that helps to situate the telos of the eschatological man who becomes perfected after the image of Christ.

While the position on the role of the pre-incarnate Word of God in the schema of the *imago* Dei is up for debate, the role of the incarnate Christ as the ontological *imago Dei* in the economy of salvation is not. In the Irenaean schema the ontological *imago Dei* is *a priori* to understanding the system as a whole. Irenaeus places Christ as the bridge by which the divide between man (post fall) and God is united in divine pardon, restoration, and a promise of salvation. Having teased out the ontological *imago Dei* in Irenaeus, we

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[530] Again, the reader should not conflate this model with the 'λόγος model' observed in Philo. See Foster, 109.

[531] Wingren, 21, 95. Cf. Cartwright, 175.

[532] There are two other scholars who also take a similar position on the formation of man after the incarnate body of the Word of God. These scholars are both a benefit to the discussion but their treatment is slightly less substantial. Mackenzie, *Irenaeus' Demonstration of the Apostolic preaching*, 107. Cf. Marc Cortez, "Nature, Grace, and the Christological Ground of Humanity," in *The Christian Doctrine of Humanity: Explorations in Constructive Dogmatics*, eds. Oliver D. Crisp and Fred Sanders (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2018), 25, 29-31.

may now turn to summarize Irenaeus' use of the *imago Dei* within his economy of salvation.

4.3.2.　The *imago Dei* in Irenaeus' Economy of Salvation

Having presented the foundational component of the *a priori* ontological *imago Dei*, we may now turn to Irenaeus' use of the *imago Dei* with reference to the economy of salvation. Holsinger-Friesen notes that the "*imago Dei* motif was well-suited for elaborating a comprehensive vision of God's economy because it could be used flexibly to locate humanity inside its span: from human origination, through fall and restoration, to eschatological destiny."[533] It is in wholehearted agreement to this position that I find it necessary to distinguish between the ontological *imago Dei* and Irenaeus' use of the *imago Dei* with reference to the economy of salvation. However, even in this second category different usages must be considered. There will be four primary headings which situate Irenaeus' use of the *imago Dei* in his economy of salvation: 1) God's commitment to save his people; 2) the necessity of the incarnation; 3) Irenaeus' distinct use of *similitudo* and *imago*; and 4) the growth of man in the economy of salvation. I am utilizing these four different headings as different angles which capture Irenaeus' usage of the *imago Dei*—it is my hope that this fourfold division will reduce the possibility of truncating the Irenaean schema of the *imago Dei*.

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[533] Holsinger-Friesen, ii.

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4.3.2.1.   God's Commitment to Save His People

Irenaeus uses the *imago Dei* to explain the existential drive behind the Lord's commitment to redeem his own creation. This was initially observed in *AH* 3.23.1-2 where Irenaeus said this, "it was necessary, therefore, that the Lord, coming to the lost sheep, and making recapitulation of so comprehensive a dispensation, and seeking after his own handiwork, should save that very man who had been created after his image and likeness…" For Irenaeus, one of the reasons for the divine commitment to redeem for himself a people stems from the intimate connection between God and his own handiwork (*plasma*).[534] Since the ontological *imago Dei* in the economy of creation is the Son of God, it makes sense that his commitment to his people would also include the restoration of beings made after his own image.

4.3.2.2.   The Necessity of the Incarnation

Not only does Irenaeus use the *imago Dei* to explain the existential commitment of God in the salvation of his people, but he also uses it with reference to the necessity of the incarnation. There will be some overlap between this section, the section on the ontological *imago Dei*, and the section below concerning the growth of man in the economy of salvation.

The starting place for this section must first recognize that the fall of man resulted in man's inability to live in accordance with the image and likeness of God after which he was made (*AH* 3.18.1, 5.6.1b, 5.10.1b-2a, 5.16.1-2). While Irenaeus' does not use 'fall'

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[534] There are other reasons for God's commitment to save for himself a people in the Irenaean economy of salvation, thought they often occur with reference to God's own nature and character (e.g., "saving being" [*AH* 2.22.3]).

language with reference to Adam and Eve, he does recognize that in the disobedience of the *protoplastus* resulted in loss, not just for Adam and Eve, but for all following generations (*Dem* 16-18).[535]

Because mankind had fallen to wickedness and had lost their ability to live in accordance with the *imago Dei*, the Word of God had to become incarnate to restore their knowledge of the likeness; and further, to offer the Holy Spirit to us (*AH* 3.9.3) to restore us in the ability to live in accordance with the image and likeness after which we were made (*AH* 3.20.2, 5.6,1, *Dem* 5).[536] Since form is prerequisite in making spirit known to sense perceptible creatures within the Irenaean grammar of imaging (*AH* 2.7.1-8, 2.17.2, cf. 2.19.6), Christ had to become incarnate to make the *imago Dei* sufficiently known to his people and restore to them the knowledge of himself. The theme of the *imago Dei* then serves as a way to explain the requirement of the incarnation in light of what was lost at the fall of man while also preserving the invisibility of the Father (4.20.7).

The primary atonement theory observed in *Against Heresies*, is the recapitulation theory of atonement.[537] In his presentation of Christ as the recapitulated head of humanity, Irenaeus codifies his position in contradistinction to his opponents. Irenaeus proposed that the Son required a full adoption of the composite anthropology in the incarnation to appropriately recapitulate Adam and put right the Adamic transgression

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[535] Additionally see the following article on the use of "Fall" language. C. John Collins, "May We Say That Adam and Eve "Fell"? A Study of a Term and Its Metaphoric Function," *Presbyterion* 46, no. 1 (Spring 2020), 53-74.

[536] On the unction of Christ and the anointing of the Spirit, also review Briggman, *Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit*, 59-77.

[537] This should not be misconstrued as the only atonement theory observed in Irenaeus' work. There are additional hints at the penal substitution atonement theory as well (*AH* 4.5.4).

(*AH* 3.22.1, 3.23.1-2, *Dem* 32-33). If the Son had not received the same formation of his own handiwork, then the analogy of man would not have been preserved and the recapitulation of Adam would not have occurred (*AH* 3.22.1). Adam, being the one who was initially made after the image and likeness of God, was restored by the Lord's recapitulation—it was in the incarnation that Christ demonstrates the likeness of embodiment to Adam (*Dem* 32-33). The incarnation of Christ, and his recapitulation of Adam, are interwoven themes in the Irenaean schema of the *imago Dei*.

4.3.2.3.   Irenaeus' Distinct Use of *Similitudo* and *Imago*

Throughout Irenaeus' works we have observed that there is the occasional distinction between image and likeness. Additionally, even when the two terms image and likeness are used synonymously, the contextual referent may indicate a slightly different sense of the 'likeness' between the *imago Dei* and mankind. Here I will attempt to show the four different ways that the term *similitudo* are used, the two ways that *imago* is used, and the five ways that the two terms together may be used with reference to the ontological *imago Dei*.

Similitudo

Let us start by observing the ways in which *similitudo* is used in *AH* and *Dem* in sections corresponding to the topic of the *imago Dei*. First, likeness may be used within the Irenaean schema of the *imago Dei* with reference to the free will that mankind and the Word of God share. This was explicitly presented in *AH* 4.37.4 but may also be intuitively observed to a lesser degree in *AH* 3.20.2 and *Dem* 11. It is because mankind has a likeness to God with respect to our free will that mankind must be advised to adhere

to the proper faith and works of God (*AH* 4.37.4). Because of Irenaeus' robust view of the freedom of the will in God and in man, this sense is not limited to texts that use *similitudo* alone (e.g. *AH* 2.1.1, 4.4.3, 4.37.5, 5.29.1, etc.). The Irenaean perspective on the freedom of the will has deserved its representation in scholarship, but the association between the *similitudo Dei* and the freedom of the will has been overrepresented in scholarship. The theme of the freedom of the will is essential to understanding divine judgement and mankind's culpability,[538] but it is only one categorical use of *similitudo* amidst three others.[539]

Second, likeness may be used within the Irenaean schema of the *imago Dei* with reference to mankind's growth towards the character or nature of Christ by imitation (*AH* 3.20.2, *Dem* 5).[540] In *AH* 3.20.2 Irenaeus proposed that we are brought into a greater likeness to the character and nature of Christ through his act of recapitulation. The effect upon our character with reference to the *imago Dei* in that text concerned man's renewed ability to imitate him by obedience of the Father's law. The context of *AH* 3.20.2 may

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[538] Donovan, *One Right Reading?*, 131-135.

[539] Contra. Osborn, 214. Osborn's presentation of likeness language here truncates Fantino's work and reduces 'likeness' language to only refer to the freedom of will or growing like God through obedience to the Holy Spirit. While Fantino does distinguish between ὁμοιότης and ὁμοίωσις in this way, he additionally allows ὁμοιότης to be contextually read throughout *AH* in the appropriate general senses. Osborn's presentation does not do justice to Fantino's nuanced work. See Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 106-118 (esp. 117-118). While imitation does overlap with the notion of the freedom of the will, I have marked it as a separate category here. For Irenaeus, imitation requires 'freedom of the will' but is further marked by the tone of a command and the explicit object after which we are called to imitate. Freedom of the will is *a priori* for *imitatio Christi*, but the freedom of the will is not specified towards or away from obedience. Additionally, imitation included notions only offered to the human person through the work of the spirit (such as growth towards incorruptibility) whereas the freedom of the will is present in all of humanity. To conflate *imitatio Christi* with the freedom of the will in a single category does not seem to capture the distinct uses observed in Irenaeus' text.

[540] This second sense is observed in Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 68-81. As well as Osborn, *Irenaeus of Lyons*, 214.

have also included the notion of growth towards incorruptibility in our nature. The same sense concerning growth towards incorruption and imitation through the work of the Holy Spirit was additionally observed in *Dem* 5.

Third, likeness may be used within the Irenaean schema of the *imago Dei* with reference to the triune presence in man's constitutive parts and formation. Christ corresponds to the form of man, the Father corresponds to the soul of man with reference to the breath of God, and the Holy Spirit is the third component of the perfected man. In this soteriological tripart framework, the Holy Spirit was in one place used with reference to the restoration of the likeness of God in Irenaeus' economy of salvation (*AH* 5.6.1 [cf. *AH* 5.1.3]). This is not to say that Irenaeus' viewed the Holy Spirit as the ontological *similitudo Dei*; but rather, that the Holy Spirit restores the likeness mankind had to the ontological *imago Dei*.[541] This use was also observed in *Dem* 11 where Irenaeus states that man is like God by the inclusion of the components of both the breath of life (from the Father) and the formation of the body (from the Son).[542]

Fourth, likeness may be used within the Irenaean schema of the *imago Dei* with reference to gift of incorruptibility. This fourth category is distinct from the second category in the following way: the second category primarily concerned the imitation of Christ, this fourth category primarily concerns the Spirit's application of eternal life to mankind. This was plainly observed in *AH* 4.38.4b.[543]

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[541] See section above: §4.3.2.1

[542] Steenberg, *Irenaeus on Creation*, 136.

[543] In this section Irenaeus uses *similitudo* as a standalone term with reference to the gift of incorruptibility and immortality, but later also uses both terms *imago* and *similitudo* with the same reference.

Imago

With the categorical uses of *similitudo* in *AH* and *Dem* presented, we may now turn to summarize the two categories for standalone uses of *imago* in Irenaeus' schema.

First, image was primarily used by Irenaeus with reference to the *plasma* of man or the incarnate Word of God. In *AH* 5.6.1a-b (cf. *AH* 5.16.1-2) Irenaeus used the image of God with reference to the formation of the incarnate Word as the model after which mankind received his formation. Irenaeus' emphasis upon bodily form-substance is intertwined with his grammar of imaging in this use of *imago*. This sense has been thoroughly discussed above and requires no more treatment here.

Second, image was used by Irenaeus with regards to the imitation of the ontological *imago Dei* by reception of the Spirit. This typologically associative use of *imago* was also observed to a lesser degree in the Ptolemaic-Valentinian usage (§2.4 [*AH* 1.5.1]). This sense is observed only twice in Irenaeus schema: first in *AH* 5.9.3; and second in *AH* 5.12.4b. Perhaps because of the limited uses of *imago* with this sense, it is overlooked by Donovan, Osborn, and Cartwright. In *AH* 5.9.3, we observed that mankind once bore the image of Adam, but now that the *imago Dei* has become fully known, the redeemed person may bear the image of the heavenly and walk in the newness of life in obedience to God. Irenaeus uses 1 Cor. 15:49 to unite the Adam Christ typology to his schema of the *imago Dei*. In doing so, Irenaeus applies the term *imago* to our connection to Christ and the call to live in accordance with the Spirit. In *AH* 5.12.4b, Irenaeus utilizes Col. 3:1-11 to denote the renewal of the human person in the knowledge of God

after the image of the ontological *imago Dei*. As we observed in that section, this included the growth of mankind in adherence to the Spirit of God.[544]

It has been observed above that Irenaeus does distinguish between image and likeness at times. The most important distinction is his use of *imago* with reference to the *plasma* of man. However, Irenaeus generally uses *imago* and *similitudo* inseparably. The division between image and likeness should neither be overemphasized or underemphasized in the reconstruction of Irenaeus' schema of the *imago Dei*.[545] In the Irenaean division between *imago* and *similitudo*, it must again be emphasized that there is a polemic aim—or at least, that the division between the two terms appear to be initially utilized in response to his opponents who exaggerated the division between image and likeness with a skewed dualistic cosmogeny, anthropology, and soteriology.

Imago et Similitudo

Now the categories for Irenaeus' use of *imago* and *similitudo* as separate terms have been presented, we may turn our attention to Irenaeus' use of these terms in synonymous conjunction. There are five primary categories that I have observed throughout my research on Irenaeus' of *imago et similitudo* in his economy of salvation.

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[544] It should be observed here that there is no notion of the loss of the rational capacity of man with respect to the *imago Dei* in these two categories. Contra. the misconception that appears to originate with Emil Bruner's work. Emil Bruner, *Man in Revolt: A Christian Anthropology*, Trans. Olive Wyon (London: Lutterworth Press, 1957), 93. Cf. Hoekema, 34. With this said, Irenaeus does discuss the notion of restored rationality (e.g., *AH* 4.37.6, 5.3.2, 5.9.3), but it is not directly tied to the schema of the *imago Dei*. And further, it is not as central to the Irenaean economy of salvation as Bruner proposes.

[545] Wingren seems to underemphasize the division of the terms in response to prior scholarship on Irenaeus' anthropology. Wingren, 157-159 (cf. 14-26). While Fantino seems to overemphasize the division of image and likeness in light of the historical development of the terms and Irenaeus' opponents' usage in his conclusion. Fantino, *L'homme, image de Dieu*, 175-176. This said, I do not think that Fantino over emphasizes the division between the two terms throughout his book, but only in the general conclusion.

First, image and likeness may be used by Irenaeus to present an unspecified association between man and the ontological *imago Dei* with some connection to the human formation (*AH* 5.1.3, 5.6.1b, 5.21.2a, *Dem* 97, 32). In *AH* 5.1.3 and *AH* 5.6.1b, it is mankind's association to the hands of God in his formation that connects humanity with the *imago Dei*—the triune presence in the perfected human's anthropology corresponds to his three constitutive parts. This category is similar to the first category of *imago* and the third category of *similitudo* as standalone terms. In *AH* 5.21.2a, *Dem* 32, and 97 Irenaeus presents the ontological *imago Dei* (being the chief prototype and archetype of man's formation) as the model by which mankind was formed after the image and likeness of God. The formation of man in Irenaeus' soteriological-anthropology is well positioned in contradistinction to the philosophical anthropology of his opponents. Image and likeness are inseparably used to formulate a schema wherein all constitutive components of the human person receive their value and formation from the triune God. This category serves as a point of defense against the dualistic perspectives of his opponents.

Second, image and likeness may be used by Irenaeus to denote growth in likeness to God concerning the knowledge of good and evil gained in the fall. This category is only observed in *AH* 4.38.4b and should be taken as *sui generis* with reference to the *imago Dei* in the progressive maturation of the human person in Irenaeus' economy of salvation. Given the discrepancy between Irenaeus' source text (Gen. 3:22 [LXX]) and his use of *imaginem et similtudinem Dei* it is difficult to say whether this use of the *imago Dei* was initially intended by Irenaeus or if it is due to a scribal error. Since it is present in the sources available to modern scholarship, and there are no additional manuscripts

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which challenge the reading of *AH* 4.38.4b, then it should be accepted as a component of his schema of the *imago Dei*.

Third, image and likeness were used inseparably by Irenaeus with regards to the redeemed person's ability to live in right relationship with the ontological *imago Dei*. This category is primarily observed in *AH* 3.18.1-2. In this text Irenaeus proposed that mankind was made able to live in accordance with the image and likeness of God. The work of Christ, applied through the Holy Spirit, enables man to again live in accordance with the *imago Dei*. This category is similar to the second category of *imago* and the second category of *similitudo* as it pertains to mankind's renewed ability to imitate the incarnate Word of God in his character and nature in submission to the Holy Spirit. This usage is additionally observed in *AH* 5.10.1b-2a, where Irenaeus proposes that the recapitulation of Christ restores man to the pristine nature of the former man by bringing us into a state of potential obedience (a nascent form of *posse non peccare*).

Fourth, image and likeness were used inseparably with reference to the growth of man towards the perfected man (teleological/eschatological) or obtaining the eternal resurrected body (eschatological). This fourth category is not to be confused with the third; in the third category the growth of man concerned the restored potential obedience of man with reference to imitation whereas the fourth category concerns the end goal of the growth obtained. This category was observed in *AH* 5.16.1b-2 where Irenaeus states that man is perfected after the image and likeness of God—in this text, the incarnate Word of God was used as a central model after which man would be formed and shaped by the Hands of God. The context required the 'perfection of man' to be interpreted as occurring in part now (by restoring man through the Holy Spirit and preparing him for

life) and fully completed in the resurrection. This same sense was also observed in *AH* 4.38.3, 5.8.1b, 5.21.2a, and 5.36.3. In these uses, Irenaeus does not attempt to specify the exact sense in which man is perfected. However, given the totality of Irenaeus' work, one may assume both ontological and moral categories are present in the growth of man towards the perfect ontological *imago Dei*.

Concluding Observations

As we have seen, the occasional separation of the terms *imago* and *similitudo* (with reference to the *imago Dei*) does not always result in radically different categories of use. The second, third, and fourth categories for *similitudo* along with the second category for *imago* have continuity with the categories under *imago et similitudo*. The standalone category for *similitudo* concerned the free will of man (presented in contradistinction to the Ptolemaic-Valentinian soteriology). While the standalone category for *imago* concerned the form-substance unity of the *plasma* of man (also presented in contradistinction to the Ptolemaic-Valentinian soteriology).

Many of the categories above have been touched on throughout the history of scholarship on the Irenaean schema of the *imago Dei*. However, many of these scholars have failed to present each of the nuanced uses of *imago*, *similitudo*, and *imago et similitudo* throughout *AH* and *Dem* in their summaries of Irenaeus understanding of the *imago Dei.* It is my hope that this section will be a helpful aid to those seeking to gain a better understanding of Irenaeus' use of image language as it pertains to the *imago Dei*.

4.3.2.4. The Growth of Man in the Economy of Salvation

In this section, I aim to present how certain elements of the *imago Dei* function throughout the arc of Irenaean economy of salvation. In doing this, I hope to concisely situate the *imago Dei* within the story of salvation as Irenaeus presents it.

In the beginning mankind was created rightly after the image and likeness of God. However, the *imago Dei* was not yet made known to sense perceptible creatures for the Son had yet to put on the image with relation to his composite creatures (*AH* 3.21.10, 5.16.2, *Dem* 22, 32b-33b). Because of this mankind, especially in their fallen state, lost the ability to live in accordance with the *imago Dei* (*AH* 3.18.1, 5.6.1b, 5.10.1b-2a, 5.16.1-2). In the transgression, mankind became subject to death (*Dem* 15); this subjection occurred because God pitied man, death became the cessation of sin (*AH* 3.23.6). Humanity was incapable of self-reformation and required a savior to restore it unto life (*AH* 3.18.1-2). Though mankind had become subject to sin, God was committed to save for himself a people (*AH* 3.21.1-2). This loss which occurred at the transgression of man became subject to the power of God. The Father used the error committed by his creatures' will to knit their knowledge of good and evil into their maturation towards the *imago Dei* (*AH* 4.38.4b).

The Hands of God serve to restore the elect to a state of potential obedience with the promise of a perfected resurrection state. The Holy Spirit works to restore the elect to a state of the pristine nature of man in this present age so that they may, by their own will and volition, choose to obey God (*AH* 5.10.1-2, 5.12.4b). This work of the Spirit which enables man to be restored to the pristine nature is attained through the recapitulated Adam: Jesus. The Son, as the perfect *imago Dei* made known to his people, enables the

Spirit to restore his people to his own image (*AH* 5.8.1b, 5.9.3, 5.10. 1-2, 5.16.1-2, *Dem* 5).

This restoration occurs in part now, but will be brought to perfection with respect to the *imago Dei* at the eschatological bodily resurrection of God's people.[546] The works of Christ applied to his people by the Spirit in the present age with reference to the *imago Dei* are as follows: preparation for eternality (*AH* 5.1.1), growth in responding faithfully to what we have been entrusted (*AH* 3.17.3, 5.11.2b), greater capacity for imitation of the Son (*AH* 3.20.2, 4.33.4, 5.9.3. *Dem* 5), and growth in the knowledge of God (*AH* 5.12.4). The works of Christ applied to his people by the Spirit in the age to come with reference to the *imago Dei* are as follows: being absolutely perfected after the *imago Dei* in a general sense (5.16.1), obtaining immortality (4.38.3b),[547] eternality perfected in the human person (*AH* 5.1.1), and incorruptibility (*AH* 5.12.4). The teleological and eschatological sense of the *imago Dei* more loosely used seems to be applied across the spectrum of the already-not-yet (4.38.3-4, 4.11.2).[548] These usages of the *imago Dei* are Christocentric in their connection to the ontological *imago Dei*, while also being Pneumatocentric in the application of salvation to the people of God.

We have observed that there is a state of progression which permeates Irenaeus' schema of the *imago Dei* in the soteriological sections of his works. This sense of progression is fitting, given that Irenaeus' economy of salvation focuses on the

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[546] Steenberg, *Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit*, 59-77.

[547] Cf. Briggman, *God and Christ in* Irenaeus, 177.

[548] Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement*, 47.

maturation of mankind.[549] Christ as prototype sets the stage for what mankind is. Christ as Archetype sets the stage for what mankind will be. The entirety of the corporate invisible Church shall be restored after the *imago Dei* and brought to the full maturity of the Son's image in the end through the work of the Son and the application of that work by the Holy Spirit (*AH* 4.37.7b). While some aspects of the perfection of man will be completed and applied (e.g., eternality and incorruptibility) this is not to say that the movement towards perfection will cease. The progression towards perfection will continue *ad infinitum*, since the redeemed person will never move beyond our state of finitude—the perfection of man is a continuous state of submission to the "creative activity of God" in the image of the Son who submitted to the Father in perfection.[550]

This concludes the synthesis of findings in Irenaeus.

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[549] This sense of maturation begins with observing Adam and Eve as children, and the recapitulated Christ as the mature *imago Dei* after whom mankind is to be perfected into a state of maturity (*AH* 4.38.3, 3.23.3). Steenberg, "Children in Paradise: Adam and Eve as 'Infants' in Irenaeus of Lyons," 1-22 (esp. 21-22).

[550] Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement*, 47.

5. CONCLUSION

The introduction to this thesis revealed two primary question-groups concerning the Irenaean schema of the *imago Dei* (§1.1). The first group concerned the origins of Irenaeus' views on the *imago Dei*. This group of questions received treatment in thesis §1-3. The second group concerned the Irenaean schema of the *imago Dei*. This second group of questions received treatment in thesis §4. The treatment of these questions and the findings will be summarized here to some degree in conclusion to the thesis.

With respect to the first group of questions, we asked to what extent Irenaeus' views on the *imago Dei* were formed in response to his opponents? Throughout the paper we observed three primary ways in which Irenaeus' schema of the *imago Dei* may have developed in contradistinction to his opponents. First, Irenaeus' emphasis on the form-substance grammar of imaging with respect to the ontological *imago Dei* appears to have developed in his refutation of the Ptolemaic-Valentinians to some degree (§2.4, §4.1 [*AH* 2.7.1-2.8.3]). The Irenaean emphasis on form with reference to imaging may not necessary be unique, but the fact that Irenaeus argues that the divine image finds its place in the created lower world is unique.[551] Second, the emphasis on physicality with respect to the grammar of imaging was then also observed in Irenaeus' insistence that the *plasma* of man is involved in the image of the *imago Dei*. Irenaeus may have developed this

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[551] Osbourn, *Irenaeus of Lyons*, 215. Osbourn points out that the Hermetic authors also place an emphasis on form-substance materiality with respect to the grammar of imaging.

unique emphasis in his response to opponents who held the physicality of God's created cosmos in contempt. Certainly, Irenaeus' position is conspicuous in contrast to his opponents, but it is uncertain to what degree he developed this emphasis as a response to his opponents. Third, and most certain, Irenaeus makes a division between *imago Dei* and *similitudo Dei*. This unnatural distinction is then used by Irenaeus to propose a corrected soteriological-anthropology, soteriology, and eschatology. Irenaeus borrows the division between *imago* and *similitudo* but defines his terms in contradistinction to his opponents (§4.3.2.3).

Additionally, we asked whether Irenaeus borrowed major concepts from the Ptolemaic-Valentinian perspective? This thesis observed only two potential concepts that Irenaeus may have borrowed from his opponents. The first is his distinction between *imago* and *similitudo*. However, his use of the terms is differentiated in both sense and referent from his opponents. The second, and far less certain, concept which Irenaeus may have borrowed is the typologically associative use of εἰκών (§2.4 [*AH* 1.5.1], §4.3.2.3 [*AH* 5.9.3, 5.12.4b]). This use may not be 'borrowed' per se but could also stem from a common shared semantic range for εἰκών.

While Irenaeus does appear to be shaped by his response to his opponents, he also appears to present the *imago Dei* from an intertextual reading of Gen. 1:26-27; Col. 1:15, 3:10; Rom. 5:12-21, 1 Cor. 15, 2 Cor. 4:4; Phil. 2:6; and Jn. 1:1-18. It is only in light of this canon informed Judeo-apostolic theology that Irenaeus is able to present his perspective in contradistinction to his opponents' perspective. The biblical source

material should not be underemphasized when considering the Irenaean schema of the *imago Dei*.[552]

Another question in that first question-group was this: were there other 'orthodox' theologians who may have helped develop Irenaeus' view of the *imago Dei*? This question was primarily explored in thesis §3. The emphasis on the *plasma* of man being made after the form-substance image of Christ is absolutely unique to Irenaeus unless it can be proved that *Fragments on the Resurrection* are found to be authored by Justin. But even here, the overlap between Irenaeus and Justin primarily concerned their anthropology. The way in which Irenaeus ties the schema of the *imago Dei* to his soteriological-anthropology is unique to the early church. The formation of Irenaeus' theology is certainly informed by those who came before him (especially the teachings of the apostles) but the extent to which he utilizes and develops the *imago Dei* in a cohesive schema is absent in other surviving Christian authors of the first and second century.

With respect to the second group of questions we asked what, or who, is the *imago Dei*? This thesis found that Irenaeus views the *imago Dei* to be the form-substance incarnate Word of God (§4.3.1). Mankind appears to be a-temporally formed after the incarnate material body of Christ. As the recapitulated Adam, it is Christ who reveals both the archetypal and prototypal man. This is the *a priori* component required to make sense of Irenaeus' other usages of the *imago Dei* in his economy of salvation.

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[552] This is one area that could be developed further in Irenaean scholarship concerning the schema of the *imago Dei*. It was in consideration of other scholarship on the topic that I chose to primarily focus on his social context in effort to observe additional sources (since the canon is a presumed source). However, there is a gap in scholarship here with respect to Irenaeus' interpretation of the biblical texts pertaining to the *imago Dei*.

Additionally, we asked how consistent Irenaeus is with respect to his use of the schema of the *imago Dei*? We observed that Irenaeus consistently roots the *imago Dei* to the Word of God.[553] This component was a constant throughout his uses. However, Irenaeus' use of the *imago Dei* in his articulation of his economy of salvation was contextually dependent. Because of the varied uses, additional categories had to be presented in thesis §4.3.2. His schema was shown to contain immense nuance throughout each of the uses observed in thesis §4.1 and §4.2. The numerous categories may give the reader the sense that Irenaeus utilized the *imago Dei* inconsistently, but I argue that the schema is quite cohesive.

The other questions posed in the introduction concerning the division of *imago* and *similitudo* and the particular uses of the *imago Dei* should be reviewed in thesis §4.3. Suffice it to say that the thesis observed that Irenaeus' use of *imago* was not solely limited to the notion of form.[554] His use of *similitudo Dei* was broader than the previously presented twofold category of 1) a general likeness with respect to the freedom of the will (ὁμοιότης) and 2) the presence of the Holy Spirit (ὁμοίωσις).[555] And Irenaeus' inseparable use of *imago et similitudo* often overlapped with his use of *imago* or *similitudo* as separate categories. If I attempted to present more on this topic here, then I

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[553] Again, I am using the terms for Christ loosely in imitation of Irenaeus' own usages. The titles and names for the Son of God are interchangeable.

[554] Contra. Fantino.

[555] Contra. Fantino, *L'homme image de Dieu*, 110-118. Though more categories have been observed, this is not to say that Fantino's categories have been undermined. Rather I have added to his categories. This thesis did not intend to challenge his hypothesis concerning the original language and distinction between ὁμοιότης and ὁμοίωσις since that preliminary position could not possibly be challenged without the discovery of more manuscripts. Throughout his work he applies appropriate nuance with respect to Irenaeus' uses, it is only in the general conclusions that he appears to reduce *similitudo* to these two categories.

would run the risk of either truncating the Irenaean schema of the *imago Dei* or being unnecessarily repetitious.

Many modern questions concerning the image of God would benefit from a greater awareness of Irenaeus' Christocentric schema of the *imago Dei*.[556] The *imago Dei* is not something possessed by man, but rather it concerns the divine prototype and archetype after whom we have received our formation. The schema of the *imago Dei* is a picture of God's whole unfolding redemption throughout creation. It serves as a snapshot of the divine heart which always intended to become bound to his beloved creatures through the condescension of the incarnate Word of God. It concerns the maturation of God's people, the gift of eternality, the freedom of the will, and the benefits of the true life available to those willing to receive the Spirit of God. Further, the form-substance perspective of the *imago Dei* has moral implications on the value of the body and has the potential to transform the way in which we see one another as creatures. Not only do we have the potential to become creatures of "everlasting splendor" in the resurrection after the archetypal *imago Dei*, but we have the opportunity in this present age to see the very form of Christ as the central prototype for the form of each and every human we engage with.[557]

I hope that this thesis has helped to show that it is not enough to look *at* the topic of the *imago Dei* within Irenaeus' schema. Irenaeus appears to be a theologian worth

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[556] Irenaeus is often noted in modern surveys of the *imago Dei*, but very few of those authors present Irenaeus' view with appropriate nuance.

[557] C. S. Lewis, "The Weight of Glory," in *The Weight of Glory and Other Addresses* (New York, NY: Harper One, 1980), 46.

looking *along*.[558] Not only is Irenaeus' view of the *imago Dei* interesting to observe; but further, his schema serves as a compelling lens through which we may see both man and God with more clarity and splendor as we move ever nearer to seeing truly what we here observe dimly.

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[558] The terms "at" and "along" are intended to portray the thoughts of C. S. Lewis in the following resource. C. S. Lewis "Meditation in a Toolshed," in *First and Second things: Essays on Theology and Ethics*, ed. by Walter Hooper (Glasgow: Fount, 1985), 54.

APPENDIX A: PHILO ON THE IMAGO DEI

The goal of this appendix is to explore Philo's understanding of the *imago Dei*—a topic he references over 50 times in his surviving works. The difficulty of this project will be in disentangling Philo's *sense* of the *imago Dei* from the *referents*[559]—a task rendered far more arduous because of Philo's eclectic tendencies and diverse writings (which span a number of academic disciplines).[560] In the body of this paper I will analyze four key representative texts concerning Philo's view of the *imago Dei* in order to unpack Philo's *sense* of the *imago Dei* amidst the numerous *referents*. In the conclusion I will point out that Philo has a single unified *sense* of the *imago Dei* that he uses (*referent*) to unpack various concepts concerning his metaphysics, anthropology, and apologetics.

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[559] It is important to note that I am not using *sense* and *referent* in absolute alignment with the analytic philosopher Gotlob Frege (see Gotlob Frege, "On Sense and Reference" ["Über Sinn und Bedeutung"], *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, vol. 100 [1892]: 25–50), rather, I am using the terms as follows. *Sense* refers to the possible meanings attached to a particular *technicus terminus* (a term ladened with nuanced meaning). Because of the situated nature of language—various authors will have an intended *sense* or semantic lexical range with any particular term. Any given technical term will be understood by the author to have a nuanced meaning that differs from the intended meaning of another author of the time. *Referent* (or *reference*) refers to the particular use of the word or phrase within a setting. A word with a fixed *sense* or lexical range can be used with a particular aim to denote or expound the object being discussed. To understand the *sense*, some notion of the way in which the term is being used must be explored through the *referent*. The desired goal of this process is to observe the limited semantic range (meaning) with which a particular author (Philo) uses a particular term (*imago Dei*). The desired result is a *grammar* of the author's semantic range and use of that particular term (i.e., the *sense* and *referent*).

[560] For more on the broad span of disciplines in which Philo is engaging, see the following resource. Peder Borgen, *Philo of Alexandria: An Exegete for his Time* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 1-13. This resource gives a rounded perspective of Philo's hermeneutic; he should not be read strictly as a Jewish mystic (for he clearly does not succumb to blatant syncretism), nor simply as a philosopher (which he certainly is), but also as an interdisciplinary exegete.

Let us now turn our attention to the first text. Here we will observe that Philo views the *imago Dei* as the λόγος of God—a concept comprehendible only within his metaphysical framework.[561] Mankind is deemed as a lesser image made after the *imago Dei*. It is because of the sense-perceptible composition of the human body that man is demoted to a lesser imaging status. Philo, in his work *On the Creation of the World* (a *legum Allegoriae*) says this:

> "Moses…when recording the creation of man, in words which follow, asserts expressly, that he was made in the image of God—and if the image be a part of the image (εἰκών εἰκόνος), then manifestly so is the entire form, namely the whole of this world perceptible by the external senses, which is a greater imitation of the divine image than the human form is…"[562]

In the context of this section Philo presents the notion that an intellectual model must exist prior to a corporeal creation. An idea (or image) held within the intellect must precede the act of creation itself.[563] He illustrates this notion by considering the process by which an architect designs and builds a city.[564] The architect, "having received in his own mind, as on a waxen tablet, the form of each building…carries in his heart the image of a city…keeping his eyes fixed on his model, he begins to raise the city of stones and wood, making the corporeal substances to resemble each of the incorporeal ideas."[565] Philo demarcates two separate spheres of the cosmos: 1) the sense-perceptible cosmos,

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[561] See Philo's hierarchical metaphysics chart below for visual clarification.

[562] Philo, *Opif.* 25. All translated citations are from the following translation. C. D. Yonge, *The Works of Philo: Complete and Unabridged*. New updated edition. (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1993). Also, I am indebted to the work done by Gregory E. Sterling's work within this section. See following resource for a fuller expansion of this text. Gregory E. Sterling "The Image of God: Becoming Like God in Philo, Paul, and Early Christianity." *Portraits of Jesus: Studies in Christology* (2012): 157-163.

[563] Esp. use of νοητός within following reference. Philo, *Opif.* 15-16.

[564] Ibid., 17-22.

[565] Ibid., 18.

and 2) the intelligible cosmos.[566] The sense-perceptible cosmos is a material imitation of the intelligible cosmos.[567] The intelligible cosmos exists (to some unspecified degree) within the intellect of God himself.[568]

In this section, Philo considers the image to be the invisible model which stems from God's λόγος.[569] The sense-perceptible human person is therefore the image of the image. Philo continues to build upon the overlapping semantic meanings of his terms. In *Opif.* 24 he develops a theology of the λόγος by clarifying that this model—which exists in the mind of God—is the θεοῦ λόγον.[570] For Philo, the *imago Dei* is logically a lesser glory if all things image God by metaphysical extension of his mind (or λόγος).[571] The

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[566] Sterling, 161.

[567] Philo, *Opif.* 16

[568] Ibid. This later is clarified as Philo's νοητὸν κόσμον—for more on this notion see the following resource. David Winston, and John Dillion, *Two Treatises of Philo of Alexandria: A Commentary on De Gigantibus and Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis* (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983), 270.

[569] For a more explicit reference to this in the immediate context see Philo, *Opif.* 31 "And the invisible divine reason, perceptible only by intellect, he calls the image of God."

[570] "And if any one were to desire to use more undisguised terms, he would not call the world, which is perceptible only to the intellect, anything else but the reason [λόγος] of God, already occupied in the creation of the world; for neither is a city, while only perceptible to the intellect, anything else but the reason of the architect, who is already designing to build one perceptible to the external senses, on the model of that which is so only to the intellect" (Philo, *Opif.* 24). It is clear that the λόγος of God is not God himself. It is the rationality of that personal being worshiped by the Jews. Some modern commentators diminish Philo's traditional Jewish background and superimpose Platonic and Pythagorean notions of an impersonal God onto Philo—but Philo consistently presents God as the source of the λόγος. For more sections in Philo which make this clear connection between εἰκών and his λόγος doctrine see the following: *Leg.* 3.96; *Her.* 231; *Spec.* 1.81, 3.83, 207; *QG.* 2.62. This list was found in the following resource, Sterling, 161.

[571] Philo is certainly engaging with some notion of the Platonic higher realm and the lower realm here. For Plato, the lower forms exist as higher forms elsewhere (see esp. *Timaeus*, cf. *Cratylus, Republic*, and *The Seventh Letter* [though it is possibly spurious])—for Philo, the cosmos exists first as the reason of God. When we engage with the lower forms and ask questions (especially concerning ethics), we must know the higher form to engage with them properly. Though, Philo is hesitant to allow this notion to be claimed by the Greek philosophers, he instead attributes it to Moses (Philo, *Opif.* 25). For other authors in the intertestamental period who do the same see Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600). The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine* (Chicago, IL: The

referent primarily concerns his understanding the metaphysical connection between God and the cosmos (as well as understanding the position of sense-perceptible creatures therein).[572] An incorporeal image (associated with the θεοῦ λόγον) must precede the corporeal image (σύμπας οὗτος ὁ αἰσθητὸς κόσμος). For Philo, the image of God is explicitly connected to λόγος. The *sense* of the *imago Dei* (being the λόγος of God) is retained when the *referent* concerns Philo's anthropology. The human individual created in the *imago Dei* is an image (corporeal) of an image (the λόγος of God) rather than image itself.[573]

In this section Philo has made two key distinctions: first, the substance of the *imago Dei* is God's λόγος; second, the *imago Dei* concerning mankind must be understood within the metaphysical relationship between the cosmos (sense-perceptible and intelligible) and God (as individual entity and supreme λόγος).

The first text made a connection between the *imago Dei* and the divine λόγος. We now turn to our next text which explores the *imago Dei* and its relation to 'mind' (νοῦς). In *On the Creation of the World* §69 Philo says this:

> "Moses says that man was made in the image and likeness of God…for nothing that is born on the earth is more resembling God than man.[574] And let no one

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University of Chicago Press, 1971), 1:33. For another Philonic reference to a similar concept see how Philo uses λόγος as a word which has stamped all of creation in the following resource: Philo, *Fug.* 12.

[572] Borgen, 225-242.

[573] More work should be done on how this notion has impacted the church fathers. Esp. Irenaeus, who sees mankind (at times) as being made according to the *imago Dei,* rather than being the *imago Dei*. The true *imago Dei* for Philo here is the λόγος—whereas the true *imago Dei* for Irenaeus is Christ himself, the divine λόγος made man. Both authors make similar arguments that lead to their conclusions (consider esp. how both authors make note of the use of prepositions in Gen. 1:26-27 ["*in* the image" "*after* his likeness"]).

[574] Although this appears to be in direct contradiction to the earlier comment which considers the whole cosmos to be a better image of God than humanity, it is likely not the case. The aim of *Opif*, §25 was to point out the metaphysical relation between the cosmos and God—whereas here, Philo's aim is to portray a narrower anthropological understanding of the man's mind being an image of God's mind (though this

think that he is able to judge this likeness from the characters of the body: for neither is God a being with the form of man, nor is the human body like the form of God; but the resemblance is spoken of with reference to the most important part of the soul, namely, the mind: for the mind which exists in each individual has been created after the likeness of that one mind which is in the universe as its primitive model, being in some sort the God of that body which carries it about and bears its image within it…"[575]

Here we observe that Philo expounds the connection between man and God through his understanding of the *imago Dei*. Philo dismisses the notion that the likeness refers to anything bodily—instead he argues that likeness refers to the mind. It is man's intellect that connects with the λόγος of God.[576] In this, Philo presents a dichotomic anthropology where the soul (a part of which is the mind) may be connected with the mind of God— but the body is rooted in the corporeal cosmos and is incapable of connection with the mind of God (which exists in the intelligible realm).[577] Philo posits that the human mind is capable of movement towards the divine λόγος in a way that our body is incapable of.[578] This is not to say that Philo has a strictly negative view of the body, indeed he is widely affirming of the importance and beauty of the natural world (at least in the first sense-perceptible humans). Rather, Philo has a negative view of the body when compared

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certainly occurs within his metaphysical model). Or, using our terms, Philo's *sense* of the *imago Dei* was used with the *referent* of unpacking the metaphysical layers of the cosmos. See Runia for a similar observation (without the notion of *sense* and *referent*). David T. Runia, *Philo of Alexandria: On the Creation of the Cosmos According to Moses* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 231.

[575] Philo, *Opif.* 69.

[576] Ibid., 145-146 (esp. §146. "Every man in regard of his intellect is connected with divine reason, being an impression of, or a fragment or a ray of that blessed nature; but in regard of the structure of his body he is connected with the universal world.").

[577] Borgen, *Philo of Alexandria: An Exegete for His Time*, 236.

[578] The immediate context following §69 (§70-71) portrays the mind as ascending through the following stages: land and sea; air; the higher firmament; to the stars and planets; to the world of the intellect; and finally, to God himself. Now, this is not to say that we achieve divinity, but rather to say that our mind can traverse spheres of reality in a way that is distinct from our bodily limitations. Origen presents a similar understanding of the mind in relation to the *imago Dei*, see Origen, *On the First Principles* 3.6.1.

to the intelligible world (he views it as a hindrance to the higher realm). For Philo, the material body is only valuable as a work of God.[579]

The *referent* here concerns to primary fields: anthropology and apologetics. Philo, in his attempt to build a cohesive perspective of the cosmos must situate mankind within that cosmos.[580] In what way is man connected to, or in, the likeness of God's mind? Only in his mind (the greatest part of the soul). Within the *referent* is an implicit imperative— or apologetic—that calls mankind to seek the highest plane of the intelligible world which is God himself.[581] How is God accessed my man? Only in the connection between our mind and God's mind. Philo's *sense* of the *imago Dei* here is clarified. We now see that it is connected to the mind of God (which is the location of his λόγος). Because of this, a human is only capable of imaging the *imago Dei* with their mind. This is the point of connection between man and God.

The two previous texts have connected *imago Dei* to λόγος and νοῦς. Now we turn our attention to the next text (*Opif.* 134-135). Here Philo applies his anthropological

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[579] For a seemingly positive view of the body see Philo, *Opif.* 67-68, 145. The crux of the issue here (and the apparent contradiction therein) revolves around his simultaneous approval of God's work of creation and contradicting view that the sense-perceptible body hinders our access to the higher realm.

[580] Borgen, *Philo of Alexandria: An Exegete for His Time*, 225, 223, & 235.

[581] See the ascending mind of man in footnote 23. Elsewhere Philo clearly distinguishes between the higher mind and the lower mind—the higher mind pursues ascent through the various spheres of the intelligible world, but the lower mind is trapped by the base longings (or sense-perception) of the body. This must be considered as the background of the hidden imperative to seek the higher realm. For the notion of the higher mind and the lower mind see Goodenough, 113.

One more comment should be made to understand why this text has a hidden imperative, for Philo (as for Ben Sira) the Torah should be understood as a "mediator of creation and revelation between God and the world." The Torah was, in another sense, God's λόγος—a living organism. Only the mind of man can engage with the Torah, and thus an encouragement (and apologetic) to push the intellect toward the higher realm. For more on the Torah as λόγος see Martin Hengel, *Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in their Encounter in Palestine during the Early Hellenistic Period* (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1974), 169-175.

framework to his interpretation of the differing creation accounts of man (Gen 1:26-27

and 2:7). He does this in order to further illustrate how the image of the *imago Dei* exists

within the intelligible world.

> "After this, Moses says that 'God made man, having taken clay from the earth, and he breathed into his face the breath of life.' And by this expression he shows most clearly that there is a vast difference between man as generated now, and the first man who was made according to the image of God. For man as formed now is perceptible to the external senses, partaking of qualities, consisting of body and soul, man or woman, by nature mortal. But man, made according to the image of God, was an idea, or a genus, or a seal, perceptible only by the intellect, incorporeal, neither male nor female, imperishable by nature."[582]

Because of Philo's understanding of the image of the *imago Dei* (as existing in the

intelligible world in connection between the νοῦς of man and the λόγος of God)*,* he

interprets the first creation account (Gen. 1:1-2:3) as a presentation of the archetypal

model, the intelligible world, the idea of ideas, and (to some degree) the λόγος of God.[583]

This first man of Gen. 1:26-28 is ontologically non-material. The man of Gen. 2:7

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[582] Philo, *Opif.* 134-135. At times, Philo's exegetical work suffers because of the apologetic value he is attempting to gain with the audience (Hellenized Alexandrians and intellectual Greco-Romans). This is one of those times. His Platonic framework has informed his reading of the creation account here in such a way as to wholly skew the interpretation (removing body and gender from the man of Gen. 1:26-27).

For a fascinating parallel text see Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* I. 31-32. "'And God created man, taking a lump of clay from the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life: and man became a living soul.' The races of men are twofold; for one is the heavenly man, and the other the earthly man. Now the heavenly man, as being born in the image of God, has no participation in any corruptible or earthlike essence. But the earthly man is made of loose material, which he calls a lump of clay. On which account he says, not that the heavenly man was made, but that he was fashioned according to the image of God; but the earthly man he calls a thing made, and not begotten by the maker. And we must consider that the man who was formed of earth, means the mind which is to be infused into the body, but which has not yet been so infused. And this mind would be really earthly and corruptible, if it were not that God had breathed into it the spirit of genuine life; for then it 'exists,' and is no longer made into a soul; and its soul is not inactive, and incapable of proper formation, but a really intellectual and living one. 'For man,' says Moses, 'became a living soul.'"

[583] Philo, *Opif.* 25b. "αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη τὸ παράδειγμα, ἀρχέτυπος ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν ὁ θεοῦ λόγος." Cf. *QG.* I. 4.

however, possessed a body which was bound to the earth.[584] This is the sense-perception body—a vessel containing the breath of God. The breath of God for Philo here refers to the intelligible and invisible divine spirit that indwells man and allots immortality to our intellect.[585] For Philo, these two creation accounts portray two separate persons: a non-material man belonging to the intelligible world and a sense-perceptible man belonging to both.

The image of the *imago Dei* is attributed first and foremost to the man of the intelligible world (Gen. 1:26-27). However, this is not to say that he denies the presence of the *imago Dei* in the man of Gen. 2:7—for later he acknowledges that Adam (being both sense-perceptible and intelligible) was the superior man for those of our race and the most "God like" creature.[586] We are left with a presentation of two men. One is a disembodied archetype who is most like the divine λόγος; the other is a lesser being, limited and bound by sense-perception, who contains the breath of God.

The *referent* at hand expands Philo's notion of a higher man and a lower man. To the higher man belongs the image of the *imago Dei* to a greater degree than the lower man. This Platonic distinction between the two men helps locate the image of the *imago Dei.* Imaging God is an act only possible (in the fullest sense) by the otherworldly

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[584] This division between the creation accounts was also observed in Irenaeus' opponents (see the second chapter of this thesis)

[585] Philo, *Opif.* 135.

[586] Here we observe a hierarchy of man in Philo's anthropology. The intelligible man of Gen. 1:26-27 is in the highest order, being truly created in *imago Dei* (*Opif.* 135). The first sense-perceptible and intelligible man—Adam—is the highest of all men (possibly being perfect in body [§136]) being the most "God like" of all the creatures (*Opif.* 137). Subsequent mankind retains the *imago Dei* to some degree, but imperfections are brought in because of the natural denigration (*Opif.* 140) due to Philo's natural law of imitations ("imitations always fall short of their original models" [*Opif.* 141])

heavenly man.[587] For Philo, there is a conflict between physicality and imaging God.

Philo has a diminished view of the limitations of sense-perception when speaking

concerning the intelligible realm.[588] The conflict appears to be rooted in this overinflation

of the intelligible realm paired with his understanding of virtues and the importance of

setting our minds on the higher realms.[589] The mind is captive to the war of passions, and

is drawn to the lower realm rather than consistently being a member of the higher

realm.[590] The *sense* here is that the image of the *imago Dei* belongs to the higher realm

alone. There is continuity between the *sense* here and the *sense* discussed above

concerning the mind, but the point of discontinuity concerns the *referent.* In this section,

the image of the *imago Dei* does not merely belong to the mind, but to a heavenly person

who is distinct from mankind and the Adam of Gen 2:7.[591] This is the perfect εἰκών

εἰκόνος—an image fully attainable by us only when we revert to a spiritual ontology. The

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[587] Sterling, 166.

[588] Because of Philo's exegetical work in Genesis, he had some notion of the goodness of Creation. See Philo, *Migr.* 135. However, because of his overly Platonized interpretation of Gen. 1:1-2:3 and Gen. 2:4-2:25 he views that "goodness" as attributed to God's works and the intelligible sphere of reality—not to the material world. The material world is not good under Philo's view. See *Her.* 159-160. "But there is no material which has any value in the eyes of God, because he has given all materials an equal share of his skill. In reference to which it is said in the sacred scriptures, "God saw all that he had made, and, behold, it was very good." But the things which receive an equal degree of praise, are by all means held in equal estimation by him who confers the praise; (*Opif.* 160) and what God praised was not the materials which he had worked up into creation, destitute of life and melody, and easily dissolved, and moreover in their own intrinsic nature perishable, and out of all proportion and full of iniquity, but rather his own skillful work, completed according to one equal and well-proportioned power and knowledge always alike and identical."

[589] Esp. see Philo, *Opif.* 165-167, 169-170.

[590] Winston and Dillon, 181.

[591] Sterling, 166.

image of the *imago Dei* seems suspended between man and God, belonging fully to neither.[592]

So far, we have seen that Philo's view of the *imago Dei* concerns the λόγος and the νοῦς. Mankind is connected to God's image by the νοῦς of the higher intelligible realm (as portrayed by the heavenly man). We now turn our attention to a text that clarifies the metaphysical relation between God, his λόγος, our νοῦς, and the human person in the physical state.

> "…'but the birds he did not divide;'[593] meaning, by the term birds, the two reasonings which are winged and inclined by nature to soar to the investigation of sublime subjects; one of them being the archetypal pattern and above us, and the other being the copy of the former and abiding among us. And Moses calls the one which is above us the image of God, and the one which abides among us the impression of that image, 'for…God made man,' not an image, but 'after that image.'[594] So that the mind which is in each of us, which is in reality and truth the man, is a third image proceeding from the creator."[595]

This section is taken from Philo's treatise *Who is the Heir of Divine Things*. Its primary aim is to discern who it is that inherits the rewards of God.[596] It is written with an

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[592] For a restatement of what is found in the text at hand, see Philo, *QG*. I.4. "What is the man who was created? And how is that man distinguished who was made after the image of God? This man was created as perceptible to the senses, and in the similitude of a Being appreciable only by the intellect; but he who in respect of his form is intellectual and incorporeal, is the similitude of the archetypal model as to appearance, and he is the form of the principal character; but this is the word of God, the first beginning of all things, the original species or the archetypal idea, the first measure of the universe. Moreover, that man who was to be created as a vessel is formed by a potter, was formed out of dust and clay as far as his body was concerned; but he received his soul by God breathing the breath of life into his face, so that the temperament of his nature was combined of what was corruptible and of what was incorruptible. But the other man, he who is only so in form, is found to be unalloyed without any mixture proceeding from an invisible, simple, and transparent nature."

[593] Gen. 15:10.

[594] Gen. 1:27.

[595] Philo, *Her*. 230-231.

[596] Ibid., 1-2.

emphasis on philosophy.[597] In order to explore the aim of the text, he illustrates the man who seeks God within his dualistic anthropology (occurring within this multi-layered metaphysical world that Philo has proposed). Previously Philo has presented man as an image of the *imago Dei*, but here he has developed the notion further. Because the mind of man is the true man (belonging to the intelligible world [divine breath] rather than the sense-perceptible world) it must be the image of the heavenly man, who is an image of the λόγος, which is an image of God himself. The mind of the sense-perceptible person is therefore an image, of the image, of the *imago Dei*.

The *referent* here again shows that Philo can use the *imago Dei* as a tool for portraying his personal metaphysical anthropology. The nuance of this *referent* is found in the additional layer of imaging. The *sense* of the *imago Dei* is again rooted in the λόγος of God. But Philo uses it to show how the heavenly man, the one associated with the invisible realm of ideas, is the closest image (εἰκών εἰκόνος). It is after the image of this heavenly man that the sense perceptible man is created (as an image of the image of the *imago Dei*).

In conclusion, these four representative texts have helped us to explore the *sense* and *referent* of Philo's understanding and use of the *imago Dei* and we may now synthesize his grammar. His *sense* of the *imago Dei* is consistent and unified. This *sense* concerns the substance of the *imago Dei*. For Philo, the *imago Dei* is the very λόγος of God himself. However, when Philo utilizes the *imago Dei* with an anthropological *referent* it can appear at first glance that the *sense* has shifted. But this is not the case. Since the *imago Dei* is God's λόγος, only the higher mind of man (being the highest

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[597] Goodenough, 107.

portion of his soul in the intelligible realm) may image the *imago Dei*.[598] Because this

image of the *imago Dei* is relegated to the higher mind of man and the intelligible world,

Philo believes that the incorporeal heavenly Adam of Gen. 1:27 is the purest presentation

of the image of the *imago Dei*. The sense perceptible man, being material, is a lesser

presentation of the image of the *imago Dei*. The distinction between the intelligible man

of Gen. 1:27 and the material sense perceptible man does not necessitate another *sense*

because it coherently fits within Philo's framework. Philo's diverse usages of his *sense* of

the *imago Dei* reveals that the *imago Dei*, as a concept, is an effective conduit by which

other fields of thought may be articulated.

As we have explored, Philo used his *sense* of the *imago Dei* in the following

fields: metaphysics, anthropology, and apologetics. Philo's grammar of the *imago Dei*

appears unusually consistent when interpreting his works with an awareness of the

intended *referent*. His *sense* also seems to remain static throughout each use of the

doctrine (allotting for various depths of presentation).[599]

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[598] I approached this project with the expectation that I would discover a diverse semantic range in Philo's view of the *imago Dei* and was shocked to find that he uses the term consistently with a single *sense* in mind. This *sense* fits his use amongst each of the diverse *referents*. It is a concept that Philo seems to have put significant thought into. There is more research to be done here in discovering (to whatever degree possible) the origin of Philo's view on the *imago Dei*.

[599] Contra. Sterling, 166-167 who argues that the meaning behind the *imago Dei* is fundamentally different in each of the texts.

A Table on Philo's Hierarchical Metaphysics:[600]

Θεός

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λόγος: the *imago Dei* (located in the
mind of God. This is the source of the
intelligible world which brought about
the sense perceptible cosmos.)

↑ ↕

    The Incorporeal Adam (the closest
    representation of man being made in
    the *imago Dei*. This Adam is
    immaterial and exists only in the
    realm of ideas [Gen. 1].

                       The intelligible world.

↑ ↑

νοῦς (located in the higher soul of
man—represented with perfection
in the intelligible Adam of Gen. 1.)

↑

άνθρωπος (the sense-perceptible man)

↕

                       The material world.

κόσμος (the material world—distinct
from man due to the lack of the breath
of God which bestowed the soul into
mankind.

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[600] I am not intending to present the entirety of Philo's metaphysics here—I only intend to represent what is
important to the body of the paper above.

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